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Abstract
It is commonly accepted that a political divide exists between Saskatchewan and Alberta.
Both provinces share similar settlement patterns, histories, and economies, but there
exists a perceived division in their political cultures between a “conservative” Alberta
and “socially democratic” Saskatchewan. Whereas Alberta emerged from the Great
Depression as the champion of “free enterprise” and limited government control,
Saskatchewan experimented with state ownership and sought to dramatically expand
Canada’s social welfare system. There is a willingness to accept that modern
Saskatchewan’s conservatism has moved it closer to its western neighbour, but historians
remain wedded to the idea that this conservatism is a departure from the past.
Saskatchewan’s political history remains almost entirely dedicated to explaining the rise
of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and the roots of the province’s social
democratic legacy.
This study challenges these narratives by detailing the development of a conservative
ideology in Saskatchewan between the province’s creation in 1905 and the election of the
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 1944. Rather than the preservation of a torytouched hierarchy, Saskatchewan conservatives defended individual rights and freedoms.
This individualist conservatism manifested itself in the major economic and social
discussions of the period, including conservative farmers’ adherence to the capitalist
grain trade, nativist campaigns for limited immigration and increased assimilation of
“foreigners,” and the growth of conservative Christian schools in response to the Great
Depression. This conservative ideology was also influential. Both the provincial Liberal
and Conservative parties owed their successes to conservative support. Whereas the
Liberal Party appealed to an economic conservatism that sought to limit the government’s
involvement in the capitalist system, the Conservative Party built its support from a racial
conservatism that argued for increased assimilation. Neither party, however, was able to
withstand the rise of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The 1944 election
was a clear victory for the new party’s collectivist ethos, but the scale of the victory
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overshadowed the large segments of the population that championed an individualistic
worldview.

Keywords
Saskatchewan, Conservatism, Liberalism, Agrarianism, Orderly Marketing, Nativism,
Grand Orange Lodge, Ku Klux Klan, Nativism, Fundamentalist Christianity, Roman
Catholicism, Liberal Party, Conservative Party, Social Credit Party, Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation.
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Summary for Lay Audience
It is commonly accepted that Saskatchewan and Alberta constitute twins separated at
birth. Although the provinces possessed similar demographics, economies, and
experiences in territorial politics, we are told that Alberta’s conservatism is in direct
contrast to Saskatchewan’s social democratic political culture. Election results certainly
lend credence to this assumption. Alberta has continually elected a long series of rightof-centre governments, beginning with Social Credit in 1935, followed by the PCs in
1971, and most recently the United Conservative Party in 2019. In contrast,
Saskatchewan’s 1944 election ushered in a long-period of CCF/NDP dominance wherein
social democratic governments have ruled for forty-seven of the last seventy-five years.
As this study demonstrates, however, Saskatchewan has always been more conservative
than historians have suggested. To argue that Saskatchewan conservatism was a nonfactor due to its inability to the CCF’s rise in 1944 assumes that elections serve as the
sole barometer of ideological commitment. Social democracy was not Saskatchewan’s
default setting. The province has always been home to a dynamic and influential
conservatism that was predicated on a defence of individual rights and freedoms.
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Dedicated to My Grandparents.
There Is Much That I Wish I Could Ask You.
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Introduction
Saskatchewan’s political history is conflicted. Between 1905 and 1944, the Liberal Party
served as the “tap-root of Saskatchewan’s history,” governing for all but four years.1
Unlike Alberta, which rejected the Liberals in 1921, and Manitoba, where the Liberals
were absorbed into the United Farmers in 1922, the party maintained its stronghold in
Saskatchewan prior to the Second World War.2 In 1944, however, the province rejected
the Liberals in favour of Tommy Douglas and the Co-operative Commonwealth
Federation (CCF). The CCF and its successor, the New Democratic Party (NDP),
dominated post-war politics, winning twelve of the nineteen elections held since 1944.
Successive CCF/NDP governments encouraged a system of co-operative enterprises,
experimented with government ownership of manufacturing industries and natural
resource production, and launched Canada’s state-funded health-care system. The
CCF/NDP’s long tenure and progressive policies left Saskatchewan with an image as the
“cradle of Canadian social democracy.”3
Saskatchewan’s recent political history challenges this characterization. In 1982, Grant
Devine’s Progressive Conservative (PC) Party swept the NDP from power. Devine
campaigned on a promise to “undue the ‘baneful’ effects of ‘socialist’ policies in
Saskatchewan and to unleash the forces of free enterprise.”4 According to James Pitsula

1

David E. Smith, Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan, 1905-71 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1975), 3.
2

David Smith attributes the party’s remarkable success to its organizational abilities, its close relationship
with the province’s farmers’ organizations, and the creation of “a reputation for Liberal inventiveness”
when dealing with economic and social issues. Similarly, Robert Wardhaugh details King’s attempts to
ensure that the Prairies remained loyal to the Liberals. David E. Smith, Prairie Liberalism, 230; Robert
Wardhaugh, Mackenzie King and the Prairie West (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
3

Jared Wesley, Code Politics: Campaign and Cultures on the Canadian Prairies (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2011), 1.
4

James M. Pitsula, “Grant Devine, 1982-1991,” in Saskatchewan Premiers of the Twentieth Century, ed.
Gordon L. Barnhart (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 2004), 318.
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and Ken Rasmussen, Devine’s two terms in office transformed Saskatchewan from “a
laboratory for social democracy” into “a hotbed for neo-conservatism.” 5 Under the
motto “open for business,” Devine relaxed environmental regulations, reduced resource
royalties, and privatized crown corporations.6 Similarly, the recent success of the
Saskatchewan Party—a right-of-centre amalgamation of PCs and Liberals—and the
seeming ineffectiveness of the NDP after 2007 has led many observers to question
Saskatchewan’s social democratic roots.7 Saskatchewan is now widely considered one of
the most conservative provinces in the country. This new political reality, however, does
not match the province’s supposedly social democratic roots. Academics treat this
conservative shift as something new, a product of rural depopulation, the decline of the
family farm, and the neo-conservatism that swept the Western world in the 1980s.8
Despite the province’s recent conservatism, the CCF’s social democratic legacy continue
to dominate Saskatchewan’s political history. Seymour Martin Lipset’s Agrarian
Socialism, first published in 1950, laid the foundations for an understanding of

5

James M. Pitsula and Kenneth A. Rasmussen, Privatizing a Province: The New Right in Saskatchewan
(Vancouver: New Star Books, 1990), 2.
6

The only detailed studies of the PC government have been overwhelmingly critical of Devine for
undermining the CCF-NDP’s social democratic legacy. Pitsula, for example, argues that Devine sold
“billions of dollars of public assets” and introduced a social policy that “rejected collectivism” and
“minimized the role of government as an instrument of collective responsibility, cooperation, community
interest, and social responsibility.” Pitsula, “Gant Devine,” 318-52.
7

Howard Leeson, “The 2007 Election,” in Saskatchewan Politics: Crowding the Centre, ed. Howard
Leeson (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2008), 119-142; David McGrane and Loleen Berdhal,
“A Social Democratic Province?: An Examination of Saskatchewan Public Opinion in 2011-12,” Journal
of Canadian Studies 49:1 (Winter 2015), 95-127; and Kenneth Rasmussen, “Saskatchewan: From
Entrepreneurial State to Embedded State,” in The Provincial State in Canada: Politics in the Provinces and
Territories, eds. Keith Brownsey and Michael Howlett, (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2001), 234-60.
8

J.F. Conway, “The Decline of the Family Farm in Saskatchewan,” Prairie Forum 9, no. 1 (April 1984):
101-17; John Courtney, “The Fate of Socialism in Saskatchewan,” in Lipset’s Agrarian Socialism: A Reexamination, ed. David E. Smith (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 2007), 13-22; and John
Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1979).
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Saskatchewan as uniquely socially democratic.9 Lipset argued that farmers’ interactions
with the monopolistic grain trade combined with the wide opportunities for political
participation in rural Saskatchewan to create an “agrarian class consciousness.” These
“hostile class attitudes” produced a form of “agrarian socialism” that attacked “the total
economic structure” of Canada. The CCF, Lipset concluded, was victorious because its
socialist leadership transformed the party into the vehicle of this agrarian unrest.10 This
interpretation placed Saskatchewan at odds with the dominant understanding of politics
in Alberta. Whereas Lipset argued that Saskatchewan’s farmers developed a class
consciousness, C.B. Macpherson’s seminal study of the rise of Social Credit, Democracy
in Alberta, attributed Alberta’s apparent conservatism to farmers’ inability to transcend
their petit bourgeois outlook.11 Alberta’s farmers viewed themselves as part of the same
dominant class and directed their grievances at the province’s “quasi-colonial status” visà-vis central Canada, not at the socio-economic and class disparities within Alberta
itself.12
Lipset and Macpherson’s elucidation of a “social democratic” Saskatchewan and a
“conservative” Alberta continue to influence how historians and political scientists view
the provinces. Nelson Wiseman, for example, argues that these divisions were a product
of the province’s separate immigration patterns. Saskatchewan’s “socialist imprint” was
left by “immigrant urban Britons radicalized by late nineteenth century industrialism”
who “carried their old country labour-socialist inclinations with them and exerted

9

Alan Cairns notes that Lipset’s Agrarian Socialism was the lens through which a generation of students
“were encouraged to view political developments and party systems” in Saskatchewan. Alan C. Cairns,
“Agrarian Socialism (Lipset), or Agrarian Capitalism (Macpherson),” in Lipset’s Agrarian Socialism, 75.
10

Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in
Saskatchewan, Anchor ed. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1971).
11

Alan Cairns provides a brief discussion of these two authors, their different interpretations, and the
influence they have had on the dominant understanding of Prairie politics. Cairns, “Agrarian Socialism
(Lipset), or Agrarian Capitalism (Macpherson),” 75-88.
12

C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, 2nd ed. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1962), 3-27.
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political influence disproportionate to their numbers in the province’s formative years.”13
Alberta, in contrast, was settled by midwestern Americans whose “great plain” politics
reinforced a “radical…form of petit-bourgeois liberalism.”14 Similarly, Jared Wesley
argues that differences between Saskatchewan and Alberta’s political cultures were
maintained and supported by political rhetoric. Whereas Saskatchewan’s dominant
political code is one of “security,” Albertan politicians stress a “code of freedom.”15 Not
all observers agree with this division. Historians of Alberta, for example, stress the social
democratic underpinnings of the early Social Credit Party.16 Likewise, Evelyn Eager’s
analysis of Saskatchewan politics led to the conclusion that, “contrary to the legend of
radicalism…the electorate of the province has shown the traditional conservatism of a
farming population.”17 These dissenting voices, however, are in the minority. There is a
willingness to accept that modern Saskatchewan’s conservatism has moved it closer to its
western neighbour, but historians remain wedded to the idea that this conservatism is a
departure from the past.18

13

Nelson Wiseman, “The Socialist Imprint on Saskatchewan Politics,” Saskatchewan History 65, no. 2
(Winter 2013): 22.
14

Nelson Wiseman, “The Pattern of Prairie Politics,” Queen’s Quarterly 88, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 311.

15

Wesley, Code Politics, 55-174.

16

Edward Bell, Social Classes and Social Credit in Alberta (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1994); Larry Hannant, “The Calgary Working Class and Social Credit Movement in Alberta, 1932-35,”
Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985): 97-116.
17

Evelyn Eager, “The Conservatism of the Saskatchewan Electorate,” in Politics in Saskatchewan, ed.
Norman Ward and Duff Spafford (Don Mills, ON.: Longmans Canada, 1968), 1. See also, Eager,
Saskatchewan Government: Politics and Pragmatism (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980).
18

This is partly the product of historians’ disinterest in conservatism. Canadian historians have not kept
pace with their American counterparts’ increased interest in the history of conservatism since the 1990s.
Unlike the United States, where studies of conservatism have seen a revival since the mid-1990s, Canadian
historians have ignored conservatism as a field of inquiry. For a discussion of the American
historiography, see Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” The Journal of American
History 98, no. 3 (December 2011): 723-43. Notable examples of this new conservative history include
Laura Jane Gifford, The Center Cannot Hold: The 1960 Presidential Election and the Rise of Modern
Conservatism (Dekalb, Il.: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009); and Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors:
The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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This dissertation complicates these findings by detailing the development of an
influential conservative ideology in Saskatchewan prior to 1944. Questions over
assimilation, the functioning of the capitalist economy, and the proper role for the state
dominated the period. This study does not dispute that large segments of Saskatchewan’s
electorate adopted a social democratic response to these questions.19 It does assert,
however, that the successes of this left-wing response and the CCF’s triumph have
overshadowed those who remained wedded to traditional values. Conservatives actively
engaged in the debate, championing an individualist ideology that resisted rising calls for
state intervention and collectivization. Although conservatives opposed the CCF’s vision
of a “co-operative commonwealth,” they were unable to block the CCF’s rise. Yet, even
in defeat, their opposition challenges traditional assumptions of the nature of
Saskatchewan’s social democratic political culture. Saskatchewan is, and has always
been, much more conservative than the historiography suggests.
Conservatism is a nebulous term. This study contends that Saskatchewan conservativism
was predicated on a staunch protection of individual rights and freedoms. This
definition, however, runs counter to traditional interpretations. Classical conservatism, or
toryism, advocated for “a hierarchically ordered and organically interdependent whole.”20
Tories rejected Lockean liberalism’s individualism in favour of “traditionalism, elitism,
the strong state,” and a “paternalistic concern” for the common good.21 Gad Horowitz’s
seminal article, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada” applied Louis
Hartz’s “fragment” theory to the study of Canadian political foundations to argue that the

19

David Laycock argues that the dominant populist response to these questions in Saskatchewan was a
“social democratic populism” that rejected “the two major parties as instruments of eastern business,”
supported “state ownership for major industries,” advocated for “a farmer-labour alliance,” and supported
the “full extension of democratic rights and practices.” David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought
in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 20.
20

James Farney and David Rayside, “Introduction: The Meanings of Conservatism,” in Conservatism in
Canada, eds. James Farney and David Rayside (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 4.
21

Gad Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation,” The Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science 32, no. 2 (May 1966): 157.
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influx of tory loyalists after the American Revolution gave Canadian politics a “tory
touch” that tempered the excesses of the eighteenth century.22 Canadian politics, he
concludes, contained a tory communalism that, when combined with liberalism’s
equality, endowed Canada with a vibrant socialist movement in the twentieth century.23
This conception of a “tory touch” influenced a generation of Canadian academics who
viewed toryism’s restraining influence on all aspects of Canada’s political
development.24 As Lipset argues, “Horatio Alger has never been a Canadian hero.”25
Yet, the adherence to a “tory touch” has not withstood more recent scrutiny. According
to Janet Ajzenstat and Peter Smith, there is “little evidence of tory conservatism in
Canada’s past.” Many historians and political scientists now maintain that “the challenge
to nineteenth-century liberalism arose from a republican ideology on the political left,
rather than toryism on the right.”26
Challenges to the “tory-touched” thesis have had profound ramifications for our
understanding of Canada’s political development. Allan Smith, for instance, notes how
nineteenth century English Canada adhered to an “individualist idea” that insisted “on the

22

Seymour Lipset’s equally influential Revolution and Counterrevolution also stressed this tory touches’
influence in Canadian political culture. Lipset argues that Canada was born of “counter revolution” that
stressed deference and a rejection of unbridled individualism. Seymour Lipset, Revolution and
Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures (New York: Basic Books, 1968).
Likewise, Donald Creighton stands out among Canadian historians as the champion of a tory influence in
Canada’s political development. For a discussion of Creighton’s political thought, see Carl Berger, The
Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing Since 1900, 2nd ed.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 208-37.
23

Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada,” 143-71.

24

Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith provide an overview of toryism’s influence in Canada’s political
culture. Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith, “Liberal-Republicanism: The Revisionist Picture of Canada’s
Founding,” in Canada’s Origins: Liberal, Tory, or Republican?, eds. Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), 1-7. H.D. Forbes critically evaluates the foundations of
Horowtiz’s thesis. H.D. Forbes, “Hartz-Horowitz at Twenty: Nationalism, Toryism and Socialism in
Canada and the United States,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 20, no. 2 (June 1987): 287-315.
25

Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative
Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 287-8.
26

Ajzenstat and Smith, “Liberal-Republicanism,” 1-2.
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reality of competition, self-reliance, mobility, and the atomic individual.”27 Similarly,
Ian McKay uses these insights in his proposition that Canada developed a liberal
hegemony between the 1840s and the 1940s. McKay’s “liberal order framework” is
founded on the premise that this liberalism was fundamentally individualistic.28
“Liberalism,” he argues, “begins when one accords a prior ontological and
epistemological status to ‘the individual.’”29 For McKay, it was politicians’ commitment
to this “‘individual’ that made the liberal order revolutionary—that is, one geared to
(rapidly or gradually) overturning patterns of economic and social relations that had
persisted for centuries.”30 Canada, he concludes, was not “an essence we must defend or
an empty homogeneous space we must possess,” but an ongoing “project of liberal
rule.”31 McKay’s “liberal order” is not without its critics. Kevin Anderson, for example,
maintains that Lipset’s understanding of liberal individualism is inherently reductionist.32
However, numerous academics have used McKay’s framework to explain all elements of
Canadian history, from race relations to tobacco consumption.33 It is increasingly

27

Allan Smith, “The Myth of the Self-made Man in English Canada, 1850-1914,” Canadian Historical
Review 59, no. 2 (1978), 215.
28

Ian McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History,”
Canadian Historical Review 81, no. 4 (December 2000): 617-45; and McKay, “Canada as a Long Liberal
Revolution: On Writing the History of Actually Existing Canadian Liberalisms, 1840s-1940s,” in
Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution, eds. Jean-François Constant and
Michel Ducharme (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 347-452. For a discussion of this
framework, see: Michel Ducharme and Jean-François Constant, “Introduction: A Project of Rule Called
Canada—The Liberal Order Framework and Historical Practice,” in Liberalism and Hegemony, 3-34.
29

McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework,” 623.

30

McKay, “Canada as a Long Liberal Revolution,” 350.

31

McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework,” 627.

32

Kevin Anderson, “Canadian Political History and Ideas: Intersections and Influences,” History Compass
12, no. 5 (2014): 444-54; and Jeffrey L. McNairn, “In Hope and Fear: Intellectual History, Liberalism, and
the Liberal Order Framework,” in Liberalism and Hegemony, 64-97. Others have relied on McKay’s
insights to reinterpret Canada’s history.
33

Examples include: Stephane Castonguay and Darin Kinsey, “The Nature of the Liberal Order: State
Formation, Conservation, and the Government of non-Humans in Canada,” in Liberalism and Hegemony,
221-45; Adele Perry, “Women, Racialized People, and the Making of the Liberal Order in Northern North
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apparent that, rather than a Loyalist toryism, Canadian society is buttressed by a
hegemonical liberalism.
As a result, our understanding of the nature of conservatism must be reinterpreted.
Michael Freeden argues that conservatism is an ideology that is bounded by “resistance
to change, however unavoidable, unless it is perceived as organic and natural.”34 Within
the context of the liberal order, conservative resistance was not predicated on protecting a
tory-based hierarchy but a deeply ingrained liberal individualism. At its core, this
individualism held that each person had the right to think and act according to their own
desires and interests with limited state or societal constraint. The most extreme
manifestation of this belief, as C.B. Macpherson explains, resulted in a form of
“possessive individualism” wherein the individual was considered “the proprietor of his
own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”35 More moderate forms, in
contrast, accepted the role of the state, but sought to limit the application of state power
to furthering individualist ends. The state, in this conception, is a necessary evil that can
be channeled towards the liberal ends of “individual liberty, competitive markets,
equality, and a circumscribed public sphere.”36 According to Ajzenstat, Canada’s
founders were dedicated to the notion that “every individual would be equally entitled to
the benefits of ‘peace, order and good government.’”37 It was Saskatchewan

America,” in Liberalism and Hegemony, 274-97; and Jarrett Rudy, The Freedom to Smoke: Tobacco
Consumption and Identity (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005)
34

Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996),
344.
35

C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1962), 2.
36

Nelson Wiseman, “Provincial Conservatism,” in Conservatism in Canada, eds. James Farney and David
Rayside (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 211.
37

Janet Ajzenstat, The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2007), 8. Emphasis added.
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conservatives’ focus on defending this individualism, not a tory-inspired adhesion to
hierarchy, that made their politics conservative.
This defence of individual freedoms aligns more closely to contemporary conservatives
than classical tories. Modern conservativism combines elements of moral traditionalism
with a neo-liberal—also termed neo-conservative—outlook that maintains “individuals
should be as free from constraint as possible.”38 Neo-liberalism emerged in the latetwentieth century and was central to the governments of Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher.39 In Canada, both Brian Mulroney and Grant Devine are widely viewed as
subscribing to these same neo-liberal tenants.40 Even Nelson Wiseman who generally
supports the tory-touched thesis concedes that the “ethos” of provincial conservative
parties “has always been more liberal than tory.”41 This is not to say that Saskatchewan
conservativism constituted an identical response in these two periods. As Donald
Critchlow warns, “political terms, ideology, and party struggle must be placed
historically, and scholars must guard against imposing contemporary labels on past actors
and movements.”42 Yet, the similarities between these periods, even after accounting for
historical differences, demonstrate a continuity in the conservative defence of
individualist values. Historians maintain that the province’s dominant political response
downplayed individualism in favour of collectivism. After all, the CCF’s vision of a “cooperative commonwealth” was predicated on replacing liberal individualism with a

38

Farney and Rayside, “Introduction,” 8.

39

For examples of this discussion, see: Eric J. Evans, Thatcher and Thatcherism, 2nd ed. (New York:
Routledge, 2004); and Steven Hayward, The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 19801989 (New York: Crown Forum, 2009).
40

For a discussion of Brian Mulroney’s political outlook and impact on Canada, see: Raymond B. Blake,
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communitarian collectivism. Saskatchewan conservatives, in contrast, resisted what they
viewed as a challenge to the people’s individual freedoms. It was, in short, an
individualist conservatism.
What follows is not an exhaustive analysis of conservatism prior to 1944. Rather, it
explores conservative responses to the central political divisions of the inter-war period.
These questions were not static. Whereas divisions over the nature of the wheat economy
and the pace of assimilation dominated political discussions in the 1920s, the debates in
the 1930s centered on the state’s role in combating the economic and environmental
catastrophe of the Great Depression.43 In both periods, Saskatchewan’s conservatives
were much more active and influential than historians have previously suggested.
This project has two primary objectives. Firstly, it outlines conservativism’s main
beliefs. Conservatives viewed society as fundamentally individualistic. This focus on
individual freedoms, however, manifested itself in decidedly different outlooks, goals,
and aims. Far from a united movement, conservative ideology prior to 1944 was
characterized by internal divisions and a lack of cohesion. Second, it reveals how the
province’s political parties reflected this individualist ideology as they vied for
conservative support. The Conservative Party itself was largely unsuccessful throughout
the period, only wining a single election in 1929, but it was not the only organization to
offer a conservative outlook. No single party had a monopoly on the conservative vote.
It is only by understanding what conservatives believed and how these beliefs influenced
the province’s political discourse that Saskatchewan’s full political history is illuminated.
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Saskatchewan’s central political divisions prior to the Great Depression were fought over
questions on the nature of the capitalist wheat economy and the province’s ethnic and
religious composition. Chapter one explores conservative farmers’ opposition to orderly
marketing. Unlike supporters of a voluntary wheat pool or a government mandated
Wheat Board who viewed the capitalist system as inherently exploitative, conservative
farmers remained wedded to the belief that they could compete effectively as individuals.
As Allan Smith explains, the farmer was traditionally viewed as the vanguard of English
Canada’s individualist focus: “He was, claimed his literary friends, in the fullest sense his
own master, free of all constraint and interference, quite literally able to shape his world
as he wished, the heir to an abundant and fulfilling future.”44 It is not surprising,
therefore, that many farmers resisted what they considered a collectivist assault against
their personal freedoms. These conservative farmers tolerated orderly marketing when its
program remained voluntary, but actively resisted any compulsory scheme that infringed
on their individualism.
Chapter two explores the place of nativism and racism within Saskatchewan politics. The
foundations of Saskatchewan conservativism lay with the province’s liberal tradition, but
its manifestation often took anti-liberal forms. The Grand Orange Lodge and the Ku
Klux Klan (KKK) promoted a citizenship that was limited to the province’s AngloProtestants. Both groups articulated a form of British nativism that viewed Catholics and
continental-Europeans as deficient individuals, lacking the prerequisite cultural values
and political beliefs to act individually. This chapter details how this nativism fueled a
conspiratorial anti-Catholicism wherein the Orange Lodge and Ku Klux Klan believed
the Roman Catholic Church’s ecclesiastical hierarchy was actively undermining the
province’s British and Protestant traditions. These groups responded by attacking what
they perceived as the main elements of this threat, including separate schools, non-British
immigration, and a creeping sectarianism within Saskatchewan’s public schools. Unlike
the province’s conservative farmers who resisted calls for state intervention into the
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economy, nativists sought to harness the power of the state to ensure the preservation of
an idealized British-Protestant province.
Questions over the capitalist grain trade and the place of religious and ethnic minorities
resulted in two distinct manifestations of conservatism, one economic and the other
social. As a result, it was possible for a voter to identify as an economic conservative but
progressive when it came to accommodations for minority groups. It would be a mistake,
therefore, to view conservatism and liberalism as synonymous. McKay argues that the
liberal order treats “‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ and (above all) ‘the individual’ as the
contestable and historically relative terms of a particular and probably transient political
program.”45 It was from these “contested” elements that cleavages between Liberals and
Conservatives emerged. Conservatives and Liberals buttressed their worldview with
appeals to individual values and freedoms but differed substantially on the best way to
protect the people’s individualism. These differences also shifted over time. Prior to the
Great Depression, the main divide between the parties lay in the openness of their
ideology. Both groups shared same adhesion to individualistic principles, which they
often expressed in terms of the “British” tradition that included the sanctity of property
rights, free speech, and the freedom of association. Where they differed was in their
approach to religious and racial minorities. Liberalism—especially that offered by the
Saskatchewan Liberal Party under Premiers Walter Scott, William Martin, Charles
Dunning, and James Gardiner—articulated a socially progressive ideology that promoted
religious freedom, political equality, and toleration for minorities.46 Liberals believed
that, given the right training and opportunity, minorities would freely assimilate into the
body politic. Conservatives, in contrast, were hesitant to afford the rights of citizenship
onto groups that they viewed with suspicion and distrust.
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Chapter three examines the reasons for the Conservative Party’s failure to gain
meaningful electoral support in light of these divisions. The chapter details how the
Liberal and Conservative Parties divided conservatives between economic and social
issues. The Liberal Party actively courted conservative farmers as a bulwark against calls
for government intervention into the economy but rejected nativists’ expression of a
chauvinistic Britishness in favour of close alliances with Saskatchewan’s Catholic and
non-Anglo immigrants. The Conservative Party, in contrast, appealed to nativists by
opposing sectarianism and supporting increased assimilation. However, the party’s
failure to develop a program that appealed to the province’s farmers ensured the Liberal
dominance of Saskatchewan politics into the 1920s.
The political situation changed dramatically in 1929 when the Conservatives finally
defeated the governing Liberals. Chapter four argues that the Conservative Party’s
victory was predicated on its ability to craft a message that appealed to conservative
farmers and nativists alike. The party had learned from its previous failures. Under
J.T.M. Anderson’s leadership after 1923, the Conservatives adopted a platform and
campaign rhetoric that portrayed themselves as the defender and champion of
Saskatchewan’s individualist tradition. Anderson’s victory was truly a conservative
victory.
Anderson’s success, however, was overshadowed by the ravages of the Great Depression.
It is widely assumed that people responded to the economic and environmental
catastrophe by rejecting earlier notions of individualism in favour of co-operation and
collectivism. Chapter five, in contrast, argues that many responded to the crisis by
retrenching their beliefs in society’s individualistic nature. The chapter examines the
creation and outlook of two religious schools, the fundamentalist Briercrest Bible College
and the Roman Catholic Notre Dame. Both schools articulated a theology that privileged
a traditional individualism. This message proved popular as both schools quickly
expanded despite the decade’s hardships. Although the leaders of these schools were not
overtly political, they envisioned their central purpose as a challenge to the period’s
rising collectivism.
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Chapter six examines how this continued adherence to a conservative individualism
influenced political alignments during the Great Depression. The Depression gave rise to
a “new” politics wherein questions over the state’s role in responding to the crisis
replaced assimilation and wheat marketing as the people’s primary focus. It also gave
rise to two new political movements, the CCF and Social Credit. The Conservative
Party’s leadership responded to the “contagion from the left” by moving its platform to
the left in an effort to undermine growing CCF support.47 Contrarily, the Liberals under
William Patterson retrenched their defence of the individualist ethic and self-reliance in
the face of the CCF’s collectivism. By defending individual values in the face of the
CCF’s “socialist threat” and the Conservative Party’s ineffectiveness, the Liberal Party
emerged from the Depression as Saskatchewan’s “conservative” party in all by name.
The chapter argues that the Depression caused a realignment in Saskatchewan politics
between ideas of individualism and collectivism as political parties adjusted their
platforms to reflect the new political realities of the 1930s. The Liberal victories in the
1934 and 1938 elections were predicated on appeals that positioned the party as the
defender of the people’s individualism. Although the CCF moderated its initial socialism
after early electoral defeats, it continued to call for increased government intervention
and the creation of its “co-operative commonwealth.” The Liberals emerged from the
Depression as the champion of Saskatchewan’s individualist tradition, while the CCF
stood for a collectivist reinterpretation of the role of government and the nature of the
economy. The Conservative Party and Social Credit, in contrast, were unable to gain
meaningful electoral support and were largely relegated to obscurity.
Chapter seven explores the CCF’s 1944 victory in light of this political realignment. The
Liberals approached the campaign with the same individualist appeals that had succeeded
throughout the Depression. Liberals spent the campaign portraying the CCF as a socialist
threat that endangered people’s individual freedoms. However, Tommy Douglas, the
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CCF leader after 1942, had learned from his party’s earlier failures and refused to engage
in the debate. Douglas ignored the overtly collectivist aspects of the CCF’s program and
campaigned on an image of a more just and equitable post-war future. This message
resonated with a population that had gone through the Depression and the Second World
War. The chapter accepts that the election was undoubtedly a victory for the CCF’s
vision of a “co-operative commonwealth.” However, it argues that the magnitude of the
Liberal defeat has overshadowed the fact that appeals to individual freedoms continued to
motivate large segments of the population. Election defeats are not necessarily
synonymous with the defeat of an ideology.
The rise of the Saskatchewan CCF casts a long shadow over the political history of the
inter-war period. Conservatism, when mentioned at all, is commonly dismissed as
“reactionary,” a “non-force,” or a “brake” on meaningful reforms. Such dismissals,
however, downplay the influence that conservative thought had on the development of
Saskatchewan’s political culture. Before it is possible to understand Saskatchewan’s
conservative present, it is first necessary to abandon the outdated reliance on
Saskatchewan’s supposed “social democratic” political culture. Far from a “non-force,”
conservatives organized in defence of their own interests and championed an
individualistic worldview that placed them directly at odds with the collectivism offered
by the left. Conservatives failed to defeat the CCF in 1944, but their individualistic
ideology continued to reverberate.
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1

Masters of Their Own Fate: Conservative Farmers’
Opposition to Orderly Marketing

The grain elevator stands as one of the most romanticized images of the Canadian
Prairies. “An unassuming structure designed as a facility to store and handle grain,” one
popular history explains, “the simple country elevator has eclipsed its intended role and
become a prairie institution that has been woven into the social and economic fabric of
the Canadian heartland.”48 No less significant is the fact that many of these elevators
have prominently displayed, at one time or another, the names of once-proud farmers’ cooperatives—the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company (SCEC), the United
Grain Growers (UGG), and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. It is from this association
with the farmers’ movement that these “Prairie Sentinels” serve as the very embodiment
of the farmers’ attempts to wrestle economic control away from the capitalistic grain
trade, a tangible connection to the farmers’ “spit-in-your-eye determination” that allowed
them to redefine their role in the wheat economy.49 This symbolism, however, is
predicated on an assumption that farmers’ political actions lay in attempts to resist or
reform the capitalist system.
Other symbols, albeit less romanticized, demonstrate a fundamentally different
understanding of farmers’ position within the capitalist economy. William Motherwell
constructed an opulent Victorian mansion, named Lanark Place, on his farm near
Abernathy. Containing a formal parlour, servants’ quarters, and a grand staircase, Lanark
Place symbolized Motherwell’s ability to “triumph through adversity, of ‘making good’
against all odds.”50 Similarly, the Spring Rice farm, located south of Pense, contained
formalized English gardens and a stately manor house filled with ornate woodwork and
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stone carvings. Like Motherwell, Gerald Spring Rice was a founding member of the
Saskatchewan Grain Growers Association (SGGA) and, along with his two brothers, used
his farm to exemplify his family’s success within the capitalist system.51 Others chose
to demonstrate their accomplishments through the size and scale of their operations.
Robert Allen Wright, the “biggest farm owner in Saskatchewan” in the 1920s, ran an
early agri-business near Drinkwater.52 Wright’s “empire,” as the local history explains,
was an “awe-inspiring sight,” consisting of two houses, an ice-house, silos, dormitory,
and four barns, one of which was over two hundred feet long and had enough space to
house eighty horses.53 Just as the Pool elevator represented farmers who viewed their
position as exploited, these stately mansions and industrial operations symbolized
farmers who not only viewed themselves as capable of competing within the capitalist
system, but understood their very success as a product of this competition.
These contradictory symbols reflect different interpretations of the farmers’ place within
the capitalist economy. On the one hand, early studies of Canada’s wheat economy
depicted farmers as victims of the National Policy. Vernon Fowke, for instance, argues
that the development of a Prairie wheat economy was of secondary concern to Ottawa’s
national project. Many of the policies which went into securing a transcontinental
nation—including the granting of a monopoly to the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR),
the creation of protective tariffs for central Canadian industry, and the indiscriminate
settlement of the Prairies—promoted national growth, not the economic welfare of the
individual farmer. The result was a National Policy with a “persistent disregard of the
competitive inferiority of agriculture within” the capitalist system.54 The farmer, lacking
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organization, was at the mercy of a monopolistic CPR and Grain Exchange. This conflict
forced Prairie farmers to band together in their collective self-interest, calling for
“popular control of the political process” and emphasizing “co-operation rather than
competition in the economic sphere in an apparent rebellion against the emerging
industrial capitalist system.”55 Acting alone, farmers were unable to ameliorate their
economic situation. 56 By group action, however, Prairie farmers could gain the critical
mass necessary to affect change.
Critics of this traditional narrative have stressed its overreliance on an assumed
homogeneity among Prairie farmers. Far from attacking capitalism’s competitive basis,
Robert Irwin notes, many famers “made decisions within the capitalist system and sought
to improve their position within it.”57 By envisioning themselves as independent agents
capable of competing within the capitalist system, Paul Voisey adds, these famers
exhibited the “aggressive, acquisitive societies” in which they were raised. 58 It was
these farmers who sought returns on their investments beyond self-sufficiency, actively
acquired more land, and built their mansions and large-scale operations as a testament to
their own success.59
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This focus on class divisions has resulted in a more nuanced consideration of the larger
agrarian movement. Lyle Dick, for example, found significant class divisions emanating
from the settlement process in Saskatchewan. Early Ontarian settlers, Dyck notes,
constituted the “privileged elite” of Saskatchewan society. Not only did their Anglo
background provide them with cultural advantages in a “British” province, but federal
land policies allowed these settlers to secure larger holdings of more productive land.
Those arriving during the immigration boom at the turn of the century, in contrast,
predominantly farmed smaller tracts, were less likely to own their own land or employ
farm labour, and were too “preoccupied with the basic problems of subsistence” to focus
on their status within society.60
These divergent class positions resulted in significantly different understandings of the
farmers’ place within the capitalist economy. Conservative farmers viewed themselves
as “masters of their own fates” and “entrepreneurs competing successfully in the overall
free-enterprise economy.” They also monopolized the executive of the farm movement.
Far from challenging the capitalist nature of the wheat economy, these farmers sought
reforms to the grain handling system—namely freight rates and access to transportation
networks—that would limit monopoly abuse, thus levelling the playing field and
allowing them to compete fairly. According to Dick, the SGGA’s early reform program
favoured farmers who could produce larger quantities of wheat and actually furthered the
smaller farmers’ “competitively disadvantageous position.”61 Farmers were not an
“organic entity,” Dick concludes, but a “house divided” over their understanding of their
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own class positions.62 Similarly, studies of the post-1945 era detail how an increasing
divergence in farm sizes fueled dramatically different political positions.63
Such insights are absent from histories of the interwar period in Saskatchewan where the
dominant conception of farmers’ political outlook remains one of a general leftward
radicalization. “All farmers,” Gerald Friesen argues, “rich or poor, confronted a different
circumstance after the First World War.” Whereas farmers were previously “in the van
of economic progress, the admired pioneers of empire and nation; now they were
perceived to be slow-witted, eternally bitching ‘sons of the soil.’ They had once
possessed political influence; now they had to fight for every adjustment in national
economic policy.”64 Nowhere was this more apparent than when the farmers’ movement
abandoned its earlier focus on production costs in favour of reforming the entire capitalist
wheat economy through a campaign for “orderly marketing.” Predicated on the belief
that the grain trade—comprised of the railroads, banks, grain elevators, and the Winnipeg
Grain Exchange—colluded to force farmers to sell in the fall when prices were low,
orderly marketing sought to replace the capitalist wheat economy with a planned system
that would guarantee “fair” prices to all producers.65 Far from a mere question of the
best system to sell the farmers’ wheat, the campaign is considered the defining moment
in the farmers’ radicalization. By uniting together in both their challenges to the
capitalist nature of the grain trade and their attacks on the SGGA’s moderate leadership,
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farmers supposedly developed a shared class consciousness. “A common economic class
situation,” Seymour Lipset argues, “was resulting in heightened consciousness and
sharpened class attitudes. Out of economic conflict, agrarian class unity was
emerging.”66

This shared understanding of the farmers’ inferior economic position

culminated in a form of “agrarian socialism” that catapulted the CCF to power in 1944.67
While certainly a central element in the history of Saskatchewan’s farmers’ movement,
this narrative ignores the large number of farmers who held firmly to their belief in the
soundness of the capitalist system. Far from a process of unanimity, the campaign for
orderly marketing produced ruptures within the farm community as conservative farmers
remained fundamentally opposed to what they viewed as a dangerous undermining of
traditional values. Historians, however, have failed to appreciate these divisions. Rather
than attempting to understand this opposition, they dismiss these conservatives for failing
to “transcend” the “narrowness” of their ideology.68 No attempts have been made to
understand how these farmers articulated their ideology, how they interacted with the
broader society, or how their values shaped Saskatchewan’s political outlook. This
absence is especially problematic given that these farmers’ ideology served as one of the
main pillars of Saskatchewan conservatism.
This chapter examines opposition to orderly marketing between the end of the Great War
and the onset of the Great Depression. Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers understood
orderly marketing and its collectivist and co-operative vision as a fundamental threat to
the capitalist economy and, by extension, their place within society. Their opposition,
however, depended on how far the proposed system forced, or compelled, them to act
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against their wishes. The campaign itself consisted of two distinct phases, each with its
own tactics and goals. The first, occurring between 1918 and 1923, saw the province’s
marginal farmers—suffering from increased debt loads and a post-war recession—
agitating for the reinstitution of a government controlled, compulsory Wheat Board. The
conservative farmers interpreted a mandatory board as undermining their individual
freedom to choose how they operated their own businesses. Conservatives successfully
blocked its creation, but their opposition earned their radical counterparts’ enmity. The
failure of a compulsory board also precipitated the second phase, lasting from 1923 until
the onset of the Great Depression. Radical farmers, now in a position of power in the
agrarian movement, turned their attentions towards the creation of a producer-controlled,
contract pool. Initially a voluntary organization, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool did not
elicit the conservatives’ ire to the same extent as a board. Rather than directly oppose the
Pool, these farmers decided not to participate in its operations, ushering in an era of
uneasy peace. Ultimately, the Pool’s inability to destroy the capitalist wheat economy
led to renewed calls for compulsion and the conservatives’ visceral opposition.
Opposition to compulsion provides a window into these farmers’ ideology. At the
foundation of this worldview was an emphasis on their own individuality. Attributing
their success to their individual efforts, these farmers opposed any movement that would
limit their ability to act as master of “their own destiny.”69 One of the myths of the
farmers’ movement rests on the idea that shared hardships and deprivations “seriously
compromised, if not shattered” the conception of farmers as “rugged individualists.”70
Yet, conservatives’ opposition to orderly marketing was predicated on their continued
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adherence to a belief in the power of their own individualism. Orderly marketing was
rooted in the notion that the capitalist system itself hindered progress. Just as the
conservatives considered their success the product of their own “rugged individualism”
and self-reliance, they attributed failure to a lack of ability, initiative, and drive. 71 It was
not systemic issues within capitalism that caused farmers to fail, they argued, but an
individual’s inability to “make good.” This continued adherence to the power of their
own individualism placed these conservative farmers at the vanguard of McKay’s liberal
order. This belief structure, McKay argues, held individualism as an “abstract principle.”
It was not a reflection of actual “living beings,” but was an ideal which every person
should aspire to emulate.72 It did not matter that many farmers owed their success to
factors outside of their own control or that they relied on government intervention to
rectify the most blatant monopoly abuses in the grain trade. 73 What matters is that they
attributed this success to their own individual efforts. These farmers’ understanding of
themselves as “self-made men” resulted in an ideology opposed to the collectivism
offered by the farmers’ movement.74
The concept of orderly marketing emerged during the First World War. Farmers
responded to increased demand and prices by dramatically increasing their wheat
production, doubling their acreages between 1914 and 1919.75 Lacking their own
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capital, farmers largely funded this expansion through high interest loans. As early as
1916, farmers’ publications began commenting on the “mountainous burden of debt”
which required the artificially high wartime prices to sustain.76 It was, as John Herd
Thompson explains, a short-sighted gamble. The illusion of wartime prosperity placed
Saskatchewan’s farmers on a “reckless course towards self-destruction.”77 Farmers
hoped that increased land values and artificially high wheat prices would carry on
indefinitely. When the price of wheat dropped precipitously after the war, however,
many found themselves at risk of bankruptcy and turned to increasingly radical solutions.
While farmers were taking on record amounts of debt, wartime experiences also
undermined traditional arguments against government intervention into the capitalist
economy. Since Saskatchewan’s founding in 1905, the SGGA’s conservative leadership
and the province’s governing Liberal Party had entered an informal alliance designed to
counter any attempt to undermine the capitalist grain trade. One of the early debates
within the SGGA, for example, pitted the conservative leadership against radical
elements—led by E.A. Partridge, a socialist-leaning delegate—over the creation of a
system of government-owned grain elevators. Known as the “Partridge Plan,” the radical
farmers hoped that government control of the grain-handling system would realign “the
grain trade away from the principles of the competitive market towards an alliance of
producers and government.”78 The conservative farmers, in contrast, viewed themselves
as “effective competitors in a free market” and “conceived a minimal role for
government.”79 William Motherwell, the SGGA’s first president and one of the plan’s
most outspoken critics, considered government elevators “entirely visionary” and a “nice
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fairy tale.”80 Not only was he confident that “private enterprise” could solve the farmers’
grievances, but government intervention posed a dangerous precedent. “If the
government was to step in every instance and provide every little want,” he queried,
“where are they going to get off?”81 When the SGGA’s membership went against their
leadership and passed a resolution calling for government ownership, the Liberals and the
conservative farmers worked behind the scenes to push for the creation of the farmer
owned Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company (SCEC).82 Not only would this
lessen the financial demands on the young province, they argued, but it would preserve
the farmers’ self-sufficiency by ensuring local “responsibility.”83
In disarming these early calls for direct government intervention, the Liberals and the
SGGA executive entrenched their own positions of power. Although the Liberals did not
act directly in accordance with the Partridge Plan’s calls for government ownership, the
creation of the SCEC demonstrated that they were willing to support the farmers in
helping themselves. As David Smith notes, this reciprocal relationship allowed the
Liberals to establish themselves as the farmers’ natural ally.84 The SGGA leadership, for
its part, quickly took control of the SCEC and, through a system of interlocking
directorships, ran the elevator company according to their own values. 85 Although they
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sold it to the rank-and-file farmers as a cooperative alternative to the capitalist economy,
it functioned like a traditional joint-stock company thus posing the smallest possible
threat to the capitalist grain trade. 86 By limiting the influence of the rank-and-file
farmers, Louis Courville argues, they “made a sham of…grass-roots democracy.”87 That
Partridge and his followers considered the situation “undemocratic” and “autocratic” was
immaterial. The ultimate success of the SCEC blunted criticism and provided the
conservative farmers with a power-base from which they dominated the organized
farmers’ movement.88
Wartime experiences, however, undermined the SGGA executive’s contention that
government intervention into the economy was a fundamental danger to society. The
federal government initially hoped to allow the wheat economy to operate according to
the status quo for the duration of the war, but skyrocketing prices led to British pressure
for some form of price control. Ultimately, the Borden government took unprecedented
steps to regulate the wheat economy through its own form of orderly marketing. It
established the Board of Grain Supervisors in 1916 with the responsibility for selling
Canada’s export wheat crop for the duration of the war, providing a fixed price to
farmers.89 When attempts at re-establishing the open market following the Armistice led
to a precipitous drop in prices, farmers called for a continuation of government control
until the situation in Europe stabilized. In July 1919, the government created the
Canadian Wheat Board to operate as a compulsory pool for the 1919-1920 crop year. By
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all accounts, the mandatory pool was successful.90 Despite this success, however, Arthur
Meighan’s Union Government was clear that Canada would return to the open market as
soon as possible. Meighen was adamant that the Wheat Board represented an
unprecedented increase in government powers and infringed on individual rights, making
it un-British in nature.91 The Winnipeg Grain Exchange reopened in August 1920.
Almost immediately, Prairie farmers’ worst fears were realized. From a high of $2.82
per bushel in September, the price of wheat began a precipitous decline to less than one
dollar the following year.92
These wartime experiences had profound ramifications for Saskatchewan farmers.
Although the board had little power to control world commodity prices, many farmers
came to associate a regulated economy with higher prices. This was especially the case
for the province’s smaller producers who, having taken on unsustainable debt loads, were
unable to meet their payments when global wheat prices collapsed. Larger farmers, in
contrast, did not experience nearly the same level of hardship after the war. A 1935 study
by the University of Saskatchewan found that the quality of soil and the size of a farmers’
operations greatly influenced their ability to survive long periods of low prices. Even
with high debt loads and decreased prices, farmers with more than a half section of highquality land continually posted a profit throughout the 1920s.93 Although all farmers
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experienced a decrease in income, it was the province’s marginal producers who lost
money.
These divergent experiences directly impacted a farmer’s proclivity for continued
government intervention into the capitalist economy. Producers who faced the real
prospect of losing their farms demanded that the government take dramatic action. In the
summer of 1920, SGGA locals in the Wynyard district began an active campaign to
reinstate the Wheat Board.94 With an average improved farm size of less than a quarter
section and high mortgage debts, these farmers could not hope to survive with the price
of wheat under a dollar a bushel.95 From Wynyard the campaign spread throughout the
north-central portions of the province, areas predominantly farmed by smaller producers
from eastern Europe. 96 Driven largely by E.A. Partridge, these calls for a new board
were predicated on an understanding of the farmers’ inherently inferior position within
the capitalist economy. The Wheat Board, Partridge argued, was the only entity that
could “appreciably increase the returns to the farmer” whose “cost of credit is greater
than the value of the service it renders to him.”97 At the same time, the SGGA’s
conservative leadership, believing that the capitalist economy served the farmers’
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interests, had little desire to continue government intervention into the capitalist economy
and pushed the federal government to abandon any plan for a 1921 board.98
This division over the necessity of continued government interference in the grain trade
fractured the farmers’ movement into conservative and radical camps in late 1921.
Saskatchewan’s radical farmers, realizing that they would make little headway within an
organization dominated by a conservative leadership, formed their own organization, the
Farmers’ Union of Canada (FU). With its main support base in the north-central portions
of the province—areas dominated by marginal farmers of non-Anglo descent who had led
the charge for government intervention in the past—the FU offered an alternative
organization for Saskatchewan’s marginal farmers who believed the SGGA’s executive
was unsympathetic to their plight. Unlike the SGGA leadership, which viewed farmers
as capable actors within the capitalist system, the FU was predicated on an understanding
of class conflict and exploitation. Borrowing heavily from the One Big Union’s
conception of “pan-industrial” organization, the FU sought to organize class-conscious
farmers into a collective force against the entrenched capitalists.99 “One of the basic
principles of this Union,” they argued, “is that it recognizes and accepts the fact of the
‘class struggle,’ and maintains that the farmers as a class have an unquestionable right to
organize and to protect and further their interests.”100 Understanding the farmers’
relationship with the capitalist grain trade as essentially exploitative, the FU urged
farmers to work towards creating a system that bypassed the private enterprise in favour
of co-operatives and government monopolies.101
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The FU’s focus on wheat marketing placed it at odds with Saskatchewan’s conservative
farmers who were satisfied with the status quo offered by the SCEC competing within the
open market. J.B. Musselman, secretary of the SGGA from 1914 until 1922 and
managing director of the SCEC from 1922 until 1924, was emblematic of this response.
Moving to Saskatchewan from Ontario in 1902, Musselman purchased a 3,000-acre farm
near Cupar, making him one of the largest farmers in the province.102 Musselman used
his influential positions within the farmers’ movement to challenge the radicals’ plans.
Not only had Musselman noted on numerous occasions that the Winnipeg Grain
Exchange was “the best system that could be devised” for handling wheat, he was also
emphatic that the creation of new marketing facilities, as envisioned by the FU, was
wasteful, dangerous, and unnecessary. 103 Through the SCEC, Musselman argued,
Saskatchewan’s farmers had already “built up elaborate machinery owned and operated
by ourselves” and did not need to experiment with new solutions.104 This opposition
transcended questions of economics. By undermining the capitalist system, supporters of
orderly marketing were weakening the individual’s freedom of action and, by extension,
the very foundations of Saskatchewan society. The fact that the FU modelled a great deal
of its program from the One Big Union only cemented this belief. Both organizations,
Musselman argued, called “for the confiscation of all private property, including farming
land, and the establishment of a communistic social order.”105
A deep apprehension over the marginal and radical farmers’ ability to view the economy
rationally underpinned this conservative response. The problem was not simply that
supporters exaggerated orderly marketing’s benefits, but that marginal farmers had little
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ability to evaluate the system along “feasible and commercially sound” lines. Musselman
and other SGGA executives feared that promises of “revolutionary short cut methods”
would lead the marginal farmers astray. These promises, they argued, would destroy “the
wheat together with the tares” and leave the farmer “more impoverished than before.”
Delegates to the 1921 SGGA convention were warned not to “anchor their hopes and
their faith in that which is new and spectacular,” or to forget the “solid and valuable
benefits” which they were attaining through the SCEC.106
At the same time, increasing radicalism amongst the farmers’ grassroots convinced the
SGGA’s leadership that they had to make efforts to at least appear sympathetic to the
marginal farmers’ plight if they hoped to retain control of the movement.107 In May
1921, Musselman announced plans for the creation of a voluntary pool under the auspices
of the SGGA. Far from a capitulation, however, the voluntary nature of Musselman’s
plan reflected the conservative farmers’ understanding of themselves as independent
agents capable of competing within the capitalist economy. By avoiding any hint of
compulsion, Musselman’s proposal allowed farmers to decide for themselves what
system was best for their own individual needs. “There is nothing which can be done
under a long-term binding contract pool,” Musselman argued, “which cannot also be
done under a voluntary pool.”108 Musselman’s plan also posed the smallest possible
threat to the capitalist grain trade. Not only would this pool use the SCEC’s
transportation facilities, but it would only sell wheat through the Winnipeg Grain
Exchange. Finally, Musselman set clear limits on the marginal farmers’ ability to control
the pool’s operations. The SGGA’s executive would run the voluntary pool’s day-to-day
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operations and, at any point, could suspend the pool or force its merger with other
organizations.109
These attempts to undermine the grassroots’ growing radicalism also stretched to the
political realm. By the summer of 1921, farmers’ parties—largely campaigning on calls
for reduced tariffs, the nationalization of railways and natural resources, and a wheat
board—had secured provincial power in Ontario and Alberta and were on the verge of
victory in Manitoba.110 In Saskatchewan, however, the province’s conservative farmers
and the provincial Liberal Party avoided the same outcome. The Liberals, under Premier
William Martin, severed ties with their federal counterparts in early 1921, promising to
refrain from taking part in federal organization or campaigns. In return, the conservative
farmers vowed to keep the SGGA out of provincial politics.111 To solidify the deal, J.A.
Maharg—the long-serving president of the SGGA and Independent MP for Maple
Creek—resigned his seat in Ottawa and joined Martin’s cabinet as Minister of
Agriculture. Maharg reasoned that he was entering Martin’s government “not as a
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politician but as a representative of the farmers.” It was a move whereby he could ensure
his “first duty” of securing “better consideration of the needs of the farmers.”112
Martin followed up by calling a snap election. The Premier claimed that he timed the
election so as not to interfere with the upcoming federal contest. However, an early
election had the added benefit of catching the government’s opponents off guard. As one
Liberal organizer noted: “When you have your amunition [sic] ready you are a fool to
wait until the other fellow has his ready.”113 The timing was fortuitous. The SGGA’s
conservative executive was doing all it could to forestall the organization’s entry into
politics. Musselman insisted that the SGGA had “no grievance and no reason to oppose
the Martin government,” but the more radical delegates were incensed by what they
viewed as their executive’s betrayal of the larger farmers’ movement. “The leaders of the
association,” a disgruntled farmer argued, “have no more right to use the association for
political purposes than the locals have.”114 In direct defiance of their executive, over
twenty-five locals nominated their own independent candidates by May. By calling an
early election, Martin was able to go to the polls before these independents had time to
mobilize, winning forty-six of sixty-three seats, sixteen by acclamation.115
The political arrangement allowed the provincial Liberals to survive in office, but it led to
the end of conservative control of the farmers’ movement. The SGGA executive relied
on the premier’s promise to refrain from federal politics to sell the deal to the general
membership. In the December 1921 Dominion election, however, Martin and other
prominent Liberals openly campaigned for Liberal candidates, especially Motherwell
who was running in Regina. In a series of public speeches, Martin claimed that the
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farmers’ platform was riddled with “contradictions.”116 Maharg realized the
repercussions of Martin’s “betrayal” and resigned his cabinet position almost
immediately, but the damage had already been done.117
Fed up with their conservative executive’s obstruction, a group of more disgruntled
farmers, including A.J. McPhail, George Edwards, and Violet McNaughton, launched an
all-out attack at the 1922 SGGA convention. Referred to interchangeably as the “ginger
group” or the “secret meeting clan,”118 these radical farmers “ruled the convention in a
way that has not been seen for several years.”119 The ginger group not only succeeded in
passing a resolution bringing the SGGA into politics but began the process of removing
conservative farmers from their positions of power and influence. A.G. Hawkes, the
seven-term vice-president, was replaced by George Edwards, a firm supporter of orderly
marketing.120 As a visible member of the co-op elite, Hawkes’ defeat, the Saskatoon
Daily Star reported, was “the principal outstanding sign-post of the change.”121
Similarly, Musselman, realizing that his position in the SGGA was tenuous at best,
accepted a position with SCEC.122 With Musselman and Hawkes’ departure, the
conservative hold on the SGGA was fundamentally weakened. Not only had the
organization decided to enter provincial politics, but it also began actively offering its
support toward orderly marketing schemes.
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Having lost control of the SGGA, Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers turned to the
Liberal Party as the main champion of their ideology. Regina’s Morning Leader, widely
considered the Liberal Party’s mouthpiece, quickly came to their support. In a scathing
editorial, the paper argued that the “old soul” had left the SGGA. By deciding to enter
provincial politics, the paper foretold, the SGGA had “taken up the sword by which they
will perish.”123 Charles Dunning’s selection as Premier following Martin’s resignation
also certainly met with their approval. As far as conservative farmers were concerned,
Dunning’s life exemplified the myth of the “self-made man.” Having moved to
Saskatchewan in 1902 as an itinerant farm labourer, Dunning established himself as a
shrewd and successful farmer, businessman, and politician. After working his way up
through the SGGA, first as a director and then as vice-president, Dunning was appointed
as the SCEC’s first general manager in 1911. It was under Dunning’s leadership that the
early elevator company established itself as one of the largest and most profitable grain
handling enterprises in the country.124 In 1916, Dunning parlayed his successful
management into a cabinet position in Martin’s government, serving terms as Minister of
Agriculture, Finance, Railways, and Municipal Affairs.125
Dunning brought to the Premier’s office an affinity for the conservative farmers’ outlook.
Dunning was clear that he did not oppose a voluntary pool, but he did have “an
instinctive distrust of the principle of compulsion as applied to trade.”126 He also
believed that most farmers felt the same way. Compulsion, he argued, was “repugnant to
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the general attitude of our people.” Farmers valued their individualism and would not
“consent” to being ruled over by a “wheat marketing autocracy” which took away their
basic rights and freedoms.127 Dunning also shared the conservatives’ disdain for
radicalism. Increased debt loads, he argued, were not caused by structural inequities
within the capitalist system. Rather, a farmer faced bankruptcy because he failed to pay
“reasonably good attention to his business and especially to his creditors’ letters.”128
This contempt for the marginal farmers’ business acumen was present throughout
Dunning’s career. In establishing the SCEC’s bylaws, for instance, Dunning took care to
ensure that the rank-and-file had little influence on the company’s day-to-day
operations.129
Dunning only had to look to the FU’s rapid growth as confirmation for this belief.
Throughout 1922, the Union made a name for itself among the province’s marginal
farmers by organizing boycotts of sheriff sales and calling for a moratorium on all future
foreclosures.130 Dunning had little sympathy for such tactics. As he explained to
Clifford Sifton, the FU was a “deadbeat organization,” which only appealed “to the
impecunious and those who are so loaded with debt that they do not ever expect to get
out of it.”131 For Dunning, debt moratorium was a direct challenge to people’s
individualism. By refusing to honour their debts, the province’s radical farmers were
unwilling to live up to the obligations they entered of their own free will. “The
continuance of society’s guarantee of freedom to all of us,” Dunning argued, “demands
that when we have signed on the dotted line, we shall stick to the obligation our signature
conveys.” Farmers’ individualism gave them the freedom to “do any fool thing” they
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chose, but also required the farmer to live up to the “consequences of his own
mistakes.”132
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers considered Dunning their natural ally against
orderly marketing. From the outset, they inundated the Premier with letters supporting
his stance on compulsion. An abiding faith in individual action was foundational to this
support. As a compulsory body, a farmer from Morse wrote, any board would deprive
the farmer of his freedom to dispose of the product of his own labour. Wheat, in short,
belonged “to the farmer and should be as sacred as any other individual property.”133 Far
from merely an economic question, compulsion’s threat to individual property rights also
weakened Saskatchewan’s British foundations. The Magna Carta, another writer noted,
enshrined property rights as the central component of British freedoms. Supporters of
compulsion, therefore, were descendants “of the old world feudal Lords,” and were
acting nothing short as “slave drivers.”134 Compulsion did not just challenge a farmer’s
right to decide how to sell his own wheat; by undermining the freedom of individual
action it sought to destroy the foundation of Saskatchewan society.
Dunning certainly shared the conservative farmer’s sentiment, but his larger concern lay
in disarming the SGGA’s entry into politics. The first political contest between Dunning
and the SGGA took place in a by-election for the Happyland constituency in the spring of
1922. Located in the dry-belt in the south-west of the province, Dunning considered
Happyland the “breeding ground for almost every new political disease
Saskatchewan…ever suffered from.”135 Although the Liberals managed to secure a
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victory, it was at a substantially reduced margin from the last general election.136 These
results deeply influenced how Dunning approached questions of orderly marketing.
Dunning’s victory convinced the Premier that radical farmers could be contained, but
their strong showing deeply concerned him. “Happyland served to give us an illustration
of the hard fight we may have four years from now,” he confided to Walter Scott, “unless
the wave of class consciousness subsides before that time.”137 The only way to protect
society—and the Liberal Party—from this rising class consciousness was to disarm the
radical farmers’ main grievances: debt and wheat marketing. Dunning’s main problem,
therefore, lay in forming a policy that would neutralize the radicals while maintaining the
conservatives’ allegiance.
Of the two issues, the debt problem provided the Premier with the most room to
maneuver. From the outset, Dunning was clear that he would not support a general
moratorium. As far as the Premier was concerned, farmers had contracted debts of their
own free will and had to live with the choices they made. At the same time, Dunning
also understood that poor harvests and depressed world prices were largely responsible
for many farmers’ hardships. The problem with a general moratorium, therefore, lay in
the fact that it would protect the “crooks” along with the “deserving.”138 As such, the
Premier worked towards a compromise whereby farmers would have flexibility in
repaying their loans while wheat prices remained low. Dunning hoped to avoid at all
costs a situation where creditors would force farmers to liquidate the entirety of a good
crop to pay for past debts, leaving them nothing to live on until the next harvest.
Although he would not forgive the farmers’ debt, the Premier ultimately convinced most
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of the farmers’ creditors to compromise on payment terms.139 By making practical gains
in alleviating the debt burden, Dunning hoped to forestall the move towards more radical
solutions by the province’s marginal farmers who were suffering under their debt loads;
by refusing to adopt a moratorium, Dunning hoped to maintain the farmers’ selfsufficiency.
Dunning’s options were much more limited when it came to wheat marketing. Although
it was clear that the province’s conservative farmers expected Dunning to act as their ally
against compulsion, the Premier understood that this was a minority position. “In the
course of my connection with public life,” he noted, “I have never known an issue upon
which the people were so absolutely of one mind as is the case in connection with the
present demand for a compulsory wheat board.”140 Dunning sympathized with the
conservative opposition to compulsion, but these sympathies were largely immaterial
given the Premier’s larger goal of disarming the SGGA. The situation in 1922 was such
that it was nearly impossible for Dunning to come out against compulsion and regain the
SGGA’s political support.141 Faced with the choice, Dunning joined the campaign as
part of his efforts at undermining the farmers’ “class consciousness.” The conservative
farmers may not have been happy with Dunning’s support for a compulsory board, but
they were unable to prevent it.
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Dunning assuaged the conservatives’ apprehension by noting that any compulsory system
would be short-lived. The extreme conditions farmers found themselves in, he reasoned,
necessitated some form of action. “None of us like to adopt the principle of compulsion,”
he wrote to Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, “but, at the same
time, we feel that the disorganized condition of people overseas…makes some form of
mass selling desirable for the present if our producers are to receive anything like
production costs for their wheat.”142 At the same time, Dunning noted that a board was
an “experiment,” not a “solution,” which would only last so long as the present abnormal
conditions in global trade persisted.143 Besides, Dunning had good reason to believe the
demand for compulsion would be fleeting. George Chipman, editor of the Grain
Growers’ Guide, informed the Premier that if farmers “get the wheat board this year and
the initial price is fixed at about 70¢…the wheat board will be damned right there and
then.”144 Conservative farmers would only need to bide their time until economic
conditions improved.
In the end, conservative farmers had little to fear as the plans for a compulsory board
never got off the ground. King’s government, feeling the same pressure as Dunning,
passed legislation in June that enabled the Prairie provinces to form their own board.
Unlike the case in 1919, the new board would only cover the wheat grown in the Prairies
and the provincial governments, not Ottawa, would be responsible for any financial
liabilities arising from its operation. Both Alberta and Saskatchewan quickly passed
legislation enabling the creation of a board, but the financial risk necessitated caution. As
Dunning reasoned: “To place the entire credit of these two provinces in the hands of men
who had not the necessary experience nor possessed the necessary measure of public
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confidence, would be no less than suicidal.”145 The problem, however, was that any
candidates with the necessary “experience” and “confidence” were largely employed in
the capitalist grain trade and wanted no part in an orderly marketing scheme. Two of
Dunning’s top choices—John McFarland, president of the Alberta Pacific Grain
Company, and James R. Murray, assistant general manager of the United Grain
Growers—went as far as to publish a public letter outlining their opposition.146 With all
potential candidates refusing the job and with time running short before the harvest,
Dunning called off the search. There would be no Wheat Board in 1922.
Dunning was ambivalent over the failure. Although he personally believed that a
compulsory board was not the farmers’ solution, his concern that a failure to secure it
would provide ammunition to his political enemies was also confirmed. A.J. McPhail,
Musselman’s replacement as secretary of the SGGA, believed that Dunning had
purposely approached candidates whom he knew would not accept.147 Many of the
province’s radical farmers shared this sentiment, and chastised Dunning for his perceived
duplicitousness. “Try and help the farmer,” one letter noted, “but don’t try & pull the
wool over his eyes so much.”148 This criticism incensed Dunning. Such a “slur” the
Premier retorted, “comes pretty hard after a man has spent the last three weeks practically
day and night attempting to get this business organized along the lines desired by the
majority of our people.”149 Dunning bristled at such criticism, but he was not
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heartbroken by the failure. He was happy to let the issue die when further attempts to
secure a board in 1923 met a similar fate.150
This failure marked a shift in the campaign for orderly marketing. For four years,
Saskatchewan’s radical farmers sought a compulsory wheat board only to have their
plans stymied by conservative opposition. Rather than continue to rely on government
intervention, these farmers instead used their newfound control of the SGGA to campaign
for a producer-controlled, contract pool.151 The idea was not new in 1923. The
Canadian Council of Agriculture had proposed a contract pool as early as 1920 and it had
remained a central plank of the FU since its founding in 1921.152 Unlike the previous
campaigns, however, the SGGA’s new leadership offered its wholehearted support to the
plan. Whereas the conservative farmers had held the SGGA back from any plan that
would limit a farmer’s freedom to dispose of their own grain, the “ginger group,” led by
A.J. McPhail, placed its entire support behind the plan.153 Following a tour of the
province by Aaron Sapiro, an American lawyer and “prophet” of the Pool movement, the
executives of the SGGA and FU agreed to work together to form a contract pool.154 The
Pool would be non-profit, non-speculative, and focused solely on the sale of wheat. It
was also entirely voluntary, only going into operation once farmers accounting for fifty
percent of Saskatchewan’s wheat acreage signed a five-year contract.155
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Historians have assumed that the successful Pool campaign was the product of nearly
universal farmer support. Opposition, they argue, was confined to the Winnipeg Grain
Exchange and the province’s daily papers.156 As Lipset notes, “the almost evangelical
appeal for farmers finally to destroy the middlemen in the grain trade and control their
own economic destiny activated more farmers than ever before.”157 These
characterizations oversimplify the conservative response. As a voluntary organization,
the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool did not threaten conservative farmers’ individualism. As a
result, most conservatives were content to let the experiment run its course so long as
they were free to sell their wheat according to their own wishes. As one farmer wrote the
Premier: “let them pool their own wheat.”158 At the same time, it was also clear that
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers opposed the Pool’s ideological underpinnings and
resented the challenge it posed to the competitive capitalist system. For conservative
farmers, the fact that the “weak and poorest farmers” were championing it was evidence
enough of its questionable foundations. Rather than working to improve their own
holdings, they reasoned, the supporters of the Pool saw it as a way “to get a few easy
dollars in their own pocket.”159 In both the Pool and Wheat Board campaigns, there was
a clear sentiment amongst Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers that orderly marketing
was merely an attempt to cover up the reasons for a farmer’s failure. Supporters of the
movement were “selfishly inclined.” They were “jealous” by nature. When they heard
of a “neighbour getting a few cents…more” for their wheat, “they…think it unjust.”160
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The capitalist system, in contrast, rewarded the farmer who was able to “market his grain
intelligently.”161
This opposition was reflected in conservative reactions to the Pool campaign. Dunning,
for instance, was concerned that Pool supporters were attempting to influence the
province’s farmers by relying on emotion, not reason. L.P. McNamee, president of the
FU, freely admitted that he made up statistics about the benefits that a pool offered
farmers.162 Similarly, McPhail, who had been excused from his position in the SGGA to
head the Pool campaign, urged Protestant ministers to preach the benefits of the cooperative Pool, going so far as to single out biblical passages detailing the Israelites’
escape from Egyptian slavery. Such underhanded tactics were anathema for
conservatives. “The business of signing,” Dunning chastised, “is not for the
emotionalists to direct.”163 Dunning took every opportunity to warn “the farmers against
expecting more than was humanly possible.”164 The Pool supporters’ reliance on
exaggeration and falsehood only demonstrated that they were not capable or suitable to
decide Saskatchewan’s economic future.
Conservatives were equally clear that, although voluntary, the Pool’s five-year contracts
posed a threat to the farmers’ individualism. For Dunning, a contract was evidence that
the system itself was untested. “If the scheme is not very sound,” he concluded, “you had
better have a contract.” The fact that many of the province’s smaller farmers were
enthusiastically joining the Pool also worried the Premier. Dunning’s experience with
post-war debt convinced him that most financial troubles were caused by farmers signing
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“contracts of the nature of which they were ignorant.”165 At the same time, Dunning’s
own faith in the farmers’ individualism would not allow him to infringe their right to
“sign any contract which is of a personal nature.” Part of the individual freedoms granted
in a British society included the right to make mistakes if people chose not to fully inform
themselves of the matter at hand. The only firm recommendation that the Premier would
give was for farmers to be absolutely sure of what they were getting into. “Before you
sign,” Dunning warned a meeting in the town of Springside, “for God’s sake read it.”166
Conservative’s expressed their objection to the Pool by following Dunning’s advice and
refused to sign contracts. Farmers had to pledge fifty percent of Saskatchewan’s wheat
acreage to contracts by September 12th before a Pool could be operational for the 1923
crop year.167 Despite an intensive campaign, the Pool only managed to secure contracts
covering thirty-five percent of Saskatchewan’s wheat acreage.168 Significantly,
Saskatchewan’s most developed and productive farms along the CPR line remained
outside the Pool. Farmers in the Milestone constituency, for example, only signed thirtyfive percent of their wheat acreage to contracts. Located on the fertile Regina Plains,
Milestone was the center of Saskatchewan’s large-scale wheat farming.169 Producers in
Last Mountain, on the other hand, where acreages were less than half of those at
Milestone, signed their entire wheat acreage to the Pool.170 The same trend held
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throughout the province as a whole. Areas where the larger and more affluent farmers
dominated did not join the Pool. Far from being a universal campaign as historians
suggests, Saskatchewan’s larger and more conservative farmers remained outside the
Pool. “Some of the best, most progressive, most prosperous farmers in this locality” a
farmer from Midale explained, “refuse to sign the wheat pool contract,” adding that they
had “the best reasons for doing” so.171 Even Pool supporters acknowledged the
geographic divide in support. The weekly Progressive, first published in August 1923 as
a mouthpiece of the Pool campaign, noted that the results proved what had “always been
supposed.”172
Pool supporters were clearly frustrated with their conservative counterparts. When
launching the 1924 campaign, the Progressive noted that, when the results of this new
campaign were in, it hoped “the farmers of the south will not be ashamed” of their
showing.173 This frustration boiled over at the 1924 SGGA convention when J.A.
Maharg, the association’s long-serving president and last remnant of the “Co-op Elite,”
was defeated. Maharg shared conservative farmers’ skepticism of a contract pool, but
Musselman and Hawkes’ departure in 1922 had left him powerless to stop the SGGA
from supporting the campaign.174 Yet, as the Progressive noted, there was a strong
suspicion among “ardent” Pool supporters, who made up the majority of the “rank and
file” membership, that the executive was “not wholly unanimous in their attitude towards
the pool.” The final straw came with the revelation that Maharg failed to sign a Pool
contract. Although they could not force farmers to join the Pool, they could make it a
prerequisite for office. With Maharg removed from office, the SGGA could now use “the
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whole strength of the organization” to secure a Pool for 1924.175 Having spent the winter
continuing the educational program and ridding the SGGA of anti-Pool sentiment, the
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool finally reached the fifty percent threshold in June 1924.176
Once again, however, the 1924 Pool campaign succeeded without the active participation
of Saskatchewan’s largest farmers. Throughout the Pool campaign, conservative farmers
proclaimed that orderly marketing was a dangerous intervention into the capitalist
market. At the same time, their belief in the freedom of individual action meant that they
would not stand in the way of others to act in their own interests. Dunning summed up
the sentiment of most conservatives by simply leaving the province for a two-month tour
of Europe at the height of the Pool’s final organizational thrust.177 Pool supporters, in
contrast, were not willing to reciprocate this sentiment. Orderly marketing was to be the
first step in the larger transformation of society. “The Wheat Pool is only a beginning,”
The Progressive argued. “It is the beginning of the economic freedom of the
agriculturalist.”178 The Pool’s ability to achieve this goal rested in the collective action
of its contract holders. Although non-Pool farmers did not actively work against the
Pool, the fact that they withheld their strength from this crusade was viewed as aiding the
capitalist grain trade. As Louis Brouillette, a FU leader and Pool’s first vice-president,
proclaimed, “he who is not with us is against us.”179
This increasing animosity was reflected in the Pool’s relationship with the SCEC. Pool
supporters believed that, so long as the elevator company continued to function as an
alternative form of wheat marketing, a minority of Saskatchewan farmers would never
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sign a contract. At first, the Pool sought to work with the SCEC to limit the ability of
non-Pool farmers to access the company’s elevators.180 The proposal was a non-starter.
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers, who continued to control the SCEC, viewed the
Pool’s suggestion for what it was: a blatant attempt to force them into the Pool by
“making it as hard as possible for the non-pool farmer to market his grain.”181 Maharg
and the other SCEC directors were clear that, as long as they controlled the company,
those farmers “who had not seen fit to become pool members” would have their choice
protected.182 Pool supporters greeted the SCEC’s intransigence with outright hostility. If
the conservatives would not agree to the Pool’s terms, they would be removed.
Beginning in late 1924, the FU began a grassroots campaign within the pages of The
Progressive and at farmers’ locals to convince SCEC shareholders to elect delegates who
would forcibly remove the SCEC conservative leadership as they had done with the
SGGA.183
The SCEC’s executive met these attacks head-on. In the fall of 1924, Musselman, now
the vice-president of the SCEC, began sending employees into the country to “keep the
shareholders informed” of the benefits provided by “their company.” Musselman also
tasked the “field service men” with reporting on the activities of the FU and Pool, and to
“combat...the active propaganda” which threatened the “interests of the company.”184
The SCEC, the leadership claimed, was superior to the Pool in every way and had “put as
much money in the pockets of the farmers of the west as the pool would do in its next
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five years.”185 At the same time, the SCEC’s executive was clear that peaceful cooperation with the Pool was possible. After surviving an attempted coup at the 1924
SCEC convention, the executive remained adamant that “no reason exists for conflict
between the two bodies.”186 Despite such claims, the balance of power shifted decidedly
in the Pool’s favour over the course of 1925. Not only had the FU outperformed the field
service men in winning over the province’s marginal farmers, but the Pool also stole the
momentum when it voted in favour of purchasing the SCEC outright at its first annual
meeting. In a reversal from the previous year, Pool supporters were a clear majority of
the delegates at the 1925 SCEC convention. The executive understood that they no
longer had the numbers to forestall a Pool takeover of their company. “You know what
you want to do,” Musselman told the convention, “and you are going to do it.”187
They would not, however, go down without a fight. The Pool’s takeover of the SCEC is
often presented as a straightforward affair, but the reality is that it occurred only after a
bitter and acrimonious debate wherein conservative farmers defiantly articulated their
opposition.188 Conservatives did not have the numbers to block the Pool’s takeover, but
they could fight against the underhandedness with which it was achieved. “The pool
wants to compel others,” one delegate noted, “not only in wheat selling but elevators”
too.189 This compulsion, another delegate added, would ultimately be in vain.
Independent farmers may lose the SCEC, but they would not “be driven into the Pool.”
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As “men,” they would not “lie down under the Pool offer.”190 This compulsion also
severed any of the last vestiges of the conservatives’ belief that they could co-exist
peacefully with the Pool. The Pool’s actions, Musselman promised, would leave “in the
hearts and souls” of non-Pool farmers “a rancour that will be hard to eradicate.”191
This “rancour” did not take long to manifest. The Pool launched in 1924 with 51,268
contract signers and no facilities of its own to handle its wheat.192 Within two years it
counted a membership in excess of eighty thousand and, having taken over the SCEC,
operated over five hundred grain elevators and claimed assets totaling thirty-six million
dollars.193 The meteoric rise, however, overshadowed a key weakness. In 1928, the Pool
accounted for roughly sixty-five percent of Saskatchewan farmers but only marketed just
over half of the province’s wheat crop.194 Historians have suggested that bootlegging—
contract members selling outside the Pool—accounted for this discrepancy.195 Yet, as
early as 1926, the Pool had begun using injunctions to force Pool members to honour
their contracts.196 Bootlegging was on the decline in 1928 and could not have accounted
for this inconsistency. Rather, these numbers demonstrate that some of the largest and
most productive farmers had remained outside of the Pool. Although they accounted for
less than a third of all farmers in Saskatchewan, they grew up to half of the province’s
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wheat. By withholding their wheat from the Pool, these farmers guaranteed the
continued survival of the private grain trade. The Pool’s immediate success also
overshadowed the fact that, by 1930, its strength had plateaued. The first five-year pool
launched in 1924 with 51,268 farmers signed to contracts, reaching 80,418 in 1926. By
1930, however, this number had only climbed to 82,893.197 Every farmer who had
wanted to join the Pool had done so. Despite losing their positions of power within the
farm movement, Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers had demonstrated that no level of
coercion would convince them to join the Pool against their better judgement.
This conservative intransigence precipitated the FU to begin advocating for legislation
that would make the Pool compulsory. Orderly marketing’s ultimate goal rested with the
destruction of the capitalist grain trade, but it could not accomplish this without control of
all of Saskatchewan’s wheat. The FU, therefore, believed conservative farmers, as a
minority, should not be allowed to hinder the Pool’s effectiveness. This sentiment
quickly gained strength following the merger between the FU and the SGGA into the
United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) [UFC] in 1926.198 By championing a
“100% compulsory pool,” the UFC articulated a conception of society that privileged
collectivism over individualism. Individual freedoms, they argued, should not be allowed
to “trump” collective progress.199 During a speaking tour in 1927, for instance, Aaron
Sapiro noted that it was the best “Anglo-Saxon practice, to let the majority rule.” The
Pool, he continued, could not be “thwarted” by the minority of farmers “who did not have
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the vision and had not seen the light.” 200 The UFC’s acceptance of compulsion also
reflected a divergent understanding of the farmers’ relationship with the capitalist
economy. Whereas conservatives understood themselves as being able to compete
effectively as individuals, the UFC believed that success would only come through
“solidarity” with one another. Through “an affirmation of the brotherhood of man,” they
argued, the “social man” would triumph where the individual, “material” man had
failed.201 In 1928, the UFC put these beliefs into practice and adopted a resolution
calling on the provincial government to enact a law compelling every farmer to sell their
wheat through the Pool.202
Moderate Pool members, however, were not yet willing to follow the UFC’s lead. Pool
delegates overwhelmingly voted against a similar measure when it reached the floor of
their 1928 and 1929 conventions. Although moderate and radical Pool supporters
believed that orderly marketing would ultimately replace the capitalist grain trade with a
co-operative economic system, they differed on the pace of this change. Moderates
believed that all farmers would ultimately come to their senses and support the Pool.
Compulsion, therefore, was not only an unnecessary expedient but a dangerous one as
coercion was the antithesis of co-operation. When you “induce compulsion,” McPhail
argued, “you eliminate co-operation.”203 Moderates also feared the influence of new
members who were forced to join the Pool without believing in its fundamental
principles. Such members, McPhail warned, could do “much more harm inside than
outside our organization.”204 The only solution, therefore, was to continue the gradual
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conversion of conservative farmers to the principles of co-operation. It may take longer
than the UFC hoped, but the moderates were willing to wait.
The experimental nature of the pooling concept ultimately forced the issue. Under the
private grain trade, anyone in possession of wheat, be they elevator companies or the
farmers themselves, could protect—or hedge—themselves against falling prices by
selling contracts for future delivery on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. Although used for
a distinct business purpose, the grain exchange was also susceptible to speculation.
Supporters of orderly marketing believed that speculators, gambling on wheat prices with
no desire to take delivery, contributed to depressed wheat prices during harvest.205 As a
result, the three Prairie Pools’ Central Selling Agency conducted most of its business
outside of the exchange, using bank loans, not the proceeds of the futures market, to pay
farmers for their wheat. Their only protection against a falling market was the spread
between the initial price they paid farmers and the current market price.206 By the
summer of 1929, the Pools were carrying roughly 52 million bushels of unsold, unhedged
wheat for which they owed the banks $68.2 million. This fact in and of itself was not
worrying as the world price of their holdings amounted to $105.3 million. Feeling
confident, the Pools set their initial price for the 1929 crop year at $1.00 per bushel.207
The first signs of trouble came that summer as an increasingly unstable European
economy resulted in a sharp decrease in the world demand for wheat, making it
increasingly difficult for the Central Selling Agency to dispose of its holdings. By
August 1930, the carryover had increased to 64.6 million bushels of unhedged wheat.
Catastrophe hit that summer as the price of wheat plunged. Whereas wheat sold for an
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average of $1.80 in January 1930, it had collapsed to $0.55 by December, well below the
initial price paid in 1929. The Pool was bankrupt. Only the provincial government’s
guarantee of their loans saved them from complete financial ruin. When the dust settled,
the Central Selling Agency was responsible for a loss of $22.1 million, of which the
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool held the lion’s share of $13.3 million.208 The first large-scale
experiment in orderly marketing had ended in catastrophe.
Pool members, however, were not willing to accept the failure. They did not believe that
the crisis was the Pool’s fault for failing to hedge its wheat. Rather, the blame fell on the
conservative farmers who refused to join. As the Western Producer argued: “the
combined efforts of all the farmers and not fifty or fifty-five percent of them are
absolutely required if the present situation is to be encountered with hope and
courage.”209 The solution was not to abandon the orderly marketing, but to force
conservative farmers to join in the crusade, against their wills if necessary. Delegates to
the Pool’s 1930 convention voted unanimously to push the provincial government for
legislation that would make their organization compulsory for all farmers.
Conservative farmers were outraged. Compulsion, with its inherent disregard for the
individualism and property rights of the non-Pool farmer, went against their
understanding of how society functioned. The problem they faced, however, was that
they no longer had an organization to advocate for their values. The Pool had forcibly
seized the SCEC and the SGGA, even before its amalgamation with the FU, had ceased
to speak for the conservative view. They needed to organize if their opposition was to be
taken seriously. In early 1932, conservative farmers created an ad hoc “temporary
association opposing compulsory pool” to petition against the proposed legislation.210 In
a public letter addressed to Conservative Premier J.T.M. Anderson, the association
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proclaimed that compulsion fundamentally weakened “personal rights” by forcing
farmers to dispose of their own property against their wishes.211 Although the
association maintained that they were not “opposed to co-operative pooling,” the 1929
overpayment was dramatic evidence that the Pool could not be trusted with the entirety of
Saskatchewan’s wheat crop. “One mistake in judgement,” they argued, “would effect
[sic] the whole West.”212 The arguments were not new. Since the First World War,
conservative farmers expressed their opposition to orderly marketing in the same terms.
Not only did compulsory systems undermine the farmer’s individualism, but the very
idea that capitalism was fundamentally unsound was a fallacy.
In the end, the association’s petition had more symbolic than practical value. Faced with
the united demands of the Pool and the UFC, the provincial government had little choice
but to act. Elected in 1929, the Anderson “Co-operative Government” was a coalition of
Conservative, Progressive, and Independent MLAs. The Progressive members made
their continued support contingent on the Premier introducing “legislation in conformity”
with progressive principles.213 Given that the Progressives owed their electoral support
to the province’s organized farmers, there was little doubt in Anderson’s mind that
compulsory legislation fell under this stipulation. At the same time, Anderson faced an
insurgency within the Conservative Party that sympathized with the conservative
farmers’ opposition. Dr. D.S. Johnstone, President of the Saskatchewan LiberalConservative Association, did not hide his antipathy with the proposed legislation. “I do
not believe that any government would be justified in submitting or passing legislation
which would have the effect of creating a monopoly, to deprive the individual producer
of the right to dispose of his product or transacting his private business as he is now
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entitled to do.”214 Anderson was forced to take a middle position by ensuring that a
government backbencher proposed the legislation as a private member’s bill. The
Premier hoped to avoid the bill’s association with his cabinet and was clear that farmers
themselves would have the final say on compulsion through a referendum before the
legislation went into force. There was also significant doubt whether a provincial
government could constitutionally legislate a compulsory pool, necessitating a court trial
before it became effective.215 While Anderson supported compulsion by allowing the
legislation to pass, conservative farmers were given two opportunities to oppose it: twothirds of Saskatchewan’s farmers had to agree, and the legislation had to survive a
challenge in the courts.216
Conservative farmers quickly began preparing for the upcoming referendum. In March, a
meeting of over 700 farmers gathered in Regina to reorganize their temporary association
on a permanent basis, creating the “Permanent Association Opposing Compulsory Pool.”
Membership was open to anyone in Saskatchewan, regardless of whether they owned
farmland or not. While the Pool and the UFC believed that this open membership made
the association little more than a front for the capitalist grain trade, the association was
clear that “no grain trade money” would ever be “accepted.”217 Membership was open to
anyone who was “in sympathy” with the association’s “campaign to defeat the operation
of the proposed legislation” and payed a one-dollar membership fee.218 Members only
had to sign the association’s declaration of principles that maintained they were “opposed
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to compulsion which in any way affects the private rights and liberties now enjoyed by
our people.”219 The conservatives were equally clear that the time for compromise and
diplomacy were over. They vowed to resist “by every lawful means” any move that
sought to “deny to citizens of this province the right of dealing in and disposing of the
products of their labor.”220 The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool had declared war on the nonPool farmer and conservatives vowed to meet this attack in kind.
To lead them in their defiance, the association chose a leadership made up of
Saskatchewan’s more affluent farmers. Robert Allen Wright, the association’s president,
embodied the very image of the rugged individualist. Born in Carroll County, Iowa in
1888, Wright lived a privileged upbringing. His father, a leading physician, owned
several businesses in Iowa, while his mother was related to the American President
Herbert Hoover.221 Wright had originally intended to follow his father’s footsteps as a
doctor, but decided to move to Saskatchewan in 1909 to run the day-to-day operations of
a farm his father had purchased in the Drinkwater district. Wright eventually bought out
his parents and expanded his operations to include over four sections of fecund land and a
ranch near Big Muddy, making him one of the single largest landowners in the province.
Wright was also active throughout the 1920s in several agricultural associations,
including stints as a director of the Regina Exhibition Association, the Southern
Saskatchewan Cooperative Stockyards, the Saskatchewan Stock Growers’ Association,
and as president of the Western Canadian Livestock Union for nine years. Wright moved
freely between the worlds of agriculture and finance, serving as a member of the Regina
Board of Trade, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, and the exclusive Assiniboia
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Club.222 Although Wright did not run for political office, the provincial Liberals
continually sought out his opinion on legislation. 223 The crowning achievement of
Wright’s public career came in 1935 when he was elected to the Bank of Canada’s board
of directors as a representative of primary producers.224
The other executives were no less illustrious. J.R. Green of Moose Jaw, the association’s
vice-president, had originally trained as a teacher before making a fortune by speculating
in land, especially the purchase of Métis scrip. He was active in municipal politics and
served as the president of the Moose Jaw Board of Trade. Possessing a keen eye for
business, Green foresaw the collapse of the Prairie real estate bubble in 1913. Where
others lost fortunes, Green sold out at the height of the market and invested his windfall
in farmland. By 1915, he owned three sections of land, the majority of which he rented
to sharecroppers.225 The secretary-treasurer, Edgar H. Petersmyer, married into farm
royalty, and helped his father-in-law run a massive farm located between Regina and
Wilcox. At over 32,000 acres, the family’s operations were considered the single largest
wheat operation in North America.226 Other executives, including W.J. Orchard of
Tregarva and Ira B. Cushing of Riceton, had served as directors in the SGGA and SCEC
before being forced out when the radicals took over.
With an executive dominated by the province’s most affluent farmers, the association
expressed a clearly conservative opposition to orderly marketing. The association used
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public meetings, advertisements, and radio programs to affirm their vision of an
individualist society. At its basis was the belief that every man had a “natural right” to
dispose of “his own property according to his own judgment.” Compulsion flew in the
face of this fact. By limiting farmers’ ability to act in their own interests, the proposed
legislation was “un-British in content and principle” and “repugnant to all citizens with a
sense of freedom and justice.”227 Even more troubling was that, once started,
compulsion would be difficult to stop. “Why should it not also compel all citizens to
attend one church,” they asked, “or buy clothes from one dealer?”228 Compulsion, in
short, was an “ugly word.” Should the legislation pass, they argued, the “peace of the
country would be endangered” because there still existed farmers who valued “their
British traditions and British liberties more highly than anything else.”229 With nothing
left to lose, conservative farmers vowed to fight it to the very bitter end.
This opposition was focused directly at the Pool. One of the association’s first
resolutions was to call for a public inquiry into the Pool’s operations “since its
inception.”230 The Pool had given many “excuses for past failures,” the association
argued, but had failed to acknowledge its own culpability in its collapse. By refusing to
hedge its wheat, the Pool had “engaged in the most colossal wheat speculation and
gamble the world has ever seen” and the public deserved to know what other mistakes it
had made.231 To make matters worse, the Pool expected the non-Pool farmer to help
offset the costs of its failure to effectively market wheat. The association represented
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itself as the backer of the independent and able farmers. The Pool, in contrast, broken
and saddled with an insurmountable debt, hoped to cover up its own failings by forcing
the non-Pool farmer into submission. This outcome was not surprising. After all, the
Pool’s democratic focus had no place in business where the ablest, not the most popular,
should lead. Pool membership was made up of the province’s more marginal farmers
who acted out of emotion, not reason, and had allowed “demagogues,” who were
“miserable failures” in their own businesses, to dominate its operations.232 Contract
holders had elected “the man of forceful personality and extreme views cleverly
expressed” over “the thoughtful, careful, successful and possibly silent farmer.”233 This
fact alone was enough evidence to convince conservative farmers that the Pool could not
be trusted with their wheat.
Figure 1 – Anti-Compulsion Cartoon234

The association was also adamant that the proposed legislation would reward an
organization based on a fundamentally flawed understanding of the economy. Rather
than view the private grain trade as something that should be overthrown, its competition
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was good for the farmer as it allowed him to choose who would store, handle, and
transport his crop and who would act as his agent in selling it. If they were unhappy with
the services provided, competition allowed them to find someone else to perform these
tasks.235 Likewise, the association also took issue with the Pool’s critique of the futures
market. Far from a detriment, hedging was a form of insurance against fluctuations in the
price of wheat. As one pamphlet argued, farmers who did not hedge their holdings—as
was the case of the Central Selling Agency—were being as reckless as those who
gambled in the futures market.236 The Pool’s 1929 overpayment was evidence that the
very premise of orderly marketing was a fairy-tale. If not for the government bailout, the
conservatives argued, the Pool would have “been in the hands of the receivers.”237 They
could not then comprehend why the government would reward the Pool for its failure by
giving it complete control of Saskatchewan’s wheat crop. “If it cannot handle 50% of the
wheat,” they questioned, “why should it be given 100% to meddle with?”238
Although the association’s campaign against compulsion was largely staged in the court
of public opinion, its victory came from legal challenges to the legislation. In passing the
legislation, Anderson was clear that the proposed referendum would wait for the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s decision on the legislation’s constitutionality. Hearings
began in early April with lawyers representing the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, the private
elevators, and the Permanent Association Opposing Compulsory Pool arguing against the
legislation on the basis that it infringed on Ottawa’s jurisdiction in matters of trade. It
was “really surprising,” the association’s lawyer argued, how far the Pool and the
provincial government were willing to go to “deprive” the farmers of Saskatchewan “of
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their own property.”239 The court agreed and declared the legislation ultra vires. The
association was jubilant, taking the decision as an affirmation of their individualism. The
decision, Wright exclaimed, was the only one that could be “expected in a British
Country” where personal liberty was an enshrined right.240 Pool supporters, for their
part, declared that the decision was only a minor setback and reaffirmed their desire to
pursue the case all the way to Britain’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council if need
be. 241
Despite this brave face, the appeal court decision placed the initiative firmly with
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers. At the end of May, a delegation of farmers from
Milestone presented a petition to the provincial government that, far from merely
opposing compulsion, called for the Pool’s immediate dissolution. The Pool’s continued
existence, they argued, was “detrimental to the best interests of grain producers.” The
Pool’s leadership was not “competent,” had lost the trust of the farmers, and had
demonstrated that they were unable to “handle this business.” The only solution was to
replace the Pool and its weak leadership with “a commission of fully qualified grain
men” who would operate the elevators on a similar basis to what had occurred under the
SCEC.242 Likewise, the association also sponsored a series of legal challenges intended
to limit the Pool’s ability to continue its compulsion campaign. In June, a judge granted
an injunction to W.A. Scott, a Pool member from Salvador who had been previously
prosecuted for bootlegging, barring the Pool from spending any further money on the
compulsion campaign. Scott’s lawyers, supported by the association’s financial backing,
successfully argued that the Pool had no legal basis for spending its member’s money to
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support compulsion.243 The decision was the final act in the compulsion campaign. The
UFC was struggling financially, having been only able to weather the onset of the
Depression with a $10,000 loan from the Pool, and could not carry on the fight alone.244
Nor could the Pool rely on the provincial government. Anderson had only backed the
legislation because he knew the Progressives wanted it. The court’s decision provided
him with the opportunity to abandon the crusade. Anderson quickly announced that his
government had no intention of appealing the decision. 245
The conservative farmers were victorious. After suffering humiliating defeats at the
hands of Saskatchewan’s radical farmers for a decade, they had ensured the end of the
Pool’s experiment in orderly marketing. On 20 July, the Pool unceremoniously
announced that it was granting its contract signers “the privilege of deciding the method”
by which their wheat would be marketed.246 Although the most idealistic farmers hoped
to continue operating a pool on a strictly volunteer basis, it was clear that the experiment
had failed. The Pool ultimately transformed itself into a co-operative elevator company,
largely indistinguishable in operations from the SCEC.247 The Saskatchewan Wheat
Pool, once the hope of the province’s more radical farmers, remained a pool in name
only.
Despite this affirmation of their individualism, conservative farmers found little solace in
their victory. While Saskatchewan’s farmers were battling over compulsion, the province
was falling deeper into the grip of an unprecedented economic and environmental
calamity. Unlike the post-war recession, which predominantly affected the marginal
farmers, all grain producers felt the dual economic and environmental ravages of the
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1930s. Even if a farmer could grow enough wheat to sell, the price received was
significantly below the cost of production. Unlike the situation in 1928, the combined
effects of the drought and drop in price were borne disproportionally by the province’s
larger farmers who relied on mechanization and large land holdings to provide economies
of scale in their operations. This strategy had allowed them to survive relatively
unscathed when prices dropped in 1920. When the low prices combined with drought,
however, the economies of scale worked against them. All farmers lost money when
their crops failed, but the larger farmers, with costlier operations, suffered significantly
higher deficits.248 To make matters worse, the hardest hit drought regions were largely
confined to the south, the very area that had the most intensive wheat production.
Wright’s experiences during the Depression were indicative of the fate of many larger
farmers. Conservative farmers selected Wright as president of the Permanent Association
Opposing Compulsory Pool because they considered him one of the most successful,
largest, and ablest farmers in the province. He was also a victim of his own success.
Although Wright’s diversified operations allowed him to weather the early Depression,
events caught up to him in 1936 when he lost his farm near Drinkwater to the Huron &
Erie Mortgage Company.249 In 1941, Wright abandoned his wife and son and moved
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back to Iowa where he would remarry and rebuild his fortune. 250 When he died in 1984,
his obituary made no mention of his life in Saskatchewan.251
Faced with day-to-day struggles of their continued survival, farmers were not able to
influence the future of Canadian wheat marketing beyond petitioning the government for
some form of price control.252 The collapse of the three Prairie wheat Pools, however,
left the federal government with few options. The Bennett government had agreed to
market the Central Selling Agency’s carryover, not out of affinity for the Pools which the
prime minister believed to suffer from mismanagement, but to protect the interests of
Canadian bankers who had loaned the money.253 The Pools’ Central Selling Agency,
now under the management of a government agent, adopted a policy of purchasing wheat
futures on the open market to prop up the price of Canadian wheat. When the
government took control in November 1930, the Central Selling Agency had on hand
roughly 37 million bushels of wheat. By the end of July 1931, this number had increased
to 75 million bushels.254 Increasingly, however, the government found that, when faced
with an obstinate private grain trade, such moves were not enough to stabilize the price.
The only solution was to take a further role in the wheat market. In 1935, Bennett
announced that his government would re-create the compulsory Wheat Board with
complete government control over the entire grain trade. Intense pressure from the
Winnipeg Grain Exchange and the opposition Liberals, however, forced the Prime
Minister to compromise. The new Canadian Wheat Board would not be compulsory.
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Rather, it would pay a minimum price to farmers who were free to sell to either the board
or the open market, depending on which prices were higher.255
The re-creation of the Canadian Wheat Board marked a turning point in the campaign for
orderly marketing. Once Bennett started guaranteeing the wheat price it was impossible
for successive governments to stop. The Mackenzie King Liberals, returned to power in
October 1935, found that they were simply unable to pull the federal government out of
the grain trade.256 The board also transformed the farmers’ relationship with the
economy. Since the end of the First World War, Saskatchewan farmers fought amongst
themselves over the best method to market their wheat. Once the government began
guaranteeing a minimum price, however, the farmers’ attention shifted from debating the
merits of differing economic systems to petitioning the federal government for higher
guaranteed prices. It would take a new generation of farmers to challenge the new status
quo offered by the Canadian Wheat Board.
These challenges, when they did emerge, offered the same individualist critique of
compulsion. In the summer of 2012, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the end
to the Canadian Wheat Board’s monopoly. In so doing, Harper articulated an ideology
which viewed Prairie farmers as independent, small-business owners, capable of making
their own rational economic decisions free from government intervention. The Wheat
Board, he argued, destroyed the individual rights of Prairie farmers to dispose of the
fruits of their own labour. “Never, never, never again,” he promised, “will western
farmers…growing their own wheat on their own land be told how they can and can’t
market their products.”257
Such a vision was not new in 2012. Far from a monolithic class reacting against the
abuses of the capitalist system, Saskatchewan’s farmers have always diverged sharply
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over their understanding of the economy and their place within it. Whereas the
province’s radical farmers viewed themselves as victims of the capitalist system,
conservative producers attributed their success to the competition of the system. At the
basis of this division lay a differing understanding of individualism. For radical farmers,
individualism was a deficiency that they needed to overcome if they ever hoped to reform
the capitalist system. Conservative farmers, in contrast, viewed their individualism as the
defining element of their society. Despite the dominant historical argument that
individualism declined in the interwar period, visceral opposition to orderly marketing
demonstrates that an individualist ideology continued to animate the actions of a large
segment of Saskatchewan’s producers.
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2

British Nativism: The Ku Klux Klan and the Grand
Orange Lodge

On the night of June 7th, 1927, the flames from a 100-foot-tall burning cross lit Moose
Jaw’s sky. An estimated 10,000 people attended the Invisible Empire of the Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan’s (KKK) first public meeting in the province.258 Although the
Saskatchewan Klan borrowed heavily from the symbolism of its American counterpart, it
was decidedly less virulent. The Klan first entered Saskatchewan at the beginning of
1927, selling itself as a fraternal, ultra-Protestant, and British organization. According to
the Moose Jaw Evening Times, those who came to the Moose Jaw rally hoping for
diatribes on racial inferiority or calls to violence were disappointed. The Moose Jaw
crowd listened aptly as Rev. T.J. Hind, King Kleagle of the Moose Jaw Klan and minister
at the city’s First Baptist Church, spoke of the need for “brotherly love” and a desire “to
live at peace with all men.” As the reporter concluded, the Klan rally “was to all intents
and purposes an evangelistic gathering, called for the purpose of urging sinners to
repentance.”259 The Klan, however, was far from altruistic in its messaging. Over the
period of three years, Klan speakers traveled to the furthest reaches of the province,
preaching a message of British supremacy, fundamentalist Protestantism, and rabid antiCatholicism.
The interwar period was a time of religious and racial turmoil in Saskatchewan, as
nativist movements grew in strength. Of these movements, the Klan, with its hooded
figures and burning crosses, has captured the public’s attention and condemnation. Yet,
the Klan was neither the first nor the most important organization to offer Saskatchewan
residents this message of racial and religious exclusion. The Klan’s rapid rise to
prominence was only possible given the earlier work of other likeminded organizations,
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namely the Grand Orange Lodge. For years, the Orange Lodge organized in
Saskatchewan and spread its ultra-Protestant message. When the Klan entered the
province in 1927, it was greeted by over 36,000 Orangemen—the highest membership for
any province outside of Ontario—who were already indoctrinated and receptive to the
Klan’s religious and racial vision.260
Although they retained their own organizational structures, the KKK and the Orange
Lodge united in a campaign to promote their vision for an Anglo-Saxon and Protestant
province. Like the province’s conservative farmers, these organizations understood the
basis of society as fundamentally individualistic. Whereas conservative farmers
expressed their individualism in their opposition to orderly marketing, the KKK and
Orange Lodge articulated a racialized citizenship that equated one’s ability to act as an
individual to their religious and racial background. The Klan and the Orange Lodge
believed that adherence to the British tradition—which they interpreted as parliamentary
democracy, freedom of speech, and Protestantism—was the basis from which citizens
possessed the ability to think for themselves and act in their own best interests. Both the
KKK and the Orange Lodge viewed Catholics and “undesirable” immigrants as lacking
these basic values. Considered “deficient individuals,” Catholics and non-Anglo
immigrants were, at best, the focus of intensive assimilationist pressures and, at worst,
condemned as a foreign force intent on destroying Saskatchewan’s British heritage and
actively excluded from public life.261 This racialized citizenship led both organizations
to articulate a form of British nativism that attacked any perceived threat to
Saskatchewan’s “Britishness,” especially separate schools, bilingualism, and non-Anglo
immigration. As a result, Saskatchewan society fractured along racial and religious lines
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as nativism and anti-Catholicism rivaled wheat marketing as the primary political
discourse of the 1920s.
This nativism fits uncomfortably within the province’s political historiography.
Historians first began paying attention to the Klan in the 1960s and 1970s.262 These
early histories viewed the KKK as an anomaly in an otherwise harmonious province.
They acknowledged the eruption of religious intolerance in 1927 with the onset of the
Klan but concluded that the Great Depression relegated these racial antagonisms to the
dustbin of history. The KKK, in short, was depicted as “exotic and marginal.”263 More
recently, historians have begun to view the Klan as being a symptom of the larger
religious and racial tensions inherent to Saskatchewan’s heterogeneous population. “The
Klan was not something alien to Saskatchewan,” James Pitsula notes, “it was
Saskatchewan.”264 For Pitsula, the Klan served as the main protagonist in a battle over
the nature of the British heritage. Britishness, he argues, “was an open, fluid concept, the
meaning of which was highly contested.”265 Just as the province’s conservative farmers
contested the individual’s freedom of action in the dominant wheat economy, the Klan
challenged the province’s racial and religious foundations articulating a citizenship that
was limited to Anglo-Saxon Protestants.
Pitsula may have brought the Klan into the historical mainstream, but his narrative
maintains the traditional assumption that the KKK’s influence and significance were
confined to the years between 1927 and 1930. For Pitsula, the Klan’s collapse in 1930
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meant the failure of its nativist message. “In the long term,” he alleges, “the Klan lost the
battle for the soul of Saskatchewan. The British Canada it believed in faded away.”266
While there is some merit to this claim, Pitsula’s conclusions miss the larger significance
of the Klan’s legacy in Saskatchewan. Far from being on the losing side in a contest over
what it meant to be British, the Klan’s characterization of Catholics and non-Anglo
immigrants as “deficient individuals” transcended the organization itself. The Klan’s
direct influence may have been limited to the late 1920s, but its conception of a raciallylimited citizenship was widely shared. By focusing solely on the Klan, Pitsula and the
earlier histories downplay the extent that racial and religious exclusionism both preceded
and outlived the KKK.
Historians of Saskatchewan have failed to appreciate the connections between the KKK
and the Orange Lodge. This is not to say that networks between these organizations have
been ignored. Even the earliest studies on the Saskatchewan Klan acknowledged this
connection. The Orange Lodge, William Calderwood notes, “contributed more to the
Klan’s success in Saskatchewan than any other body.”267 Similarly, Pitsula recognizes
that “the organizations were complementary and overlapping, not competitive or
mutually exclusive.” Rather, historians have insisted on treating these organizations in
isolation.268 Noting that the Klan “offered a populist type of British Protestant
nationalism, such as the Orange Lodge did not provide,” Pitsula introduces the Lodge and
then spends the rest of his study ignoring it.269 Downplaying these connections is
especially problematic given the fact that, by the mid-1920s, the messages offered by the
Klan and the Orange Lodge were indistinguishable. Both organizations used their large
followings to champion a racially-limited citizenship wherein Britishness existed as the
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sole litmus test for a person’s ability to think and act as an individual. Studying the Klan
in isolation not only ignores its similarities with the Orange Lodge, it also portrays this
nativist ideology as foreign to Saskatchewan.
The Orange Lodge, far from an anomaly, was central to Canada’s political and social life.
First emerging in late-eighteenth century Ireland, the Orange Lodge took its name from
King William of Orange whose victory at the Battle of Boyne on July 12th, 1690—
celebrated by the Lodge as the Glorious Twelfth—ensured Protestant domination of
Britain and Ireland. Orangemen envisioned themselves as following in William’s
footsteps and sought to defend the interests of Protestant settlers against the native Irish
Catholics. For Orangemen, this defence entailed a “strident monarchical Britishness,
defensive Protestantism and resolute anti-Catholicism” which fused “political and
religious beliefs.”270 A secret society, the Orange Lodge used ritualism and symbolism
to bind British Protestants together in ethnic and religious solidarity. From humble
origins in County Armagh in 1795, the Orange Lodge spread to all corners of the British
Empire wherever Protestant Irish could be found. Canada’s first lodges appeared in
Montreal and Halifax in 1800 before spreading with the rapid influx of Irish immigrants
following the War of 1812.271
Although initially an Irish-sectarian organization, the Grand Orange Lodge of British
America—formally organized in 1823—dedicated itself to defending the interests of all
British Protestants. The Canadian Orange Lodge, Cecil Houston and William Smyth
note, possessed an inherent “chameleon-like quality,” allowing itself to adapt to local
conditions. This flexibility enabled lodges to appear in areas with limited Irish settlement
by fostering a sense of community around a shared religion and an uncompromising anti-
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Catholicism.272 By the late-nineteenth century, the Orange Lodge had become one of the
dominant political and social forces in Protestant Canada. Not only did local halls serve
as schools, town halls, and meeting places, but membership within the Lodge was widely
considered a prerequisite to securing work and political office. Between 1860 and 1910,
one-third of English-speaking Canadian men were active in the Lodge at one point in
their lives. 273
The Orange Lodge first emerged in Saskatchewan in the late nineteenth century. The
province’s first locals appeared in Regina in 1891 and Prince Albert in 1892, following
settlers from Ontario and Great Britain. As railways began crisscrossing the province,
the Orange Lodge followed. By 1905, for example, lodges had formed along the Soo
Line through Moose Jaw, Drinkwater, Milestone, Yellow Grass, Weyburn, and Estevan,
and along a parallel line south-east of Regina.274 Between 1892 and 1905, the Orange
Lodge expanded from sixteen to fifty-seven lodges, with an estimated membership of
1,424. The largest period of growth, however, occurred after the First World War.
Under the guidance of W.H.G. Armstrong, Grand Organizer for Saskatchewan during the
1920s, membership increased from the second-lowest to the second-highest in Canada.275
The reasons for the Orange Lodge’s expansion in Saskatchewan are multifaceted. For
many members, the Lodge served a social need in a frontier society. With immigrants
pouring in from all corners of Canada and the British Empire, the Orange Lodge
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“provided mythology, conviviality, and a sense of identity.”276 Whether one was born in
Dublin, Edinburgh, or Toronto, the Orange Lodge offered a welcome site of stability and
familiarity. Membership also offered immigrants a sense of respectability. In a society
divided by distinctions between urban and rural, large and small farmer, the Orange
Lodge’s fraternalism worked to break down discrepancies of wealth, residence, and
privilege. The Orange Lodge was “not restricted in class and creed.” 277 The only
stipulations for membership required an applicant to be British, loosely defined, and
Protestant. In fact, elites encouraged membership from the “middling sorts” as a means
of moral uplift for their fellow Protestants. Religious instruction, lending libraries, and
speakers’ series all formed part of the local lodge’s activities.278
Membership also came with its own set of material rewards. The Orange Lodge
functioned as a mutual-aid society, with members swearing to provide each other with
assistance ranging from informal connections— helping newcomers secure work,
housing, and good farmland, assisting with harvest, and making introductions—to a more
formalized network of the Lodge’s extensive life-insurance policy guaranteed to all
members. Membership came with the assurance that, whatever hardships frontier life
presented, their fellow Orangemen would support them. The Orange Lodge, a familiar
sight in many small Prairie towns, also provided a much-needed service to the local
community, acting as a gathering place, town hall, and school. The highpoint in the
social calendar of many of Saskatchewan’s rural communities came as the Orange Lodge
celebrated the Glorious Twelfth, bringing the community together for parades, picnics,
speeches, and dancing.279
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In return for these services, the Orange Lodge required members to live up to its ideals of
Protestant citizenship. “We need numbers in our Order,” an officer noted, “but, more
than numbers, we need men of the right stamp, men of the kind that will prove a credit to
the Order, who will manifest its principles in their own lives and will assist in placing it
in the van of every movement making for social purity, civic righteousness, and national
honor.”280 Orangemen were expected to support the Lodge in its quest to maintain
Saskatchewan’s traditional racial, religious, and cultural makeup. These “principles”—
often expressed in its informal motto “One Language, One School, One Flag”—served as
the guiding force behind the Lodge’s attacks on French Quebec and Saskatchewan’s
separate schools. They also acted as the lens through which Saskatchewan’s sizable
contingent of Orangemen understood and reacted to the world around them.
The Orange Lodge understood its mission as protecting the people’s British
individualism. When it came to religion, for example, the Saskatchewan Orangemen
were firm in their sectarian denunciations of the Catholic Church. This was not merely a
theological distinction. For Orangemen, the Catholic Church’s ritualism, secrecy, and
hierarchy threatened the people’s personal liberty and freedoms. “The teaching of the
Roman Catholic Church,” S.A. White, the Lodge’s field secretary in the late 1920s,
noted, “and the history of every country in which Roman Catholicism has been
established prove conclusively that Roman Catholicism is the foe to human progress, its
spirit is autocratic and it has ever sought to impose shackles upon the free spirit of
man.”281 Even more worrisome for Orangemen was the belief that, once the Catholic
Church gained a foothold, it was impossible to remove. Nat Given, Grand Master in
1928, warned that “the shackles of the Roman Church are strong and hard to cast asunder
once the soul is tied up with them.”282 In light of this threat, the Orange Lodge
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understood its central purpose as protecting personal freedoms by fighting the first signs
of the “the ascendancy and encroachment” of Catholic influence within the province.283
Ironically, the Lodge’s attacks on Roman Catholicism in the name of freedom actually
limited the individualism of its members. Strict penalties existed for members who failed
to live up to expectations. Expulsion for marrying Catholics and failing to honour debts,
for instance, occurred regularly throughout the 1920s.284 For Orangemen, to marry a
Catholic was akin to forsaking one’s British Protestant heritage; such men were no longer
worthy of membership.
A sense of urgency permeated this defence. Orangemen believed Catholics were actively
working against Saskatchewan’s British traditions. As W.J. Kernaghan, Grand Secretary
in 1892 argued: “The Rome today is the same as the Rome of centuries ago, and [is] busy
endeavouring to plant their Romish settlements throughout our country.”285 Adding
weight to this belief was the fact that Saskatchewan’s Catholic population was growing at
a faster rate than other areas in Canada. In 1901, less than 18,000 Catholics resided in the
province, accounting for roughly twenty percent of the population. By 1921, in contrast,
Increased numbers of non-preferred, largely Catholic immigrants swelled their number to
147,000, significantly larger than either Alberta or Manitoba whose populations were
97,000 and 105,000 respectively.286 Orangemen responded to this increase with a
visceral anti-Catholicism. “Better wake up before it is too late,” the Lodge argued, “and
we have a revolution, for as sure as you are alive, blood will be spilled if the Protestant
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people don’t band together.”287 For Orangemen, the threat of revolution and bloodshed
were not mere rhetorical flourishes.
A conspiratorial mindset dominated the Orange Lodge. Orangemen truly believed that
the Pope was intent on replacing Saskatchewan’s freedom loving Anglo-Protestant
citizens with the “dregs and off-scourings of Central and Southern Europe.”288 As Rev.
A. Walker, the provincial Grand Master for 1931, argued: “Rome is striving with all the
power she has to get control of this Canada of ours.”289 Orangemen, for example,
viewed any encroachment of bilingualism as a Quebec-Catholic plot to gain control of
Canada. References to bilingual stamps, postage forms, and radio publications filled the
provincial Lodge’s annual meetings as evidence of Quebec’s aim to “not only force
bilingualism upon the whole of Canada, but if possible to make French the dominant
language.”290 Within this conspiratorial mindset, any perceived decline in AngloProtestants’ position was a gain for their Catholic enemy. Orangemen had to stand on
constant guard. “If we are to continue as free, enlightened, and progressive people,” the
Lodge’s field secretary argued in 1930, “we must be keen to see and quick to repulse the
first gesture of ecclesiastical aggression.”291
Orangemen saw Catholicism’s creeping influence everywhere they looked. This was
especially the case with the province’s youth. Orangemen believed individual freedoms
emanated from the province’s British traditions. It was essential, therefore, to ensure that
the province’s education exemplified these values so that Saskatchewan’s youth would
carry the traditions forward. The Catholic Church, they argued, was doing everything
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possible to destroy these young people’s individualism before it had a chance to take
root. Since 1905, for example, the Catholic Church ran the lion’s share of the province’s
orphanages. This was an intolerable situation for Orangemen who viewed it as Rome’s
attempt to subvert Protestant youth, weakening their British values. According to Dan
Malcomson, Grand Master in 1930: “the hands of the Romanist is out so that they may
grab the orphan children of this Province irrespective of their faith.”292 In 1923, the
Saskatchewan Lodge established its own orphanage in Indian Head—the “Orange
Home”—to ensure that Protestant children were not lost to Catholicism. This institution
provided a much-needed public service, but its impetus and the substantial resources the
Lodge placed into its operations were predicated in this pervasive fear of a Papist
conspiracy to “grab” Protestant children.
This focus on protecting youth was also central to the Orange Lodge’s denunciation of
Saskatchewan’s separate schools. In 1905, Wilfrid Laurier’s Liberal government passed
the Saskatchewan Act, setting out the constitutional framework for the province’s
creation. Even though the British North America (BNA) Act made education a
provincial responsibility, section 17 of the Autonomy Bill guaranteed Saskatchewan’s
Catholics the right to form their own publicly-funded separate schools. For Orangemen,
the fact that Ottawa “foisted” this “iniquitous system of Separate Schools” onto
Saskatchewan was evidence of a Catholic conspiracy. The Pope, they argued, pushed
separate schools as a means of furthering the “ascendency, extension, and encroachment
of the Church of Rome” onto the minds of Saskatchewan youth. Laurier, as a Catholic,
had simply “bowed” to his master’s command. 293 The Orange Lodge was unequivocal
in its opposition.294 Unless Protestants stood fast at any sign of Catholic aggression,
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Saskatchewan would become “a second Quebec with the Roman hierarchy dictating our
policies and language.”295
Although Orangemen championed this conspiratorial anti-Catholicism, they also
understood that they were fighting a losing battle in their quest to limit Catholic influence
in Saskatchewan. Majority support for abolishing separate schools never materialized.296
Yet, the Lodge did not interpret this fact as a deficiency in their platform, but as a
weakness in Saskatchewan’s mainstream Protestantism. Beginning in the early twentieth
century, Canadian Protestantism underwent a modernization process. Theological
liberals, located in the nation’s church-affiliated universities, sought to keep
Protestantism relevant by accommodating biblical criticism and evolutionary theory,
rejecting biblical literalism, and switching focus from personal to societal salvation.
Many Canada’s mainstream Protestant denominations—including Methodists,
Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and the Anglicans—were swept up in this
modernization. Not everyone, however, was content or comfortable with these changes.
By the 1920s, conservative Protestants began challenging this liberalization, arguing for a
revitalized Christianity based upon biblical literalism, traditional ethics, and the need for
an individual, personal salvation. These conservative-minded Protestants organized both
inside mainstream denominations—most notably in the Baptist and Presbyterian
churches— and in their newly created independent “fundamentalist” networks of schools,
conferences, and churches.297
The Saskatchewan Orange Lodge played a central role in this fundamentalist-modernist
controversy. Although the Lodge did not require its members to adhere to a specific
Protestant denomination, it actively endorsed a fundamentalist outlook. S.A. White
informed his fellow Orangemen in 1927 that liberal Christianity was to blame for a great
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deal of the Catholic Church’s successes in the province. “Roman Catholic aggression,”
he argued, “will continue just so long as we allow ourselves to be cajoled into that false
tolerance which is rather weakness.” Even more troublesome, Orangemen believed this
liberalism weakened individual action and future generations’ ability to stand up to this
aggression. As Stuart Muirhead, Grand Master in 1932, proclaimed: “we are raising a
generation who have no conviction…and the position of the great mass of Protestant
clergymen seems to be that we must be liberal, broadminded, etc., and not cause strife or
religious prejudices, but if we forget what it cost to give us the liberties we now enjoy,
then the result of such spineless teaching can easily be prophesized.”298 The only
solution, therefore, was a return to their theological-conservative roots. Protestants had
to “tighten up all along the line and have our Protestantism definite, clear-cut, and
unashamed.”299 To this end, the provincial Lodge provided “a program of Protestant
education and enlightenment” with the ultimate goal of “a Protestant awakening in the
province.”300 The Orange Lodge also actively courted conservative clergy hoping that
they would “declare themselves in their endorsation of our aims and principles.”301 By
1930, the Saskatchewan Orange Lodge included over 300 clergymen among its
members.302
This conservative Protestantism influenced the Orange Lodge’s understanding of
individualism. For Orangemen, to be British was to be Protestant. Orangeism, White
argued, “is firmly based upon the true foundation of religion and liberty and is definitely
pledged to do its utmost to maintain the dominance of British ideals and Protestant
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principles.”303 These “British ideals,” including “loyalty to our free institutions, and love
for justice, fair play, toleration and individual liberty,” not only sprung from the AngloProtestant tradition, but were also a guarantee of Protestantism’s continued ascendency in
Saskatchewan.304 “British Supremacy, British Prestige, British Customs, the English
Language, the Common Law and the Union Jack,” Grand Master Adams argued, “are
essential to the future well-being of this Dominion.”305 For Adams, this belief was
immutable: “The Principles and Objectives we profess are the same today as they were at
the commencement of the Orange Association.” No matter the time or place, Orangemen
would continue to stand behind the same motto as William of Orange: “THE
PROTESTANT RELIGION AND THE LIBERTIES OF ENGLAND.”306
Separate schools were not just the Papacy’s attempts to convert the people of
Saskatchewan, but a direct attack on the personal freedom granted by the province’s
British tradition. As White explained this logic: “The Roman Catholic Separate School is
under the domination of the priesthood, the priesthood is under the absolute dictation of
the Papacy, the Papacy is an institution which derives its being from all that is most
diametrically opposed to liberty and progress, is itself an autocracy and depends on
autocracies for its very existence.” Separate schools weakened the Protestant and the
British nature of society. As such, they posed a “menace to the development of true
Canadian citizenship.”307 The inverse of this point, they asserted, was equally true. Any
threat to the British nature of Saskatchewan constituted an attack on its Protestant
identity. The Orange Lodge interpreted attempts to foster a distinctly Canadian identity
at the expense of the nation’s British heritage as a process of Catholic aggression. “The
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Province of Quebec,” White noted, “is dominated by the Catholic Church, and because of
their national aims and their church affiliations, a subtle campaign of disintegration has
been carried on for many years which in these latter days has emerged into the open.”308
The Orange Sentinel, the national Lodge’s newspaper, went so far as to equate these
challenges as a fight over Saskatchewan’s very essence, informing readers of “The Battle
to Preserve Saskatchewan as a British Province.”309 As a part of this battle, Orangemen
considered attempts to replace “God Save the King” with “O Canada,” adopt a distinctly
Canadian flag in place of the Union Jack, introduce bilingual postage stamps, or weaken
in any way Canada’s legal ties to the British Empire a part of this Catholic plot.310
The interconnectedness of Protestantism and concepts of Britishness shaped how
Orangemen understood race. The Orange Lodge divided society along a racial hierarchy
based upon the perceived ability of different ethnicities to adopt the English language,
profess a Protestant faith, and internalize British values, especially their capacity to act as
individuals independent of outside control. Anglo-Saxon Britons, who had the language
skills and cultural heritage necessary to fully integrate into Saskatchewan’s BritishProtestant society, were at the top of this hierarchy. “No better citizens can be found,”
Grand Master Malcomson argued, “than our own flesh and blood.”311 People of
“Teutonic” background—including Scandinavians, Germans, and Danes—were next on
the list. Not only did these peoples “speedily learn English…and Canadian customs,”
their “standards of education” and “manner in organizing life” made them almost
indistinguishable from “people of the British Isles.” On the other hand, Slavs and
“Mongolians” (i.e. Finnish, Magyar, and Hungarian) were not welcome. “They come
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from countries of retarded civilization,” White argued, “holding ideals and standards of
life vastly different and undoubtedly lower than our own.” While White conceded the
possibility of assimilating small numbers of these people, the “long process of educating
and training” necessary to make them “British” made the attempt hardly worth the effort.
In fact, the amount of resources required lowered “the standard of living in this
country.”312 Visible minorities and Indigenous peoples, in contrast, never even merited a
mention by the Orange Lodge. This absence is a clear indication of the Lodge’s
racialized thinking. Whereas the Orangemen believed European immigrants could be
assimilated, visible minorities would never belong and were ignored altogether.
The Saskatchewan Orange Lodge was not alone in adhering to this racial hierarchy. The
province’s conservative farmers disparaged their counterparts from eastern and central
Europe for their perceived proclivity towards radical economic theories. In fact, a racial
hierarchy was widespread throughout the province.313 The women’s arm of the SGGA,
for instance, buttressed much of its work on the belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon
races.314 Similarly, Clifford Sifton, as Minister of the Interior in Wilfrid Laurier’s
cabinet, adhered to a racial hierarchy similar to that offered by the Orange Lodge.315
Even Tommy Douglas, Saskatchewan’s future CCF Premier and the nation’s “greatest
Canadian,” once advocated for the forcible sterilization of “defective” immigrants from
central and eastern Europe.316
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What is different, however, is the extent that this racial theorizing dominated the Orange
Lodge’s outlook, feeding its conspiratorial anti-Catholicism and fears of a weakening of
British individualism in the province. Unlike Sifton, who welcomed continental
European immigrants—whom he referred to as “stalwart peasants in a sheepskin coat”—
the Orange Lodge opposed any immigration from non-preferred countries.317
Orangemen understood immigrants from Central and Eastern Canada were
disproportionately Catholic. As in the case of separate schools and orphanages, the
Orange Lodge portrayed the presence of these people in Saskatchewan as part of the
same sinister Catholic plot. “The Roman Catholic Church,” Grand Master Given argued,
“has been especially active in promulgating and rigorously so, a system to fill this
country with people of their own faith, regardless of nationality.”318 Likewise, the
Orange Lodge was insistent that, because of the difficulty in assimilating these
newcomers, they posed a direct threat to the future of the Anglo-Protestant makeup of the
province. If the government allowed these non-preferred “foreigners” to enter the
province, the Orange Sentinel warned, British citizens would “be surrounded by people
who know nothing, and care less, about British ideals, and who have names which take
three sneezes and a yodel to pronounce.” Even worse, Orangemen would “probably have
to learn to talk bohunk in Lodge to carry on a conversation with [their] future son- or
daughter-in-law.”319
In response, the Lodge urged a complete overhaul of the immigration system. Under
Sifton’s system, Saskatchewan received a “preponderance of immigrants from the
countries of Central and Southern Europe,” who “know nothing and care less for our
British ideals, but tend to cling to their own language and perpetuate their own
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customs.”320 Instead of continuing to accept “dregs and off-scourings,” Canada needed a
system preferential to “immigrants from the British Isles and Northern Europe
instead.”321 As in all matters relating to this conspiratorial anti-Catholicism, Orangemen
considered immigration a matter of life-or-death. The “danger” existed that “full rights
of citizenship may be conferred upon those whose principles are opposed to our British
ideals and whose sole aim is to subvert the constitution of the country.”322 Saskatchewan
ran the risk of becoming “another Balkans or worse” if the Catholic Church succeeded in
flooding the province with non-preferred foreigners.323
The Saskatchewan Orange Lodge presented itself as both a fraternal organization
providing real benefits to a frontier society and as the champion of a nativist British
nationalism. While its social and communal benefits were important to the Orange
Lodge’s popularity overall, its uncompromising religious and racial stances were
responsible for the timing of the Orange Lodge’s rapid expansion after 1918. Heightened
racial and religious tensions characterized the inter-war period. Massive immigration
increases during the first three decades of the century expanded the province’s population
ten-fold from 91,000 in 1901 to 921,000 in 1931. With this expansion, Saskatchewan’s
Anglo-British population witnessed a weakening in their relative position. On the eve of
the Great War, 54% of Saskatchewan’s population identified with a British ancestry. By
1931, this position declined to 47%. Of the three Prairie provinces, Saskatchewan’s
British population was the only one to lose its majority position. Equally concerning, the
religious makeup of the province underwent a similar shift as increased immigration from
“non-preferred” countries increased the province’s Roman Catholic population from 19%
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in 1921 to 25% in 1931.324 While the province’s Anglo-population continued to hold a
privileged place in Saskatchewan society—controlling the levers of political and social
power—the decline of their relative position vis-à-vis racial and ethnic “others” caused
apprehension over the future of the province.
Religious and racial issues that were tolerated a decade earlier now took centre stage in
the public’s mind. The most vicious debate centered on the public school’s ability to
serve as a site of assimilation. Controversies surrounding race, language, and religion in
Saskatchewan’s schools were not new in the inter-war period. The Saskatchewan Act,
when first introduced in 1905 with protections for religious and language instruction,
infuriated elements of the province’s British population. Sifton went so far as to resign
his cabinet position in protest.325 Under the guidance of Premier Walter Scott, however,
the British and “foreign” elements within the province entered a period of uneasy
compromise. Public schools were free to offer instruction in foreign languages for a halfhour at the end of the day or in French for the first two years. Likewise, Saskatchewan
developed a system of separate schools under the nominal control of the provincial
Department of Education. Although some issues continued, such as the controversial
decision in 1913 to require all Catholics to assign their taxes to separate schools if they
existed in their district, Scott’s compromise lasted until his retirement in 1916.326
This period of tolerance ended with the war’s rising racial tensions. In February 1918, a
fiery meeting of the provincial school trustees replaced the moderate president with
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James F. Bryant, an unyielding anti-Catholic and future Conservative cabinet minister,
who claimed English was the only means of uniting Saskatchewan’s disparate ethnic
groups 327 Under Bryant’s leadership, trustees voted overwhelmingly in favour of
making English the “sole language of instruction in the schools of the province.”328 The
Orange Lodge fueled this apprehension. J.T.M. Anderson, an Orangeman and future
Conservative Premier, published The Education of the New Canadian in 1918 which
detailed his experiences working with immigrant families during his tenure as a school
inspector for the Department of Education.329 Anderson argued that widespread
immigration was bringing newcomers into the province faster than the schools could turn
them into British citizens. For Anderson, the provincial Liberal party, buoyed by the
non-British immigrants’ votes, compounded this problem by refusing to act. The result,
he argued, posed a threat “to our national existence” and made Saskatchewan the
“laughing stock of all enlightened peoples.”330 For Anderson and the Orange Lodge, the
only solution was a fundamental reordering of how the province treated its foreign
population. Immigration had to be immediately curtailed, English had to be the only
language of instruction in the province’s schools, and the citizenship rights of “new
Canadians” had to be limited until they fully accepted “our language, customs, and
ideals.”331
Anderson’s treatise spoke to the fears felt by a significant proportion of the province’s
Anglo-Saxon population. The SGGA, the Anglican Synod, and the Baptist Convention
also lent their voices to the Orange Lodge and school trustees, passing a series of
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resolutions calling for an English-only education system.332 Backed with this support,
the Orange Lodge flooded the province with flyers calling for a settlement of the
“language question” and helped institute a letter writing campaign that inundated the
Premier with hundreds of letters urging him to act.333 Martin, under pressure from all
sides, capitulated and passed legislation forbidding all foreign language instruction
except for French in the first grade or for one hour at the end of the day if the local school
board desired. Going further, the government also appointed Anderson to the newly
created office of Director of Education among the New Canadians.334 The Orange
Lodge’s racialized vision was now mainstream.
This widely-shared nativism further fueled apprehension over sectarianism and the
presence of Roman Catholic separate schools in the province. The Saskatchewan Act did
not distinguish between Catholic and Protestant religious minorities when it granted the
right to form separate schools. Most of these schools were Catholic, but several isolated
pockets existed across the province where Protestants were in the minority. Although
they had the same right to form separate schools afforded to Catholics in minority
positions, many were unable to afford the costs associated with such an enterprise.
Instead, most of these Protestant students attended public schools administered by
Catholic trustees. In the climate of intensified racial and religious tensions, rumours
circulated among the province’s Anglo-Protestant population of the apparent
depravations these children endured. Nuns and priests employed as teachers, the
prominent display of Catholic symbols, and degrading punishments, including forcing
students to kneel in front of the crucifix for hours on end all served to fuel AngloProtestant outrage. “As soon as the French element get control of the Public School,” the
Orange Sentinel opined, “they proceed to make it a Roman Catholic school.”335 Matters
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reached a climax in 1928 when a group of Protestant parents in the Gouverneur School
District—located west of the French Catholic community of Ponteix—made headlines for
refusing to send their children to the local school. During their trial on charges of truancy
where Bryant served as their attorney, the parents substantiated many of the rumours,
claiming that their local Catholic school trustees replaced the Union Jack with a Crucifix
and forced Protestant students to learn the catechism. Although the courts acquitted the
parents, the Gouverneur case enflamed anti-Catholic and anti-immigration sentiments.336
The Gouverneur case provided an opportunity for the Orange Lodge to popularize its
anti-Catholic message and spread it across Saskatchewan. For Orangemen, the trial was
the latest attempt by the Pope’s “hidden hand” to “forcibly…destroy our public school in
the province.”337 As a result, the Orange Lodge did its utmost to drum up opposition.
“Would you like to have a black-skirted ‘she-cat’ of a Nun teach your children in a public
school that you are a heretic,” they questioned, “then when chastising your child make it
kiss the forbidden image, the Crucifix?” 338 The Lodge’s defence of the province’s
public schools played off Anglo-Protestants’ fears of their future place within an
increasingly heterogeneous Saskatchewan.
This strategy paid off. In a decade of heightened racial and religious tensions, the
Lodge’s unequivocal position resonated with Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Protestant
population and fueled the organization’s exceptional growth. Prior to the Great War,
Saskatchewan accounted for only fifty-seven lodges and a membership of less than 1,500.
Simply put, the organization lacked the grassroots support to push its controversial
positions into the mainstream. It was not that Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Protestants were
uninterested in this vision, but that they did not fear their position eroding. As anxieties
increased in the 1920s, however, the Orange Lodge capitalized on Protestant fears. The
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Lodge’s stance on immigration, language, schools, and religion resonated with
Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Protestant population, providing a sense of security in otherwise
apprehensive times. In return, the Lodge became one of the province’s largest social
organizations with over 200 lodges in 1929 and a membership exceeding 60,000.
Although the Orange Lodge’s reach spread across the entire province, the strongest
representation occurred in the rural areas of central and south Saskatchewan, especially
those areas adjacent to large Catholic and foreign settlements.339 From 1922 until 1929,
the Lodge’s R. Dawson Shield—awarded annually for the county with the largest
increase in membership—was awarded to areas with significant Catholic and foreign
populations.340
Despite this dramatic increase in membership, the Saskatchewan Orange Lodge found it
difficult to translate its newfound size into direct political action. Fearing that a direct
political stance would alienate it from both government and the citizenry, Orangemen
adopted an official position of non-partisanship. “The supreme thing in our national
life,” White argued, “is not the political party which may control our government, nor is
it the material wealth we may be able to display, but it is the character of our citizens, the
moral life we develop in our churches, our homes and our streets.”341 This did not mean,
however, that Orangemen did not think or function politically. In 1910, the provincial
Lodge adopted its first political platform that exemplified its dream for a “British”
province. Under this vision, English was to be the “only official language,” only “nonsectarian” schools would receive “aid from the public treasury,” immigrants from nonpreferred countries would undergo “close supervision,” and the province would maintain
the “British connection” at all costs.342 Yet, the Lodge never intended its policies to
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transform the organization into a political party. Rather, the platform—as well as the
annual resolutions passed in its support—provided members with an overview of the
Lodge’s beliefs against which it could judge the province’s political parties.
Even without an official endorsement, the similarities between the Lodge’s platform and
Saskatchewan’s conservative parties were clear. Frederick Haultain, the former territorial
Premier and leader of the Provincial Rights Party, campaigned in 1905 and 1908 for a
single non-sectarian “national” school system “with equal rights to all and special
privileges to none.”343 Likewise, the 1916 Conservative Party platform joined the
Orange Lodge in calls for a “clear cut policy” of English-only schools.344 Prominent
conservatives at both the federal and provincial levels—including J.T.M. Anderson and
John Diefenbaker—were avowed Orangemen, appearing often at Lodge meetings to
drum up support for their parties. So close was this connection that conservative
politicians often felt pressured to take out Orange Lodge membership as a prerequisite to
receiving their nomination.345
Although the Lodge did not tell its members who to vote for, it left little doubt as to who
they should vote against. The Liberal Party, both federal and provincial, could not be
relied upon to defend Protestant and British interests in Saskatchewan. The provincial
party, in office from 1905 until 1929, relied heavily on the Catholic and immigrant vote
to retain power, while the federal party under Wilfrid Laurier and Mackenzie King relied
heavily on Quebec.346 For Orangemen, this constituted nothing less than a
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“prostitut[ion]” of “our Canadian ideals of citizenship in order to gain temporary political
advantage.”347 R.J. Gibson, Grand Master in 1914, vowed that the Lodge would “put a
Liberal party out of power” for saddling “this province with separate schools.”348
Orangemen went a step further during a meeting with the Premier in early 1916. The
delegates avowed that the Lodge would only support political parties opposed to separate
schools and insinuated that Orangemen had turned out governments in other provinces
that “tampered with the public schools.”349 The federal party, in the Lodge’s estimation,
was just as corrupt. Orangemen believed Ottawa was “under the control of the solid
Quebec Roman Catholic block,” fueling fears that the Papacy directly controlled the
Liberals.350 At the same time, communists and socialists also received the Orange
Lodge’s scorn for their unabashed secularism. Communism, Grand Master Walker
noted, was a “hydra-headed monster” that struck at the very “roots of Christianity.”351
As the CCF rose to prominence during the Great Depression, the Orange Lodge was
quick to inform its members of the danger posed by the new party. “Romanism,” Grand
Master Stanley M. Wilson warned the Lodge in 1935, “is not the only enemy in our
midst.” The CCF was “trying hard to raise its head.” The Lodge had no choice but to
“fight this menace” with any means possible.352
These critiques and warnings notwithstanding, the Lodge’s inability to accomplish its
stated goals dissatisfied many of its new members. By the mid-1920s, the Saskatchewan
Orange Lodge had successfully capitalized on Anglo-Protestants’ fears to become one of
the province’s largest special interest groups, surpassing even the UFC(SS) and SGGA at
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their height. For members who believed that the Lodge would do something to
ameliorate their weakening positions, however, the usual tactics of lobbying and
education were not going far or fast enough. Although the Orange Lodge could point to
the English-only amendments to the Education Act, minority groups continual flouting of
the law angered Orangemen. The Orange Lodge had encouraged religious and racial
antagonisms but could not take the next step and translate this antagonism into further
reform.
This failure opened the door for the KKK’s blistering expression of the same nativist
British nationalism. The Klan first emerged in the southern United States during
Reconstruction. The organization helped re-establish white supremacy through its
proclivity for violence and intimidation against newly freed slaves, including rapes,
lynching, and beatings.353 After disbanding in the 1870s, the Klan re-emerged in 1915
with a more moderate focus. Although it retained the symbolism of its earlier
manifestation—including regalia, peculiar naming, and cross burnings—the second Klan
reinvented itself as a fraternal and social organization dedicated towards engaging white
citizens in building stronger communities. The Klan was still a racist and sometimes
violent organization, but it disdained overt actions of violence in favour of uniting all
white Protestant Americans in a social crusade.354 This new focus allowed the Klan to
spread across the nation from its original heartland in the American south. Indiana, for
example, had a larger membership in the 1920s than Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi
combined. With a black population of less than three percent, the racial violence
commonly associated with the southern Klan was almost entirely absent in the Hoosier
state. Rather, the Indiana Klan gained the support of one-third of all native born white
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men by emphasizing an “ethnic nationalism” which “concerned itself primarily not with
persecuting ethnic minorities but with promoting the ability of average citizens to
influence the workings of society and government.”355 Although virulently anti-Catholic
and anti-Semitic, the new Klan abandoned the violence of its earlier form, calling instead
for social reform, a return to traditional morality, and the cleaning up of corrupt politics.
It was this “reborn” Klan that spread from Indiana to Saskatchewan. In late 1926, Lewis
Scott, his son, Harold, and Hugh Emmons—all from South Bend, Indiana—arrived in
Saskatchewan with a warrant to organize a provincial Klan. Earlier attempts to set up
local Klaverns in Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Calgary had met little success. In
Saskatchewan, in contrast, the Klan took root. The Scotts established themselves in
Regina, while Emmons went to organize in Moose Jaw. Of all Klan centres in
Saskatchewan, Moose Jaw proved the most fruitful. As a railway divisional point,
Moose Jaw’s large transient population earned the city a reputation for corruption,
violence, and vice. The police force, often implicated in the crimes themselves, did little
to rectify the situation. Emmons portrayed the Klan as a civic organization dedicated to
“cleaning up” the city. A charismatic speaker, Emmons asserted that Moose Jaw would
be a fine city if not for the “painted ladies [plying] their obnoxious trade and other visible
offences against God.”356 With eighty-five percent of the population claiming British
ancestry, Emmons singled out the remaining fifteen percent as the cause of this vice,
especially the Chinese population.357 Under Klan pressure, police began raiding Chinese
cafes, the stories of which made for spectacular headlines in Moose Jaw’s papers, further
increasing the Klan’s popularity. Buoyed by these results, Emmons quickly expanded
membership in the city. By mid-1927, Emmons sold 1,400 memberships to Moose Jaw
residents, donating an additional 800 to prominent politicians, business leaders, and
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clergymen. Of a city with a total population of only 20,000, at least 2,200 belonged to
the Klan.358
While successful in recruiting members, Emmons’ anti-vice campaign was a means to a
more lucrative end. Initiation in the Klan cost ten dollars, plus three dollars for the first
three months’ dues. The Klan promised prospective members that their thirteen-dollar
fee would cover organizing costs, the remainder of which would be turned over to the
local Klan once it received its formal charter. Under their contracts with the Indiana
Klan, however, each organizer received a percentage of their membership sales.
Emmons, for example, initially received eight dollars for every membership he sold. In
April 1927, this share expanded to include the entirety of Moose Jaw sales and two
dollars for every membership sold outside the city at events where he spoke. By
September, Emmons had sold 4,700 Klan memberships for a total income of $21,800.359
Emmons later claimed that, after deductions for expenses, he earned a total of $1,650
during his residency in Saskatchewan.360 Regardless of the amount, the three organizers
absconded from the province with the Klan’s money in September 1927.361
This scandal proved fortuitous for the Saskatchewan Klan as it allowed the organization
to re-emerge under local leadership. The first task lay in regaining Klan members’ trust.
The Klan’s reorganization convention, held in Moose Jaw in October 1927, passed
several resolutions intended to limit the possibility of continued dishonour. Henceforth,
the Klan would act as a provincial body with no outside affiliation to any other
organization. Likewise, delegates limited American organizers’ influence. The new
executive, for example, was one hundred percent Canadian-born. J.W. Rosborough,
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elected Imperial Wizard (leader), was a Regina accountant and Orangeman. Born in
Ontario, Rosborough lived in Buffalo for some time before moving to Saskatchewan
during the war. He worked for the provincial Education and Treasury Departments
before his close connections to the Conservative Party put him at odds with the governing
Liberals.362

Although well respected by Klan members, Rosborough was not their first

choice for Wizard. Rather, delegates preferred W.D. Cowan, a dentist and former
conservative Mayor of Regina and Unionist MP for Regina from 1917-1921. To the
Klansmen’s chagrin, however, Cowan turned the job down as he believed that his
association with the Conservative Party would limit the Klan’s effectiveness. Cowan
instead agreed to serve as Klan treasurer.363 Delegates also limited their organizers’
ability to unduly profit from their work. Newly hired organizers and lecturers—including
James J. Maloney, a rabid anti-Catholic who once studied in the seminary, and James
Hawkins, a Klansman from West Virginia—were paid on a strict salary basis. All
proceeds from membership sales would go directly to the organization itself.
These moves proved popular, and the reorganized Klan quickly surpassed its strength
under Emmons and the Scotts. Between 1927 and the end of 1928, the Klan added forty
local Klaverns and expanded its membership to a conservative estimate of 25,000.364
Rather than collapsing, as its detractors may have hoped, the provincial Klan emerged
from the scandal a much stronger and more united organization. “The Ku Klux Klan,”
Charles Ellis, secretary for the Regina Klavern, promised, “is not dead yet.”365
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Historians have posited several explanations for the Klan’s success in Saskatchewan. For
William Calderwood, the Klan owed its growth to the province’s unaddressed racial and
religious tensions. The Klan, he argues, “was nurtured on sentiments and prejudices
which had been latent in Saskatchewan society for years.”366 Although Saskatchewan
certainly had its share of racial and religious antagonisms, Calderwood’s explanation fails
to appreciate that every province had these same tensions. Racial and religious strife,
including questions over separate and public schools, were not unique to Saskatchewan.
Rather, the Klan’s success in Saskatchewan was the result of its close connections with
the Orange Lodge. In Ontario, for instance, the Orange Lodge had a series of informal
alliances with the ruling Conservative Party which ensured that the Lodge’s platform
received favourable political treatment. In Saskatchewan, on the other hand, the Orange
Lodge’s nativism alienated the ruling Liberal Party. “Ontario Orangemen had no need of
the Klan,” Pitsula concludes, “while those in Saskatchewan had an interest in having the
Klan succeed.”367 The relative success or failure of the KKK rested on the level of
support it received from other like-minded organizations.368
As the Klan established itself in Saskatchewan, it found enthusiastic support from the
provincial Orange Lodge. In many locales, Orange Halls served as meeting places for the
nascent Klan with the two organizations sharing speakers and lecturers.369 Likewise, the
publications of the organizations—the Orange Order’s Orange Sentinel and the KKK’s
The Klansman and The Western Freedman —ran stories outlining and praising each
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other’s activities.370 Most striking, however, was the overlap in membership. The
limited records that do exist point to Orangemen’s proclivity for joining the Klan. The
town of Kincaid, for example, had forty-three Klansmen, of which fifteen also belonged
to the Orange Lodge. Of Hazenmore’s fourteen Klansmen, two belonged to the
Lodge.371
With this overlap in membership, the activities of the two organizations intertwined. In
early 1927, the Klan and the Orange Lodge coordinated their opposition to the
Saskatchewan French Catholic Association’s proposal to have French-language teacher
training in the provincial Normal School. In identically-worded telegrams sent to the
Premier, both organizations stated their uncompromising opposition: “We will oppose in
every way possible the enforcing of bilingualism in this province. We believe in UNITY
of the Canadian People and that in this great NATION we should have ONE
LANGUAGE, and do not wish to see this part of Canada divided by language as found in
other parts of the world.”372 In a follow-up campaign, both the Klan and the Orange
Lodge inundated Liberal Premier Jimmy Gardiner with hundreds of letters in opposition
to bilingual training.
Although historians have acknowledged this affinity between the Klan and the Orange
Lodge, their primary focus on the KKK leaves the impression that the organizations were
separate entities. Unlike the Orange Lodge, Pitsula argues, which jealously guarded its
“elite” status and respectability, the Klan specialized in offering a “boisterous, vibrant,
populist” form of British nativism.373 This portrayal of the Klan and Orange Lodge as
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similar, but separate organizations, has significantly impacted our understanding of
Saskatchewan conservatism. On the one hand, historians have dismissed the provincial
Orange Lodge as politically ineffective, arguing that the Klan’s arrival was the
prerequisite for Conservative victory. “Above all, the Klan was present,” Pitsula argues.
“It filled a vacuum, offering leadership and inspiration in a way the Orange Lodge failed
to do.”374 This interpretation has resulted in an understanding of the Klan as an alien
import into the province despite recent attempts to write it into the “mainstream of
Canadian history.”375 Whereas the Klan was only active in Saskatchewan for a short
period of time, the Orange Lodge established itself over a period of decades.
Downplaying the connections between the two organizations only serves the fallacy that
the Klan was a racist anomaly. The Orange Lodge, in contrast, remains a respectful, if
prejudiced and ineffectual social organization. Historians have failed to appreciate that
the differences between the Orange Lodge and the Klan were much more a matter of
degree and optics than symptomatic of an ideological or organizational cleavage. This is
especially problematic given the fact that contemporaries clearly associated the two
organizations. La Survivance, Saskatchewan’s leading French-language newspaper,
ominously warned that the province’s “hot-headed Orangemen,” had allied with the
“grotesque and cynical K.K.K.”376
The KKK shared the Orange Lodge’s conspiratorial anti-Catholicism. Saskatchewan
may be nominally “under the flag of Britain,” a Klan speaker argued, “but we are under
the heel of Rome.”377 For Hawkins, the Catholic Church was behind a plot to destroy the
very essence of British individualism. “We have the principle of persecution and
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compulsion, and the approval of torture and every kind of maltreatment endorsed,” he
argued, all “blessed by a Church which cares little for the individual, but desires only
world-mastery and enslavement of the human soul to what she conceives to be the
truth.”378 The only option, therefore, was for Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Protestants to
oppose the Catholic Church at every opportunity. “Eternal vigilance,” a speaker argued,
“is the price of liberty and we must be on our guard that the hand of the Pope is not
permitted to grip and throttle this province.”379 These sentiments, although spoken by
avowed Klansmen, could easily have come from their counterparts in the Orange Lodge.
In fact, Klansmen reiterated many of the Orange Lodge’s main criticisms of Catholic
attempts to undermine the province’s individualist heritage, including preferential
immigration for Catholics, public funding for Catholic orphanages, and Catholic
influence in public schools.380
Unlike the Orange Lodge, however, the Klan felt no need to moderate the sensationalism
of its anti-Catholicism. Klan speakers routinely fabricated stories of papal plots to gain
support for their anti-Catholic crusade. Maloney, for example, told a Regina crowd that
the Pope planned to build a “residential palace” for himself in Montreal. “Mussolini of
Italy,” Maloney explained, “is a strong man, a just man, a right man. He won’t permit the
Pope of Rome to run Italy’s affairs much longer,” leaving Canada as the prime alternative
for the Holy See.381 Similarly, Maloney warned that Catholic priests, trained in
“mesmerism and hypnotism,” had “a terrible hold” on Catholic women.382 In the same
vein, Maloney alleged that priests used this power over their female parishioners for
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nefarious ends, filling Saskatchewan’s Catholic orphanages with their “illegitimate
children.”383 The Klan even equated campaigns for birth control with a Popish plot to
“keep down the Protestant children and augment the Roman families.”384 The Klan was
also more willing than the Orange Lodge to advocate extreme measures to prevent these
Catholic conspiracies. Maloney was willing to “shed his blood” in opposition to papal
domination. “We will demonstrate,” Maloney told an “overflowing” crowd at
Kerrobert’s Orpheum Theatre, “even if we must take up arms.”385
Both organizations promoted a dogged anti-Catholicism and conservative Protestantism.
Hawkins, like his Orangemen contemporaries, promised the people a “Protestant revival”
by turning back the liberalization of mainstream religion.386 The KKK “exists to uphold
the Christian faith in its initial purity” and would not rest until Saskatchewan returned to
“God and Christianity, pure and undefiled…for which our fathers bled and died.”387 The
Klan also borrowed the Orange Lodge’s tactic of recruiting like-minded Protestant
ministers to join its ranks and participate at Klan rallies. Reverend William Surman of
Regina’s Cameron Memorial Baptist Church, for example, served as Regina’s Exalted
Cyclops, or chief organizer, where he used his position as a religious leader to persuade
people to join the Klan. “I am a Minister of the Gospel,” he told a Regina Klan meeting,
“and, as Minister of the Gospel, I see nothing Contradictory in the principles which I
teach and the principles of the Klan, to which I belong.”388 Similarly, Reverends S.P.
Rondeau (a Woodrow United Church Minister), T.J. Hind (Moose Jaw’s First Baptist
Church), T. Bunting (Saskatoon’s Third Avenue Methodist), and R.G. Simpson all
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received speaker fees on behalf of their work for the Klan.389 These efforts paid
dividends. Outside observers often portrayed the Klan primarily as a Protestant, not antiCatholic, organization. The Kinistino Representative reported that a Klan rally at Melfort
attended by upwards of 7,000 was evidence that “…a great Protestant movement is
working for the uplift of all mankind.”390
In addition to its Protestantism, the KKK also mirrored the Orange Lodge’s British
nationalism. The Saskatchewan Klan readily advocated for the British connection as a
bulwark against Catholic tyranny, domination by “non-preferred” foreigners, and a
decline in the people’s individualism. Provincial leaders freely mixed British and
Protestant symbols with those of the Klan. The May 1929 cover of The Klansman, for
example, prominently displayed a hooded Klansman brandishing a Union Jack in defence
of a cross and the Bible.391 These symbols, the paper explained, served as a poignant
reminder that the Klan swore to uphold the protections offered by the British tradition in
Canada, including “Free Speech, Free Press, Free Schools, Freedom to worship our God,
right of citizenship and all constitutional laws.”392 The Catholic Church, on the other
hand, sought only to weaken ties with Britain as a means of dominating Saskatchewan’s
people. As one Klansmen noted in a letter to the Saskatoon Star: “It is surely apparent
from history, ancient and modern, that Rome is the only existing power that today
threatens our democratic rights and privileges.”393
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Figure 2 - The Klansman, 15 May, 1929394
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For Orangemen and Klansmen alike, maintaining the British connection was the only
way of guaranteeing the continued supremacy of Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Saxon peoples.
The Klan did not baulk at the idea that it was an inherently racist organization but reveled
in its perpetuation of “white supremacy.”395 Klan speakers criss-crossed the province
spreading a message of race exclusion. “I believe that Almighty God,” Hawkins argued,
“created the white race as superior to any other race.”396 At the same time, the Klan
played on Anglo-Saxon fears of “foreign” men corrupting white women. The Klan,
Hawkins noted, refused “to be the god-father of a tribe of mongrelised children,” and
would continually oppose the right of a “colored man to marry a white woman.” 397 Such
an idea, he argued, was against God’s plan: “If God had intended a mongrelised race, he
would have created one.”398 The Orange Lodge may not have spoken directly of a
“mongrelised race,” but the same beliefs underlay its prohibitions on the intermarriage of
Protestants and Catholics.
Despite the Klan’s sensationalist message, the foundations of KKK and Orange Lodge
racism were indistinguishable. Both organizations adhered to the same racial hierarchy
which privileged Anglo-Saxons and northern Europeans. Not only did eastern European
“continentals…live cheaply” and “underbid labor, forcing the Canadian and Britisher out
of work,” Hawkins argued, but they also stubbornly “cling together, form their own
communities and do not become Canadianized.”399 Hawkins’ racism found a receptive
audience in Saskatchewan whose citizens had already internalized these ideas. Even
Klan detractors spoke in the language of white superiority. The Maple Creek News, for
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example, criticized Hawkins’ disdain for continental Europeans by noting that the Klan
merely added “Germans, Russians, Austrians, Frenchmen, and Spaniards” to the category
of undesirables which already included “niggers, Chinks, Jews and Catholics.”400 No
single group had a monopoly on racism in interwar Saskatchewan, but the Klan and the
Orange Lodge—albeit less overtly—differentiated themselves by making racial
categories central to their understanding of society.
As the KKK and Orange Lodge’s nativism were largely indistinguishable from one
another, it is not surprising that the Klan echoed the Lodge in its stance on public issues.
Immigration, for example, dominated the Klan’s messaging. “The Klan takes the stand,”
Hawkins told a crowd of over 1,300 people at Regina’s City Hall, “that the admission of
any race of people who cannot become assimilated is a danger to Canada.”401 Similarly,
the Klan also condemned Catholic interference in Saskatchewan’s public schools. A
special issue of The Klansman dealt solely with the issue facing the Protestant minority in
Gouverneur, featuring the headline: “Protestant Children Compelled to Kiss the Crucifix
as Form of Punishment.”402 Reverend Rondeau, addressing the same Regina crowd as
Hawkins, summed up the Klan’s position: “When the child goes to the public school,
sectarianism must be left outside.”403 The Klan went so far as to hire James F. Bryant to
defend the Gouverneur parents in their legal case.404 Like the Orange Lodge, the Klan’s
attacks on Catholic education included a condemnation of separate schools themselves.
A single “common school,” Imperial Wizard Rosborough argued, was the only way to
“break down race prejudice” and assimilate “children of different nationalities.”405 Far
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from being separate entities, as historians maintain, the Orange Lodge and the KKK were
united in their response to every major racial and religious controversy Saskatchewan
experienced during the 1920s.
The only substantial difference between the Saskatchewan Lodge and the Klan was their
stance on partisanship. Despite the close connections between the Orange Lodge and
provincial conservative parties, the Lodge refrained from engaging in partisan politics,
preferring to rely on subtle hints and reminders to its followers on the best course of
action. In the lead up to Saskatchewan’s 1929 election, for example, the Orange Sentinel
simply stated that Saskatchewan’s voters “will have to work out their own salvation if
they desire to escape…[papal] domination.”406 While the implication that this “work”
entailed voting out Jimmy Gardiner’s Liberal government was clear, the Orange Lodge
did nothing to directly state its position to the electorate. The Orange Lodge, White
noted, was strictly “non-partisan” in that it did not pledge itself to “any particular
political party or creed.” Membership did not require a political test, and the Lodge was
willing “to support any measure” that helped further its vision for a staunchly British and
Protestant society.407
The Klan, in contrast, had no qualms about directly entering the political arena.
Although it did not release a political platform in the same manner as the Orange Lodge,
Klan leaders openly expressed the political ramifications of their nativism. According to
Rosborough, “the Klan believes in Protestantism, racial purity, gentile economic
freedom, just laws and liberty, separation of church and state, pure patriotism, restrictive
and selective immigration, freedom of speech and press, law and order, higher moral
standards, freedom from mob violence, and one public school.”408 Klansmen were clear
that they would put their full support behind any political party which actively promoted

406

SAB, F65, Gardiner, IV.17.k, Orange Sentinel, 17 January, 1929.

407

SAB, F367, Orange Lodge, Annual Report, 1929, 88.

408

The Winnipeg Free Press, 9 May, 1928.

107

these principles. “The members of the Ku Klux Klan,” J. Cox, secretary for the Regina
Klavern, explained, “are not so much concerned about which political party endorses
their principles as they are about getting them put into practice. They feel that sound
policy is never at variance with substantial justice, and it is safe to say that the party
which comes nearest to the adopting [sic] this attitude will receive the major portion of
Klan votes at the next election.”409 Yet, Klan leaders followed the Orange Lodge’s lead
in refraining from endorsing a specific political party. While the Klan would not “tell a
man how to vote,” Hawkins explained, “it does urge the exercise of the franchise” and
told its members to vote for the “best man.”410 Much of the Klan’s political activities,
therefore, were dedicated towards explaining which men did not deserve Klan support.
From the outset, the Klan was clear that the provincial Liberal Party under Jimmy
Gardiner was unfit for leadership. With a Liberal government in power since
Saskatchewan became a province in 1905, the Klan had many grievances—both real and
imagined—upon which to attack the Gardiner Liberals. On the one hand, the Klan
argued that the Liberal Party’s long tenure in office made them arrogant and corrupt. It
was well known that the Liberal Party “machine” was a primary reason for the party’s
continued success.411 It was “degrading” for the people of Saskatchewan, the
conservative Regina Star reported, that their government was kept in power “by a party
organization, maintained with their money…for the simple purpose of wholesale bribery
and corruption.”412 For Klansmen, the Liberal machine undermined Saskatchewan’s
British values of “law and order” and “high moral standards.”413
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Klansmen were also adamant that the Liberals used their undemocratic party apparatus to
further Catholic interests over those of Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Klan
speakers continually referred to the idea that the Gardiner Liberals were too friendly to
Roman Catholics. The “Roman Catholic Church,” Reverend Rondeau argued, is
“permeating the public…life of the province in defiance of the law and the expressed
wishes of the people.”414 The reasons for this abuse, Maloney added, was that Gardiner
was “trying to get Henry VIII’s title of ‘Defender of the Faith.’”415 Rather than stand up
for Anglo-Saxons, the Gardiner Liberals were catering to the Catholic minority. The
Liberal machine, according to Maloney, was the “Liberal Jesuit Machine.”416 Not only
did “Rome run our government at Ottawa,” Maloney told a packed crowd in Regina, but
it also ran the “government at Regina.”417 For Klansmen, this fact was evident in
Gardiner’s response to many of the alleged abuses. Papal control of Saskatchewan’s
public schools, for example, was not only tolerated by the Liberals, but encouraged. As
The Klansman editorialized: “Either…Roman Catholic majorities may at will crush our
weak minorities, in which case an immediate amendment is urgently required to the
School Act; or the Department has full powers to correct this nefarious outrage and
refuses to do so.”418 Whatever the case, the Klan urged that it was “time for the free and
fair-minded citizens of Saskatchewan to open their eyes” and vote out the Liberal
government.419
The divergence of the Klan and Orange Lodge on direct partisan politics is reflected in
the Liberal response. Gardiner had little respect for either the KKK or the Orange Lodge.
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For the Premier, both organizations were nothing more than a Conservative Party front.
It was no coincidence, he wrote to a Liberal supporter, that Klan organizers focused their
activities “in the Conservative centers of the province, and more especially where Orange
Lodges were located.”420 Despite this fact, Gardiner limited his public criticisms to the
Klan itself, ignoring the Orange Lodge entirely. Both organizations shared a similar
nativism, but only the KKK openly attacked the Liberals. Gardiner distrusted the Orange
Lodge, but he could not condemn a well-respected organization without just cause.
Unlike the Klan, the Orange Lodge had a long history in Canada and was viewed by
many as a central element of the country’s British heritage. By not appearing openly
hostile, the Orange Lodge could rely on its aura of respectability to limit Gardiner’s
response. When Gardiner’s opponents attempted to portray his attacks on the Klan as an
assault on the Lodge, the Premier immediately issued a forceful denial: “Let me say this
in the clearest language of which I am capable, neither I or any other member of the
government have ever at any place or time made any statement that would reflect upon
this organization.”421 While Gardiner’s public stance may have ignored the fact that the
religious and racial messages of each organization were almost entirely interchangeable,
the public nature of the KKK’s partisanship allowed Gardiner to respond in kind.
Gardiner’s rejoinder was dictated by two competing factors. Firstly, Gardiner was
convinced that the KKK’s anti-Catholicism was a ploy by Conservatives to drum up antigovernment support. “The whole intention of those who work by Maloney’s methods,”
the Premier argued, “is to create an atmosphere of suspicion with regard to the
Government and anyone who apparently supports the Government. They have chosen to
make their attack along religious and racial lines, and are only making use of the K.K.K.
to further that end without coming into the open and saying that it is a move to defeat the
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government.”422 Secondly, Gardiner was deeply concerned about the ultimate outcome
of Saskatchewan’s increased religious and racial tensions. The province’s Catholic
population was demanding a response from the government. “We regard the tolerance
towards the K.K.K at the present time,” Patriote de l’Ouest editorialized, “only as an
incident of a systematic campaign against us in which the Government is liable to
sacrifice its friends instead of muzzling a band of fanatics.”423 Not only did Gardiner
receive warnings that Catholics were “boiling over and threatening reprisals,” but the
Premier believed that the “very nature” of the Klan itself “encourages a sense of
lawlessness.”424
Something had to be done before violence broke out. The Premier believed that the
province had nothing to fear from a Catholic conspiracy. In fact, it was Saskatchewan’s
Catholic minority which “have far more to complain about than the Protestant people
have.”425 Yet, Gardiner understood that he could not hope to defeat nativism itself.
Rather than confront the Klan’s anti-Catholicism—which was promoted just as
vehemently by the Orange Lodge and found widespread support across Saskatchewan—
Gardiner focused his efforts on attempting to discredit the Klan.
Launching his attack from the legislature in early 1928, Gardiner hoped to portray the
Klan as a violent American institution completely incompatible with the British values of
law and order. The Klan, he argued, “left a trail of bloodshed in its wake everywhere it
has gone in the USA and a trail of lawlessness as well.” Gardiner explained that any
organization “parading about the country wearing hoods over their heads” has “no place
in British institutions of government.” Focusing on the Emmons-Scott controversy,
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Gardiner concluded that the Klan was nothing more than a scam concocted by American
adventurers who sought to “get an easy living” by taking “people’s money.” 426 The fact
that the re-organized Klan had already remedied all of Gardiner’s criticisms, including
American control, the wearing of hoods, and the collection of money, was entirely
ignored by the Premier. Gardiner’s refusal to combat the root of the Klan’s nativism
indicates the ideology’s power by the late 1920s.427
Gardiner followed up his speech in the legislature by turning the entire power of the
Liberal machine against the Klan. The Premier hoped to convince the electorate that, in
addition to constituting a foreign organization, the Klan was also a tool of the
Conservative opposition. In May, government agents brought Pat Emmons from his
home in Indiana to testify on charges of embezzlement. It was clear from the beginning
that the case against Emmons was frivolous. Emmons had a signed contract which
promised that he could keep the money he collected.428 Yet, it was in the government’s
interest to have Emmons testify in support of Gardiner’s attacks on the Klan. Throughout
his testimony, Emmons strayed considerably from the charges against him to allege
collusion between the Klan and the Conservative Party. “The Klan,” Emmons argued
under oath, was “a Christian fraternal organization” until “Dr. J.T.M.
Anderson…snatched it out of my hands.” It was the Conservatives, he continued, who
decided to vilify Roman Catholics. Feigning innocence, Emmons claimed he wanted no
part of this as it “meant bloodshed and they would cause the Klan to be built up the same
as in the United States…I said it was a shame to let them go on and allow them to build
up an organization which means religious war.”429
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Conservatives and Klansmen alike were aghast at what they considered a political trial.
Anderson, fearing that Emmons would cast a “slur upon him,” employed James F. Bryant
to attend court and speak on his behalf. Bryant claimed that Anderson was “not a
member of the organization, was not at any time and never attended any meetings.”430
Justice Heffernan, a Liberal appointee, ruled Bryant out-of-order, adding that Emmons’
testimony was interesting and he wanted to hear more of it.431 Similarly, Heffernan’s
closing remarks directly attacked the Klan and its membership. The magistrate lamented
that Emmons had “full authority” from the Klan’s “big mogul” to collect the entirety of
the funds he could from the “suckers” willing to pay. Heffernan found it “unbelievable
that, in the Great dominion of Canada, a gang of adventurers can come here and do what
they have done, take thousands of dollars out of the pockets of innocent men.” Heffernan
further questioned the “manhood” of Saskatchewan residents who allowed “this gang
from the United States…to tell us what the Union Jack stands for.”432 Clearly Heffernan,
like Gardiner, had little affinity for the Klan.
Klan supporters, however, did not need evidence to establish that Emmons’ trial was
political and not criminal. Maloney, addressing a crowd in Regina, claimed to have
possession of an affidavit wherein Gardiner “promised to pay [Emmons’] expenses” in
return for favourable testimony.433 While the affidavit was never produced, Bryant
believed Gardiner was behind the whole spectacle. In an open letter to the Regina
Leader, Bryant alleged that Liberal agents interviewed Emmons before his return to
Canada and that the Liberal machine had the trial transcript edited to reflect negatively on
the Conservative Party. Given Gardiner’s “political tactics,” Bryant concluded,
thousands of Saskatchewan “suckers” will be “eager to pay their $13.00 to join” the Klan.
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Even if Liberals had nothing to do with the Emmons case, the party attempted to use it
for political advantage. Saskatchewan’s Liberal-controlled newspapers vilified the Klan
and the Conservative Party for its alleged involvement. “It may well be that no
‘snatching’ was required,” the Moose Jaw Times argued, “and that instead the
‘organization’ really belonged to Dr. Anderson all the time, and that the politicalreligious group within the Conservative party were responsible for using Emmons for
political purposes.” If nothing else, the paper concluded, the trial proved that the Klan
was the “very essence of Toryism.”434 The Regina Leader, for its part, found that while
Gardiner was trying to protect “the people against handing over their money to Klan
adventurers,” Anderson and the Conservative Party were “encouraging the organization
in this province of a movement, which, on its record, has been subversive of British
ideals and institutions.”435 Gardiner believed that the attacks on the Klan served their
intended purpose. The anti-Klan campaign, he confided to a supporter, had “been a very
successful one,” and it appeared that the Klan could “accomplish very little more in this
Province.”436
This bravado notwithstanding, Gardiner utterly failed in his attempts to discredit the
Klan. The Premier’s portrayal of the Klan as an American import and Conservative
political tool was a grave miscalculation. Gardiner underestimated the extent that the
Klan’s nativism resonated with a large segment of the Saskatchewan electorate. Rather
than a menace, the Klan was providing what many residents believed was a much-needed
service. As the Regina Standard argued, the fact that Gardiner hid “behind a sect in
parliament” and defamed “a society who has done so much to suppress immorality and
vice here with false and malicious charges, that he dare not utter publicly appears both
ungentlemanly and cowardly.”437 So long as the Klan was willing to stand up for the
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province’s Anglo-Saxons, it did not matter if it was a political tool or had American
origins. Saskatchewan residents indoctrinated into its brand of British nativism simply
did not care whether the Klan was a Conservative Party tool or not. As the Birch Hills
Gazette noted: “It may be an attempt to make all Protestants believe that the Catholics
control the Liberal party. (That statement circulates freely all through the Province.) No
doubt it would be great to see the present government unseated. A change of government
would raise the life of the people all over the province.”438 Gardiner’s attacks also failed
to adequately deal with the charges the Klan was making against his government. Far
from discrediting the KKK, the Premier simply gave them free publicity. “It will be well
for those in high places to bear in mind,” the Wadena Herald warned, “that it is the
charges rather than the ‘soap-box agitator’ we are likely to consider. It would seem to
call for something more convincing than the mediated insolence of an unmannerly
attorney or the childish equivocation of a misfit minister to answer charges half proved
by the savage anger of the accused.”439 The Klan, unlike the more established Orange
Lodge, was actively helping to defeat the Liberal government and received a great deal of
support from Gardiner’s opponents for doing so.
Klan leaders also capitalized on Gardiner’s attacks to further raise their organization’s
profile. Hawkins began following the Premier around the province challenging him to a
debate. After numerous encounters throughout early 1928, a frustrated Premier agreed
with a date set for the evening of June 19th in Lemberg, Gardiner’s home town. The
debate, as Pitsula notes, was a “coup for the Klan” as it “put Hawkins on the same
platform as the Premier, as though Hawkins were the leader of the opposition.”440 Given
its significance, a crowd of over 1,500 packed into the skating rink to hear the two square
off. Hawkins spoke first for an hour and a half, maintaining that he was an honourable
British subject, not an American adventurer. Although he happened “to be born across
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the Border,” Hawkins asserted that he was British through and through, with the Grand
Master of the Orange Lodge of British North America vouching for his character and
loyalty. Hawkins also took issue with Gardiner’s attempts to portray the Saskatchewan
Klan as bloodthirsty and lawless. These characterizations were “justified as far as the
Klan in the States was concerned,” but the Saskatchewan Klan had “removed every
objectionable feature” and was “in compliance with every law in Canada demanding
equal rights for all men.”441 The Saskatchewan Klan, Hawkins concluded, stood for the
interests of the province’s Anglo-Saxon population by opposing the “intermingling of
races, separate schools, and a government beholden to religion for support.”442 Far from
being intimidated by Gardiner’s attacks, Hawkins used the opportunity to reiterate his
charges against the Liberal Government and the “threat” it posed to the people of
Saskatchewan.
Gardiner continued the same line of attacks from his speech in the legislature. The
Premier claimed that he attacked the Klan because “they first attacked the Liberal party
of which I am the leader” and the “government of which I am head.” Rather than defend
his government from Hawkins’ charges, Gardiner reiterated his assertion that the KKK
was a violent, American organization. The Klan, he noted, sought to “supplement the
law courts of this province, to admit which would be to recognize lynch law, which
prevails in that part of the United States from which the lecturer of the organization
comes.” Gardiner also restated his claims that the Klan was a fraud, designed to part
people from their money. Despite evidence to the contrary, Gardiner argued that the
Klan had not changed since its previous leaders absconded with its funds. “When $13
fees ceased to roll in,” the Premier concluded, Hawkins and other leaders in the
Saskatchewan Klan “would soon leave” as well.443
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Gardiner received “three cheers and a tiger” from the crowd at the close of his remarks,
but his performance at Lemberg was another miscalculation. Hawkins and other Klan
leaders had spent the previous months attacking the Liberal government. By not using
the opportunity to defend his government against Hawkins’ charges, Gardiner appeared
evasive. Gardiner’s remarks, on the other hand, did little to reassure the “thousands of
citizens” who did not fit into the Klan’s vision for an Anglo-Saxon society.444 By
sharing the platform with Hawkins without challenging his characterization of
Saskatchewan’s Catholics, visible minorities, or foreign-born population, Gardiner gave
legitimacy to the Klan’s nativist ideology.
Most observers—outside of the Liberal-controlled press at least—viewed the debate as a
Klan victory. Not only did Gardiner fail to respond to the charges levelled against his
government, but he was also misguided in his characterizations of the Klan as Americancontrolled and violence-prone despite evidence to the contrary. As the Esterhazy
Observer explained: “Everything that does not run on all foure[sic] with Mr. Gardiner’s
view is very gravely wrong, so that his extreme views on the K.K.K. are quite
understandable and must be taken with a quantity of salt.”445 Gardiner’s public attacks
on the KKK were alienating Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Saxon population, many of whom
had never been members of the Klan or had known much about it prior to the beginning
of the Premier’s crusade.
Gardiner’s fear of the Klan’s growing power is evident in his continued private attacks on
the organization. The Premier had no real proof that the Klan was either lawless or that
its leaders were fraudsters. The solution, therefore, was to find or manufacture the
needed proof. Following the Lemberg debate, both the provincial and federal authorities
brought a series of questionable legal actions against prominent Klansmen in
Saskatchewan. The first target was a R.C. Snelgrove, a Klan organizer from Regina. As
the Lemberg debate began, a police officer approached Snelgrove and questioned him as
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to whether he was in possession of a firearm. Snelgrove admitted that there was a
handgun locked in the trunk of his car but claimed that he had a permit to carry it.
Snelgrove’s gun was confiscated and he was released without charge, leading him to
believe the matter was closed. It took authorities a full month to bring charges. Despite
Snelgrove’s claim at his trial that he had purchased the gun for self-defence after a “gang
of drunken Roman Catholics” threatened his life, the presiding judge found that the
permit was invalid and sentenced Snelgrove to two months in jail and a seventy-fivedollar fine, lowered to one month’s imprisonment and a fifty-dollar fine on appeal. 446
Given the apparent political nature of the trial, Snelgrove’s supporters rushed to his
defence. Snelgrove was not a hardened criminal, the Klan argued, but a respected
member of the community. He served in the 28th Infantry Battalion during the Great War
and was an executive member of the Great War Veterans’ Association. He was also
active in his trade union local and was a former member of the Regina Young Liberals
Association.447 As Maloney explained at a Klan rally in Yorkton, “Snelgrove is a
returned soldier who at one time carried a gun for $1.10 a day for the country which
afterwards sent him to jail.”448 To his supporters, Snelgrove was the unjust victim of
Gardiner’s political attacks. “There is ground for great disquiet of mind in the thought
that not even our courts are free from the baleful influence of a party machine,” the
Regina Daily Star argued, “and that they are being degraded, their dignity lowered, and
public confidence weakened in their integrity, because of the needs of partisanship.”
Gardiner, the paper concluded, “has allowed his fear of opposition to outweigh his
common sense.”449 Far from being a discredit to the Klan, as Gardiner had intended,
Snelgrove received a parade in his honour upon his release from prison.
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Other Klansmen faced similar legal troubles. On June 28th, police charged Thomas
Pakenham, a former police chief in Melville, with the illegal possession of a firearm. Not
only did Pakenham believe that, as a former police office, he could legally carry the
weapon, but the gun itself was not loaded. As with the other cases against the Klan,
however, the presiding judge took the opportunity to opine on the KKK’s lawless nature.
Even if a man were a “lecturer” for the Klan “and might stir up an audience,” Justice of
the Peace Stewart Gordon intoned, “it was quite unnecessary for any man in Canada to
carry a gun for protection.”450 Given the “serious matter” of the charges, Gordon
sentenced Pakenham to two months in jail and a fifty-dollar fine.
Imperial Wizard Rosborough also came under legal scrutiny. While Rosborough was
standing for re-election in late 1928, charges emerged that he had embezzled two hundred
dollars during his work as a chartered accountant for the rural municipality of Mountain
View in 1923 and 1924. Rosborough testified that his charges were politically motivated,
swearing under oath that the deputy attorney promised to have the charges dismissed if he
agreed to disband the Klan. Refusing to defame the Klan, Rosborough preferred to go to
trial where he was acquitted of all wrongdoing. As a show of continued support and
defiance of Gardiner and the Liberal machine, Klansmen re-elected the Imperial
Wizard—customarily an annual position—to a two-year term.451
The most overt political attack came against the Klan’s most visible spokesman.
Shortly after his debate with Gardiner, Hawkins received a deportation notice from the
federal government. Hawkins’ last visit to the United States had been for a period of 366
days. Legally, however, he could only be absent from the country for 365 days. Given
that Hawkins had only been overdue by a single day, and that more than a year had
passed before the matter caught the government’s attention, many supporters believed
that the Gardiner Liberals had pushed the federal government to deport Hawkins in
retribution for the Klansman’s attacks. Had it not been for “pressure from Premier
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Gardiner,” the Regina Daily Star reported, the federal government would never have
acted. J.F. Bryant, representing Hawkins in his appeal, declared that the deportation
order was “nothing but a cheap political trick.” Even though Hawkins was the “most
desirable immigrant” imaginable, a legal “technicality” resulted in his removal from his
adopted home.452 After exhausting all appeals, Hawkins was forced from Canada.
If authorities hoped that these legal cases would weaken the Klan, they were mistaken.
Each case only strengthened the organization and increased its attacks on the Liberal
government. The common perception at the time was that the Liberal machine, with the
Premier at the wheel, was pulling the strings and pushing for the charges. The Orange
Lodge used the political nature of the charges to break its customary non-partisan stance
when dealing with the provincial government. Gardiner “has put Saskatchewan politics
in ferment,” the Orange Sentinel reported, by adopting the “Prussian method of disposing
of an inconvenient political opponent.”453 Even more troublesome, the legal campaign
reinforced the Orange Lodge and KKK’s belief that Saskatchewan’s Anglo-Saxons were
victims of a Catholic-controlled conspiracy. “I am really sorry for Premier Gardiner,”
Hawkins told a crowd in Regina on the eve of his departure, “but I understand that he has
had to obey His Master’s Voice.”454
Although the Klan differed with the Orange Lodge in its willingness to overtly attack
Saskatchewan’s Liberal government, both organizations benefited from Gardiner’s
response. Historians estimate Klan membership at 25,000 in 1929.455 The Orange
Lodge also saw impressive gains, with its meteoric rise during the 1920s culminating in
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1930 with over 60,000 members.456 In comparison, the SGGA accounted for a total
membership of only 35,000 at its height.457 With locals in every corner of the province,
the Lodge and Klan capitalized on their newfound notoriety to promote their nativist
message in the lead-up to the 1929 election. The Klan, far from being curtailed by the
legal attacks on its members, went on the offensive. Meeting at their annual
Klanvocation in Saskatoon, Klansmen passed a series of resolutions continuing the
organization’s attacks on the Gardiner government and Saskatchewan’s educational
system. If the Klan had its way, it would eliminate provisions protecting Catholic
positions on local school boards, it would require all school trustees to be able to read and
speak English, and it would eliminate all constitutional protections for separate schools.
If not for “weak-kneed poltroon Protestant politicians” in the Liberal Party, Reverend
Rondeau told a crowded meeting during the convention, “much of the grief in the
country” would have been avoided.458 The Orange Lodge’s 1929 convention also
intensified its attack on the Liberal government. Orangemen passed a resolution
congratulating “our Brother J.T.M. Anderson” on his attempts to prohibit “the use of all
clerical garb and sectarian symbols in the Public Schools.” In the same breath, the
convention noted that it “deeply regretted the action of the house in rejecting the
resolution.”459 Understanding that 1929 was also an election year, the Lodge’s political
platform reappeared in the report of the convention proceedings after an absence of
several years.
Gardiner’s attempts to discredit the Klan failed. Although the Premier spent most of
1928 attacking the Klan, using every tool available to his government to discredit its
membership, the Klan entered 1929 more united and visible than at any point in its brief
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history in the province. Gardiner failed understand that many voters were captivated by
the Klan and Lodge’s articulation of a British nativist message. Far from an anomaly,
much of the province’s British population fundamentally adhered to this brand of antiCatholic nativism. This was not the product of Klan “populism” as Pitsula maintains, or
a new manifestation of racial hatred as Calderwood alleges. The Klan neither invented
this ideology nor was it the first to bring it to Saskatchewan. It is only by understanding
the close connections in membership, organization, goals, and ideology between the Klan
and the much older Orange Lodge that it is possible to appreciate the extent that this
brand of nativism served as a major foundation of Saskatchewan’s conservative thought
in the inter-war period.
A fundamental adherence to their own individualism animated Saskatchewan’s
conservatives. Conservative farmers, understanding themselves as masters of their own
fate, viewed their successes, and failures, as a product of their own individual efforts.
The capitalist grain trade’s competitiveness, far from a menace, was central to these
farmers’ understanding of their own business. This same individualism, albeit in an
extreme form, was central to the nativist British nationalism articulated by both the Ku
Klux Klan and the Orange Lodge. Understanding individualism as the corner-stone of
Saskatchewan’s British tradition, these organizations articulated a worldview wherein
race and religion functioned as the main litmus test of citizenship. Since the settlement
period, this nativism manifested itself in challenges to any deviation from an idealized
British and Protestant society. It was also vital to the program of Saskatchewan’s
Conservative Party as it sought to build its base and capture power from the governing
Liberals.
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3

The Politics of Division: The Saskatchewan
Conservative Party, 1905-1921

Conservative farmers and nativists constituted the two main elements of Saskatchewan
conservatism prior to the Great Depression. Both groups articulated a conservative
ideology that was predicated on defending individual rights and freedoms. Both groups
were also deeply influential in the major economic and social problems facing
Saskatchewan. Conservative farmers used the SCEC, SGGA, and the Permanent
Organization Opposing Compulsory Pool to promote an economic individualism that
resisted the compulsory elements of orderly marketing. Similarly, British nativists
believed that individual freedoms were racially and religiously based and used the
Orange Lodge and the KKK to advocate for a racially-limited citizenship. Despite their
shared focus on defending individual rights, these conservative movements were not
natural allies. Ideology is fluid and often contradictory. It was possible, therefore, for a
conservative farmer to identify as a conservative in economic matters but a progressive
when it came to questions of race and religion. Conservative farmers’ belief in their
ability to compete effectively as individuals within the capitalist system fueled their
opposition to orderly marketing. However, this economic focus but did not naturally
align with nativists ideas of a racial and religiously-based individualism. There was
certainly overlap between the two groups. The Orange Lodge’s membership, after all,
was primarily made up of farmers, many of whom opposed orderly marketing. Similarly,
some conservative farmers may have remained outside of the Lodge and the KKK shared
these organizations racialized thinking and believed that eastern Europeans’ racial
background contributed to their support for marketing schemes. Yet, there were many
who did not overlap between the two manifestations of conservative thought. When it
came to politics, therefore, Saskatchewan’s conservatives were not predisposed to
support the same party.
The Saskatchewan Liberal Party actively exploited these divisions. Since
Saskatchewan’s creation in 1905, the Liberals forged alliances with Saskatchewan’s
conservative farmers and brought several leading producers—including William
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Motherwell and Charles Dunning—into government. This alliance entrenched
conservative farmers in positions of power within the farmers’ movement and ensured
that the government would avoid costly experiments in state intervention into the wheat
economy. Attempts by the Conservative Party to weaken this alliance were largely
ineffective. At the same time, Liberals rejected nativists’ racial and religious views in
favour of a close relationship with Saskatchewan’s Catholic and newcomer populations.
The Conservative Party, unable to win over farmer support, turned to British nativists as
their main electoral base. Far from a single political movement, Saskatchewan’s early
conservative history is one of division.
These divisions have shaped the dominant understanding of Saskatchewan conservatism
prior to the Great Depression. The Liberals, galvanized by their base among conservative
farmers, Roman Catholics, and recent immigrants, won every election between 1905 and
1944 except one. The Conservative Party, in contrast, was plagued by disorganization,
electoral failure, and personal animosities. Whereas the Liberals became the “tap-root of
Saskatchewan politics,”460 the Conservative Party was “a succession of legions plodding
an indefinite, long march from disappointment to disappointment and ending in a last
confusion and surrender.”461 Yet, the failure of a single political party is not akin to the
failure of an entire ideology. The fact that the Conservative Party only won a single
election prior to the Second World War does not mean that conservatism itself was not a
vibrant and powerful political force in Saskatchewan.
This chapter examines the Saskatchewan Conservative Party’s development from its
origins as the Provincial Rights Party during the autonomy debates until the 1921
election. This was a period of frustration for the Conservative Party as it sought to break
the Liberal monopoly on government. From its inception, British nativists formed the
Conservative’s primary support base, but they lacked the numbers and the geographic
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reach to win power on their own. Conservative success at the polls was only possible by
uniting this nativist base with the province’s conservative farmers. The Liberal
government, however, jealously guarded its connection with the farmers’ movement.
The Conservatives responded by attempting to win over the province’s radical farmers
who advocated for increased government intervention. Not only did this further alienate
conservative producers, but these attempts foundered through Conservatives’ association
with their high tariff federal counterparts after 1911. The Conservative Party failed to
make inroads with the province’s farm population prior to the late 1920s. Although the
Conservative’s experience during this period was one of defeat, it did provide valuable
lessons that they used to successfully challenge the Liberals in 1929. The Conservative’s
adherence a nativist rhetoric throughout this period also demonstrates the strength of this
strain of conservatism. Throughout every electoral defeat, the Conservatives maintained
and nurtured this association, steadfastly defending a shared sense of British
individualism.
The party system came late to Saskatchewan politics. The region favoured a non-partisan
political stance during the territorial period. Led by Frederick Haultain after 1897,
politicians believed that rejecting partisan labels would allow the region to negotiate with
Ottawa more effectively regardless of which party held power federally. As Grant
MacEwan explains, Haultain did not oppose “the principle of opposition in government,”
but believed that the party system “tended to destroy the independence of elected
individuals. Perhaps the party system was justifiable on the national scene, he reasoned,
but it would be a liability on the frontier.”462 Haultain’s political sympathies lay with the
federal Conservative Party, but he was determined throughout his career that party labels
would only weaken the territory’s bargaining position with Ottawa.463 This non-partisan
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stance, however, does not mean that territorial politics were without divisions.
“Opposition to the shape and detail of Haultain’s administration,” Stanley Gordon
explains, “existed throughout his regime, and grew stronger as time went on.”464 By the
early twentieth century, it was increasingly clear that local Conservatives and Liberals
were intent on introducing the two-party system. In 1903, a group of Conservatives
formed the Territorial Conservative Association with the expressed purpose of contesting
the next territorial election on a party basis. Although Haultain disapproved of the
resolution, his acceptance of honorary president of the association angered Liberals.
Similarly, Haultain’s fierce support of the Borden Conservatives during the 1904 federal
election, only earned him further distrust.465
This growing tension between Haultain and the Liberals was also on display in the
debates over the terms upon which the region would enter Confederation. Haultain
maintained that the entire region, consisting of present-day Alberta and Saskatchewan,
should enter as a single province. “We do not want a single province made up of one big
wheat field,” he argued, “or one big cattle ranch and coal mine. We want wheat fields,
cattle ranches, and coal mines, and every other thing that goes to make up a big, rich
country.”466 Laurier, in contrast, believed that such a province would “upset the balance
of power in Confederation” and provide Haultain, a Conservative, with “a tremendous
power base.”467 The most controversial aspects of the discussion came down to the
region’s rights within Confederation. Haultain believed that the territory should have
complete control over its crown lands and natural resources, a right granted to provinces
under the BNA Act but withheld from Manitoba in 1870. Laurier and his Minister of the
Interior, Clifford Sifton, claimed that uniformity with previous homesteading policies
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required their continued alienation. Similarly, Haultain believed that the region should
have the power to decide its own educational system, another right granted to the
provinces under the BNA Act.468 Laurier, fearing the provinces would use the power to
limit separate schools as had been the case in Manitoba, sought guarantees “that the
minority shall have the power to establish their own schools and that they shall have the
right to share in the public moneys.”469 The Autonomy Bills, passed by the House of
Commons in 1905, rejected Haultain’s claims. The region would enter Confederation,
but it would do so as two provinces, lacking control of their natural resources and the
ability to decide on the nature of education systems.470 Haultain was furious. By
refusing to accept Alberta and Saskatchewan as equal partners in Confederation, he
intoned, Laurier had created an “unwilling, inferior, and imperfect organization.”471
The Liberals responded to Haultain’s public intransigence by actively excluding him
from power. The Saskatchewan Act allowed the federal government to select the
provinces’ first Lieutenant Governors and Premiers before holding popular elections.
Many observers believed that Haultain—as the man most intimately connected with the
quest for regional autonomy—should have the honour of leading one of the new
provinces’ first governments.472 The Liberals were not convinced. Far from ceremonial
positions, the first Premiers were responsible for filling valuable patronage positions.
“The federal Liberals,” Gordon Barnhart notes, “believed it was vital to have control of
patronage for the first election. To have given Haultain the Premiership would have been
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like giving him the keys to the store.”473 Haultain’s association with the Territorial
Conservative Association and federal Conservative Party, as well as his opposition to the
Autonomy Bills made his selection “an impossibility.”474 Instead the Liberals appointed
Walter Scott, a Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) and owner of the Moose Jaw Times
and Regina Leader, as Premier. Saskatchewan’s first Liberal convention, held in Regina
in August, unanimously endorsed the decision and established plans to hold the
upcoming election on “straight party lines” with Scott as their leader.475 Scott’s selection
as leader placed Haultain in a precarious position. Haultain intended to contest the
upcoming Saskatchewan election, but the Liberals controlled the government and the
patronage that went with it. Haultain was popular, especially among older settlers in the
south-east, but admiration alone could not overcome the Liberals’ advantages. Haultain
needed an issue that transcended party divisions and allowed him to steal support of
erstwhile Liberals.
Rather than fight the election on “straight party lines” as the Liberals intended, Haultain
attempted to transform it into a referendum on Saskatchewan’s inferior position within
Confederation. “We want governments,” Haultain argued, “which are quite independent
of Ottawa. We want men who when Western interests are involved will work with a
single eye to those interests without regard to party interest or convenience.”476 It was a
novel plan. By turning the election into a referendum on autonomy Haultain believed he
had an issue that would appeal to all of Saskatchewan’s residents regardless of party
affiliation. Under Haultain’s guidance, provincial Conservatives chose to abandon their
party label in favour of a Provincial Rights Party, open to anyone regardless of federal
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party affiliation who desired “full provincial rights” for Saskatchewan.477 If elected,
Haultain promised to appeal the Autonomy Act’s education and natural resources
provisions to Canada’s courts at the earliest opportunity.478
Haultain’s stance on autonomy began the process of dividing Saskatchewan’s
conservative farmers and British nativists between the Liberal and Provincial Rights
Parties. For the Orange Lodge, separate schools were a Catholic plot to undermine the
country’s British heritage. The Lodge was equally clear that it would support any party
that opposed them. Haultain, for his part, was clear that his opposition to separate
schools was constitutional, not religious. It was not the presence of separate schools that
he took issue with, but the fact that the federal government, in granting them in the
Autonomy Act, infringed on a fundamental provincial right. Once the courts overturned
these unconstitutional laws, Haultain would “leave it to the people to say whether we
shall have separate schools or not.”479 The Liberals, in contrast, only promised to
maintain the status quo. If the province reopened the separate school question, they
argued, Saskatchewan could very well end up with “clerically controlled schools such as
existed” at the territory’s creation.480 Choosing which plan to support was not a difficult
decision for Orangemen to make. Neither party fully supported the Lodge’s position on
separate schools, but Haultain at least held out the possibility of limiting Catholic
influence at a future date. Meeting at their annual convention in Regina, Orangemen
announced that they would “oppose the re-election of any member” who supported the
“unwarranted and tyrannical” educational clauses in the Autonomy Act.481
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Whereas Haultain’s opposition to the education provisions within the Autonomy Act
endeared him to Orangemen, the Liberals focused their attention on Saskatchewan’s
Roman Catholic and “foreign” populations. The 1896 immigration boom transformed
Saskatchewan’s racial makeup, as thousands of “non-preferred” continental European
immigrants settled the province. The Liberals consciously sought these newcomers’
support. In the lead up to the 1905 election, Liberals wrote leaders in the German and
Ukrainian communities reminding them that it was the Laurier Liberals who were
responsible for their settlement. The Liberal Party also published campaign material in
German, Ukrainian, and other foreign languages, and organized naturalization drives so
that all eligible immigrants could vote. Additionally, Scott warned Roman Catholics that
the Provincial Rights education policy posed a direct threat to legal protections for
Catholic separate schools.482 The province’s Catholic hierarchy agreed. At the height of
the election campaign, Adélard Langevin, the archbishop of St. Boniface, issued a
pastoral letter condemning Haultain and urging all Catholics to “unite and vote for those
who are in favor of the actual system of separate schools.”483 Haultain and the Provincial
Rights Party may have earned the support of Saskatchewan’s British nativists, but the
Liberals were able to effectively counter by developing relationships with recent
immigrants and Roman Catholics.
In contrast, farmers’ political loyalty remained an open question. British nativists, recent
immigrants, and Roman Catholics could sway election outcomes, but they did not have
the strength to win them on their own. Both Scott and Haultain understood that the only
sure measure of future electoral success lay with the province’s farmers. Unlike
questions over separate schools, however, both parties promised the same agricultural
policies to win farmers’ support. The Liberal platform contained provisions for improved
transportation facilities—including the completion of roads and bridges, a rail line to
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Hudson Bay, and the expansion of branch lines to newly settled districts—and to provide
general assistance to farmers to “advance in every way possible the prosperity of the
Province and its citizens.” For Scott, Saskatchewan’s “illimitable rich acres,” when
combined with a Liberal administration, left little doubt that the province would shortly
become “the banner province of Canada.”484 Not to be outdone, Haultain also vowed to
complete an extensive system of roads and bridges, encourage the development of branch
lines, and provide “general assistance” to the province’s farmers.485 Both leaders also
promised to challenge federal control of natural resources and the Canadian Pacific
Railway’s exemption from provincial taxation, both elements of the Saskatchewan Act
that farmers universally despised.486
With both sides promising a similar agricultural program, the only differentiation
between them came from their ability to deliver results. The Liberal’s main advantage
lay in their control of government which they used to demonstrate their party’s dedication
to the farmers’ cause. Upon entering office, Premier Scott selected William Motherwell,
the President of the Territorial Grain Growers, as his Commissioner of Agriculture.487
By accepting the leader of the organized farmers into his cabinet, Scott demonstrated his
party’s commitment to actively work in their interests. At the same time, Scott used
Haultain’s association with the federal Conservatives to argue that, given the chance,
Haultain would continue the National Policy’s high tariffs and monopoly protections.
Haultain, they argued, would “leave the C.P.R. Co. forever in the enjoyment” of its
“unjust” privileges.488 Although at a disadvantage, Haultain relied on his reputation from
his time as territorial leader convincing several leading farmers to join his new party.
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With the Liberals and Provincial Righters offering similar agricultural policies, racial and
religious issues dominated the 1905 campaign. Haultain spoke directly to the Orange
Lodge when he claimed that a “conspiracy” existed between Liberals and Catholics
which posed a “menace to our school system, and to the sound principles upon which it
has been established.” The only “safety for our educational system,” he urged, lay “in
once and for all establishing it on an absolutely national basis, with equal rights to all and
special privileges to none.”489 The Liberals, for their part, pointed out that no evidence
existed that linked them to a Catholic conspiracy. Evidence, however, mattered little to
those whose worldview centered on a conspiratorial anti-Catholicism. Haultain’s stance,
Clifford Sifton noted, won over voters “who were sore on the question.”490
Haultain won the nativist vote but lost the election. A clear geographic division existed
in the results. Liberal support was strongest in the more recently settled areas north of
the CPR main line. Haultain, in contrast, dominated areas where “old-timer” AngloSaxons proliferated in the south and around Prince Albert. While it is not possible to
make concrete statements as to how the different racial and religious groups voted, there
is a clear pattern in these results. Scott fared best in areas with high proportions of
Roman Catholics and continental Europeans, winning every seat that possessed a
Catholic majority as of 1901. In contrast, the Provincial Righters, who did not even
bother nominating a candidate in the German-Catholic-dominated riding of Humboldt,
won every riding with a Protestant majority except for Moose Jaw.491 Even here,
however, the results rested entirely “upon the Willow Bunch poll” where the large
Catholic population voted solidly for the Liberals.492
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Figure 3 - Electoral Map, 1905

The results convinced Provincial Righters that they had wisely supported the British
nativist cause. Editorials comforted the party faithful by claiming they had succeeded “in
the old settled districts where the true Canadian vote” resided.493 Liberals, on the other
hand, only won “where development is crudest, where the foreign element is most
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pronounced, and where reliable news and views were least accessible.”494 Their defeat,
therefore, was not a failure in tactics. Rather, they argued that the Liberal’s unscrupulous
tactics stole the election from the province’s Anglo-Saxons. In the follow-up to the
election, opposition newspapers were filled with accounts of the Liberal “machine.” Not
only had the Liberals used the levers of government patronage to gerrymander ridings
and ensure an increased foreign vote, but Liberal agents spent election day stuffing ballot
boxes and “buying votes at $5.00 each.”495 Although many of these claims could not be
corroborated, some vindication occurred when it emerged that Peter Tyerman, the Liberal
Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) for Prince Albert County, received 151
votes from polls which were not even held. The ensuing investigation found that at least
two deputy returning officers—both federal government officials—and Tyerman
colluded in stuffing ballot boxes.496 If not for “systemic corruption, the work of Federal
office-holders and the misuse of naturalization papers,” Provincial Righters concluded,
they would have formed the government.497
While such conclusions certainly comforted Provincial Righters in their defeat, they did
little to spur organization. The party spent the interim between the 1905 and 1908
elections moribund, offering little in the way of organization. Haultain had never been
comfortable with the machinations of party politics, relying instead on “his supporters
organizing his electoral machine on his behalf.”498 As a result, Provincial Righters
neglected the behind-the-scenes maneuvering that was required to keep a party
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functioning and win elections. Fundraising, constituency organization, and candidate
recruitment were all neglected.
The Liberals had no such qualms. Even before the 1905 election, Scott and his chief
lieutenant, James Alexander Calder, began building what David Smith terms a “welloiled machine.”499 The “machine” existed to ensure electoral victory, using all available
tools at its disposal. Through their constituency organizations, Liberals kept a constant
tally of each eligible voter’s political affiliation. It was the machine’s job to ensure that
Liberal voters remained committed, that undecided voters were won over, and the
opposition’s influence was minimized. In 1907, for example, the machine funded the
creation of Der Courier after the province’s German population demanded their own
newspaper.500 The machine also used government powers to actively influence political
allegiance. “When it could not win converts by legitimate persuasion,” Escott Reid
notes, “it did not shrink from using corrupt methods.”501 Positions in the civil service, for
example, were limited as much as possible to the party faithful. “Any man or woman
who benefited from the government’s largesse,” Smith explains, “was expected to work
for the party when requested.”502 The machine also used government money to buy
support. Printing contracts were actively funneled to friendly newspapers, and many
local businessmen were told that “if he and his family did not transfer their allegiance
from the Conservatives to the Liberals they would get no government business.”503
The power of the Liberal machine was on full display in the 1908 election. Scott called
the election a year early to take advantage of Provincial Righters’ disorganization.
Whereas Scott could rely on the machine to fight an election with short notice, Haultain
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had not even begun selecting candidates. Haultain was outraged at Scott’s tactics.
“There was a good British sense of fair play among the people of this province,” he
argued, and did not think that the “springing of an election…would appeal to that
spirit.”504 Even without the timing of the election, however, the Liberals were once again
unmatched. Whereas the Liberals had their local machine in place to get their issues in
front of the electors, the Provincial Righters were forced to rely on an “army of workers
sent in from Manitoba.”505 It was this organizational advantage that decided the contest
for the Liberals. With only 50.5% of the popular vote, the Liberals secured twenty-seven
of the forty-one seats in the newly expanded legislature. Significantly, the Liberals won
eleven ridings by fewer than 100 votes. In comparison, only three of Haultain’s fourteen
victories were within the same margin. Had it not been for the superior Liberal
organization, the results would have been much closer.506
As was the case in 1905, results in 1908 came down to questions of religion and race.
The Liberals won nineteen of the twenty-five seats north of the CPR, dominating in areas
with high concentrations of Roman Catholics and newcomers. As a Liberal organizer
explained to Scott: “as long as our torry [sic] friends use the word foreigners so much as
they do we are sure of the German vote.”507 Scott was unapologetic in courting the
“foreign” vote. “These back settlements,” Scott proclaimed, were home to the “bone and
sinew and the best intelligence and true foundation of the development of this
province.”508 Provincial Rights candidates, in contrast, held on to the Anglo-Saxon
regions around Prince Albert and in the south of the province. Despite their defeat, it was
a positive showing for Haultain. The party declined in its share of seats, but the close
popular vote demonstrated that victory was within its grasp.
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Figure 4 - Electoral Map, 1908

Saskatchewan’s first two election campaigns solidified the Provincial Righters as the
champion of Saskatchewan’s nativists. The relative parity in the popular vote, however,
demonstrates that neither party had yet won over the province’s farmers. Both sides
promised the same things: better transportation, efficient administration, and a
sympathetic ear for their grievances. Farmers split over who to support. In 1905, half of
the seats south or adjacent to the CPR—the heart of the settled farm district—were
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decided by a margin of less than 100 votes.509 Similarly, Provincial Righters nominated
the same number of farmers as the Liberals in 1908 but elected more as a percentage of
their total strength in the Legislature.510
The central political issue prior to the Great War rested on which party won the farmers’
support. This contest was evident in debates over the creation of a provincial telephone
system. In early 1907, delegates to the SGGA annual meeting, upset with the Bell
Telephone Company’s monopoly on long-distance service in Canada and lack of
development of rural lines, passed a resolution calling for the creation of a provincially
operated telephone system. “Because of its ability to conquer space and time,” Ronald
Love notes, “the telephone was seen as a potential means, better than railways and good
roads, to overcome the farmer’s customary isolation by connecting him directly with the
towns where he sold his grain, bought his goods, and formed his social relationships.”511
Rural telephone systems, however, were not only expensive to build, but no private
company was willing to take the financial risks associated with servicing a sparsely
populated province. Haultain quickly jumped on the issue to demonstrate his party’s
support for the farmers. The Bell Company, he argued, constituted “one of the most
grasping and tyrannical monopolies” in Canada, and he urged the Legislature for “the
early establishment” of provincially “owned and operated telephones.”512 Taking a stand
in line with the SGGA’s expressed demands, Haultain reasoned, would earn farmers’
support.
Scott sidestepped the issue of public ownership altogether. While it would be “simply
suicidal” from a financial standpoint to develop a provincial system of telephones, he
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confided to Sifton, it would be “better to keep clear of the matter entirely” if his
government could not “hold out hope of the telephone system to the farmers.” Scott
understood that the farmers wanted rural telephones and did not particularly care how a
system was achieved. In fact, the SGGA’s conservative leadership was ideologically
predisposed against government ownership. Any system, Scott argued, had to bring
practical results to the farmers “while still leaving enough responsibility on the country
people themselves to keep the government free from the danger of being swamped.”513
After commissioning a report on the telephone situation in Saskatchewan, the Liberals
brought legislation which avoided government intervention and ensured the conservative
farmers’ support. The government would take responsibility for building and
administering the capital-intensive long-distance service, while leaving local service up
to the municipalities or resident controlled co-operatives. Under the government’s plan,
farmers received rural telephone service, the province avoided ownership, and the
Liberals received all the credit.
Haultain’s attempt to win farmer support backfired. The Provincial Righters were on the
record as supporting a government-owned system. They were now in the uncomfortable
position of opposing what proved to be a popular program. Haultain had no choice but to
double down on government ownership. Upon the bill’s final reading in the legislature,
the leader of the opposition proposed an amendment expressing regret that “the principle
of provincial ownership of telephone lines had not been applied for the benefit of the
rural portions of the province.”514 Whereas the Liberal government was able to provide
farmers with a practical scheme of rural telephone development, the opposition was only
able to offer empty criticisms.
A similar situation occurred during the elevator debate. Questions of the public
ownership of grain elevators divided Saskatchewan’s farmers along class lines. The
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larger and more conservative farmers, led by Motherwell and the executive of the SGGA,
were “diametrically opposed” to the “fairy tale” of the Partridge Plan, while the smaller
and more radical farmers viewed it as the only way to compete against the monopoly
interests in the grain trade.515 With the Liberals proposing legislation to implement a cooperative system, the Provincial Rights party came out firmly in favour of government
ownership. Haultain contended that he was “more convinced than ever” that the public
ownership of elevators was the only workable solution to the farmers’ grievances. 516
Haultain promised farmers the exact plan they demanded, but SGGA delegates voted
unanimously to support the Liberal plan. A co-operative system was not their first
choice, but most farmers followed their conservative executive’s lead and supported a
Liberal plan that offered some solution to their grievances. Outmaneuvered, Haultain
again confirmed his policy of government ownership. Renewing the debate in the
Legislature, Haultain “re-affirmed his belief in the principle of government ownership,”
claiming that the decision of the SGGA was “immaterial.” Farmers, he argued, had
“asked for a loaf” but were “given what he would call a stone.”517
Haultain hoped that his continued opposition to the co-operative scheme would exploit
the fissures present within the SGGA. It was increasingly clear that the Liberals and the
province’s conservative farmers were inseparable. Yet, Haultain reasoned that he may be
able to win the support of the more radical farmers who supported the Partridge Plan.
“Because of the looseness of its organization,” Duff Spafford notes, the Provincial Rights
Party “could embrace both Tories and farm radicals without putting a strain on the
principles of either.”518 The Liberal plan, Haultain warned, would only serve to create a
“scheme of glorified farmers’ elevators,” where “the central directors controlled
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everything” leaving the small individual farmer with “little local control.”519 Even here,
however, Provincial Righters miscalculated the support for the co-operative scheme. “If
the two proposals were placed before the people,” Scott boasted, “I am sincere in
doubting whether Government elevators could obtain the approval of two hundred men in
the whole Province.”520 Faced with a losing hand, Haultain moderated his position. The
Provincial Rights Party, he announced, would “accept the bill not as something they
believed the farmers wanted, but as something which was aimed at removing evils under
which the farmers suffered.”521 Haultain was clearly frustrated with the farmers’
continued rejection, but swallowed his pride in the hopes that he would eventually gain
their support. However, it was clear that the Liberals were winning the contest for
farmers’ support. As David Smith explains, “The statute books contained tangible
Liberal policies which appealed to the electorate but demoralized the opposition.”522
Questions over reciprocity drove the final wedge between Haultain and Saskatchewan
farmers. With his long history in territorial politics, Haultain was intimately aware of the
western farmers’ struggles against the protective tariff. John A. Macdonald’s National
Policy installed protective tariffs as part of a larger effort to develop central-Canadian
industry. Over time, farmers viewed this protectionism as both “an imposition and an
iniquity.”523 Protective tariffs did nothing to increase the price Canadian wheat received
on the world market and they cost the farmers money by artificially raised the farmers’
production costs. Any promise to lower or eliminate these protective tariffs received
favourable attention from Prairie farmers. Wilfrid Laurier, for example, won three of the
North-West Territory’s four seats in 1896 in part by equating protection to the “bondage”
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of “American slavery.”524 When the Liberals failed to act in office, over 500 Prairie
farmers joined a “Siege of Ottawa” to bring their demands directly to Laurier.525 It is
difficult to understand, therefore, how Haultain could misread the political situation in
Saskatchewan when Laurier announced a reciprocity agreement in January 1911.
Initially, Provincial Righters joined with the Liberals in urging the passage of the deal.
The “benefits to be derived from reciprocity,” Haultain noted, “were so great as to cause
all considerations of party to sink into insignificance.” The deal, if adopted, would speed
up Saskatchewan’s “inevitable destiny” of becoming the largest food producer on the
continent. Nor did it pose a threat to Canadian sovereignty or development. Haultain
argued that he would “be willing to forgo tariff reductions” to protect his “British
birthright,” but assured the Legislature that “he was not prepared to set up his British
proclivities when there was no necessity for so doing.” 526 Although the reciprocity issue
would ultimately become the central dividing line between Liberals and Conservatives in
the 1911 Dominion election, Haultain clearly did not believe that it posed a threat to
Canada’s British connection.
Not all Haultain supporters felt the same way. Reciprocity proved popular with
Saskatchewan’s farmers, but significant portions of Haultain’s base were less
enthusiastic. Editorials in newspapers otherwise friendly to Haultain warned that the deal
would destroy any hope of Saskatchewan developing secondary industries, such as grain
milling. Rather than fill western cities with “an army of workers,” the Saskatoon Capital
reported, reciprocity promised a “death-blow” for the “the one single industry which
might reasonably be expected to flourish in western Canada.”527 More worrying for
Haultain, however, was the Orange Lodge’s opposition. Speaking at the Lodge’s annual
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convention only a week after Haultain endorsed the plan, Grand Master Daniel Ellis
warned that “patriotic” citizens could not ignore the dangers the deal posed to the “future
of our beloved Dominion.” Reciprocity, he thundered, “means annexation.” Either
Canadians would “rise above party affiliations and stand steadfastly by Canada and the
Empire,” or they would “undo the work of the past thirty years for the doubtful benefits
of this pact.” The decision was an easy one for nativists to make. British traditions were
the foundation of Saskatchewan society and they would oppose reciprocity even if it was
popular among Saskatchewan’s farmers. Although the Grand Master maintained that he
was not commenting on how reciprocity “affects political parties,” the message for
Haultain was clear. Politicians could not support reciprocity and “proclaim their loyalty”
to the Lodge’s ideals.528 Haultain faced a difficult choice. Either he could continue to
support reciprocity and lose a substantial portion of his base, or he could change his
position and risk the wrath of the province’s farmers.
Haultain ultimately decided alienating farmers was worth the risk. The Provincial Rights
Party had yet to find a wedge issue from which it could separate the province’s farmers
from the Liberals. During the telephone and elevator questions, Haultain hoped to win
farmer support by promising the SGGA direct government intervention. In both
instances the SGGA, guided by their conservative leadership, ended up supporting the cooperative system. By opposing reciprocity, Haultain gambled that he could win over
farmers who favoured free trade but placed more emphasis on their adherence to the
British tradition. It was the very tactic that federal Conservatives were adopting. As
Conservative leader Robert Borden announced to the Manitoba Grain Growers: “I am
absolutely opposed to the reciprocity agreement. And if you gentlemen in the West were
prepared to make me prime minister tomorrow if I would not support that agreement, I
would NOT do it.”529 At the same time, Borden used his opposition on reciprocity to
express his solidarity with farmers’ other grievances. Borden spent the summer touring
the Prairies with promises to redress long-term grievances, including construction of the
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long-awaited Hudson Bay Railway, development of inland terminals, and turning over
control of natural resources to the provinces. All the electors had to do was vote against
the Liberals. Borden’s opposition held out the hope of providing the Provincial Righters
with an issue to differentiate themselves from the Liberals.
The opportunity proved too tempting for the party to pass up. In July, delegates to the
Saskatchewan Conservative Association convention unanimously agreed to an antireciprocity stance. Going a step further, delegates also decided to amalgamate the
Provincial Rights Party and federal Conservative Association into a single organization.
Haultain, now leader of a party officially opposed to reciprocity, distanced himself from
his earlier support. Although free trade “appealed” to him “strongly as a Western man,”
he reasoned, Laurier’s plan meant ruin for Canada. Appealing directly to the farmers’
British nationalism, Haultain noted that reciprocity threatened Canadian sovereignty:
“There are only two ways in which Canada can be annexed to the United States, by direct
conquest or by a deliberate act of the people of Canada. So long as I am alive and able to
shoulder a gun it will have to be by conquest.”530 In forming a provincial Conservative
Party, Haultain and Provincial Righters wagered that there was more potential upside to
opposing reciprocity. The gamble failed.
Conservatives underestimated farmers’ desire for reciprocity. Although Borden used the
issue to dethrone the Laurier Liberals in the 1911 federal election, Saskatchewan’s
electors voted overwhelmingly for Laurier and reciprocity.531 Haultain’s position on
reciprocity also alienated the farmer support he had developed since 1905 as leading
farmers began defecting from the new Conservative Party. F.C. Tate, a Provincial
Rights MLA and director of the SGGA, for example, broke ranks and actively supported
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an independent farmer candidate during the campaign.532 Matters went from bad to
worse for the Conservatives during the provincial election the following year.
Conservatives were initially buoyed by a friendly government in Ottawa and the renewed
organizational zeal that flowed from control of federal patronage. “Our opponents are
active in a thousand different directions,” a Liberal cabinet minister confided, “every day
bringing forth fresh evidence of the creation of an organization on an extensive scale.
From appearances, the weight of their money is beginning to count and goodness knows
where the end may be.”533 Even with federal patronage, however, the Conservatives
were unable to overcome the alienation of the province’s farmers. Haultain realized that
his new party was in a precarious position and refused to discuss reciprocity during the
campaign, declaring it a federal matter out of the provincial purview.534 Conservatives
instead focused on other issues important to the farmers and offered a “progressive,
populist package” of railway development, reduction in freight rates, low interest loans,
rural road construction, the Hudson Bay Railway, and a rural power scheme.535
The Liberals, in contrast, would not let the reciprocity issue die. Scott declared that the
election was “the second engagement in the struggle between the producers of Western
Canada on the one hand and the Big Interests and Monopolies of Eastern Canada.”536
Whereas the Liberals sought to protect the farmer, the Conservatives were completely out
of touch with reality. Haultain, Liberal propaganda noted, had paraded himself as the
defender of provincial rights, but, at the first opportunity, sacrificed provincial interests
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for party favour. “Farmer Haultain,” Liberals mocked, was no farmer at all, but a
Conservative lackey working “for the interest of Eastern Tories.”537
Figure 5 - Electoral Map, 1912
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The election results solidified the Conservatives’ worst fears. It would have been an easy
fight, a supporter noted without any trace of irony, “if it were not for reciprocity and the
cry that Mr. Borden is hostile to the west.”538 Conservative representation in the
legislature was cut nearly in half, from fourteen to eight, while their share of the popular
vote dropped dramatically from a high of 49.5% in 1908 to 42% in 1912. Even more
alarming, however, were the Conservative losses in farming districts. Whereas the
previous two elections demonstrated Haultain’s strength in the south-east, his association
with the anti-reciprocity movement nearly wiped out Conservative support in that corner
of the province, winning only five of the twenty-one seats either south of or adjacent to
the CPR.
After battling the Liberals since 1905, Haultain’s stance on reciprocity and connection to
the Conservative Party destroyed any chance of gaining farmer support for the
foreseeable future. These results also demonstrated the relative weakness of Haultain’s
nativists message. In the previous two elections, Haultain’s stance on racial and religious
issues resonated with the Anglo-Saxon “old-timers” in the south-east. When these
farmers were forced to choose between reciprocity and appeals to a British nationalism,
they chose the former. Haultain may have retained the Orange Lodge’s support, but he
could not win an election without wider inroads into the farming community. His party
was left reeling. Haultain had failed in three elections and announced his retirement from
politics, taking a position on Saskatchewan’s Supreme Court.539 It fell to Wellington
Willoughby, a largely unknown lawyer from Moose Jaw, to rebuild the “shattered” party.
Willoughby focused on organization which Haultain had neglected. Under new
leadership, the party greatly expanded its fundraising, membership, and constituency
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organizations.540 Improved organization, however, would not win elections by itself.
The Conservatives had lost the fight for farmers’ support. What they needed, therefore,
were issues that appealed to their British nativist base.
The Conservatives did not have to wait long for their opportunity. In 1912, the Scott
government amended the School Act to require minority ratepayers to assign their taxes
to separate schools if they existed in their locality. This was the general practice since
the territorial period, but a court decision the previous year decided that ratepayers could
support whatever system they chose. In passing the amendment, Scott was reacting to the
fact that many Protestants were assigning their taxes to Catholic schools with lower tax
rates, imperiling public schools.541 The by-product, however, reignited fights over
separate schools in the province.542 The Orange Lodge viewed the amendments as akin
to forcing separate schools on an unwilling population. Rather than merely challenge the
amendments, however, nativists used the opportunity to attack the existence of separate
schools. “When Roman Catholics demand separate schools in this province,” Grand
Organizer Armstrong informed a Glorious Twelfth rally numbering over 4,000, “they are
demanding special privileges and every Roman Catholic school in this province is a
standing advertisement of unfair treatment.”543
The Liberals unleashed a firestorm. While it was obvious that the Lodge would oppose
these moves, moderate Protestants also expressed their displeasure. In a series of
vociferous attacks extending the better part of three years, Reverend Murdoch
MacKinnon of Knox Presbyterian in Regina denounced Premier Scott, one of his own
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parishioners, from the pulpit. In passing the laws, MacKinnon told his congregation,
Scott was allowing Catholics within the Liberal government to whip their co-religionists
“into line.”544 The amendments allowed the Catholic Church to introduce “non-AngloSaxon ideals and features” into Saskatchewan’s education system and were a “a lapse
into the atmosphere of pagan slavery.”545 The only solution, MacKinnon concluded, lay
in being “true to our heritage” of individual freedom and choice.546
The Conservatives quickly joined MacKinnon’s assault. Willoughby believed that
Catholics voted en masse for the Liberals. “The people of the province,” therefore, had
the right to “know why any denomination found it fit and proper to give its united support
to any political party.” Since 1905, the Conservatives had dedicated themselves to
protecting Saskatchewan’s hard-won British freedoms, but “working against us is the
solid vote of a corporate church.”547 The only solution rested on Conservatives taking a
firm stand against this Catholic influence. “There is nothing to be gained by conciliatory
methods,” the Evening Province announced in support of Willoughby’s plan. “The
Conservative party has everything to gain and nothing to lose by boldly declaring its
opposition to such interests as are already openly opposed to it.”548 The party’s 1916
convention passed a platform they hoped would resonate with nativists. Delegates
pledged to not only rescind the Liberal amendments to the School Act, but also vowed to
establish English as the sole language of instruction. The direction clearly appealed to
the party hopeful. After announcing the new platform, “the two hundred delegates
cheered themselves hoarse.”549
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Despite the growing sense that Conservatives could regain momentum through renewed
religious and racial tensions, they struggled to find a platform that would win farmer
support. The Liberal Party’s alliance with the SGGA’s conservative leadership, and its
unqualified support for reciprocity, made it a “farmers’ party” in all but name.550
Willoughby wanted to differentiate himself from the Liberals, but was stuck with
supporting programs that had ceased to be issues for many years. For example, the 1916
platform swore to nationalize the province’s telephone system.551 Not only was the issue
long-dead, but most farmers were perfectly content with the co-operative system
established by the Liberals.552 It was equally clear that the Conservatives remained
susceptible to attacks on reciprocity. Liberal propaganda included veiled references to
the Conservative’s earlier stance on the issue well into the 1920s.553
Conservatives responded to their lack of popular policies by campaigning directly on the
farmers’ individualist ideology. The Liberals may have supported co-operatives and
reciprocity, the Conservatives argued, but their corruption was undermining the farmers’
freedom. It was in this vein that Conservatives began attacking the Liberal machine as an
anti-democratic institution that used bribery, blackmail, and outright fraud to undermine
the sanctity of the farmers’ vote. “Shameless Representatives of the People,”
Conservatives proclaimed, “Sold Themselves For a Few Hundred Dollars to Thwart the
Popular Will.”554 Liberal corruption was also stealing valuable funds that could
otherwise support Canada’s war effort. “Money collected,” a Conservative advertisement
claimed, “goes to pay fat salaries to favored civil servants…while the patriotic fund
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suffers.”555 The message was simple. If the farmers of the province valued their
individualism and hard-won British freedoms, there could be “No Compromise with
Wrong.”556 The Liberal army of “party hacks doing nothing but party work at the
expense of the people of the province” had to cease.557 By focusing on the farmers’
individualism, the Conservatives hoped to use the Liberals’ organizational strength
against them.
These tactics were on full display as the Conservatives brought formal charges against
the Liberals. As early as 1915, Conservative newspapers began hinting at government
corruption, noting that there was a “need of a house cleaning in a certain Augean
stable.”558 As the election approached, J.E. Bradshaw, Conservative MLA for Prince
Albert, tabled a motion in the legislature alleging “wholesale graft and corruption.”
Bradshaw purported to have evidence that Liberal MLAs accepted bribes to oppose
temperance, that hotel operators had funneled money into Liberal party coffers, and that
the government had paid over $50,000 to friends for “pretended contracts for road
work.”559 Bradshaw kept up the pressure with further charges over the coming days.
Leading cabinet ministers—including J.A. Calder, W.F.A. Turgeon, the Attorney General
and Roman Catholic representative in cabinet, and P.A. McNab, Minister of Public
Works—were alleged to have accepted bribes from the liquor interests.560 Bradshaw also
contended that the government, “through graft, incompetence, and connivance of
government officials,” dramatically overspent on the construction of the Battleford
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Asylum.561 The Liberals, reeling from the charges, hoped to deal with the issues through
a select committee. The Conservatives wanted as much publicity as possible and pushed
for a royal commission to fully investigate the serious charges. Faced with opposition
entrenchment, mounting charges, public outrage, and the threatened defection of
prominent Regina Liberals, the government caved and ultimately referred the charges to a
series of Royal Commissions.562
It proved to be a fleeting victory. After intensive investigations, the commissions
completely absolved Scott of wrongdoing. Several civil servants and four Liberal
backbenchers were found guilty of fraud, but the commissioners found that the corruption
did not reach the Premier or his cabinet.563 Willoughby maintained that the commissions
vindicated Conservative charges. “If the Conservatives are put in place of the Liberal
ministers,” he noted, “who can tell what else may be revealed when the records of
departments are investigated and the employees freer to tell of what they know.”564 For
most people in Saskatchewan, however, the issue was settled.
Conservatives found some solace when Scott announced his retirement in October. After
years of depression and ill-health, Scott’s feud with MacKinnon and the Conservatives’
all-out attack on his government proved too much to bear. “The actual fact,” journalist
J.W. Dafoe confided to Sifton, “is that for at least four years Walter has been neither
physically nor mentally capable of carrying the burden of the premiership.”565 Yet, it was
a disappointment for Conservatives who were quietly holding out hope for a repeat of the
situation in Manitoba wherein Rodmond Roblin’s Liberal government resigned over
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allegations of corruption in the construction of the province’s Legislative building.566
William Martin, the new Liberal Premier, rewarded farmers’ continued support, bringing
Dunning—then general manager of the SCEC—into his government and pledging to do
everything possible to “lighten the burden” on Saskatchewan producers.567
The Conservative Party’s continued failure to win farmer support was on full display in
the 1917 election. Once again, the “stone broke” Conservatives went face-to-face with
the “well oiled” Liberal machine.568 Organization, however, was only part of the
problem. Conservatives’ inability to differentiate themselves from the Liberals continued
to confound the party. Both parties pledged to assist the province’s farmers through low
interest loans and assistance in purchasing additional land, provide for a form of mother’s
allowances, improve the working conditions of the newly enfranchised women of the
province, acquire rights to the province’s natural resources, and assist the returned
soldiers’ adjustment to civilian life.569
With no substantive policy differences, the Conservatives hoped that appeals to the
farmers’ individualism would resonate with the voters. The Liberal machine figured
prominently in Conservative campaign literature. With titles ranging from The Big Steal,
to Phantom Roads, to The Old Gang Still Stands, the Conservatives reinforced the idea
that the Liberal party had betrayed farmers’ trust.570 In contrast, the Conservatives were
prepared to fight the “political jobbery, the graft and corruption with which every
department of Government has been honeycombed, and which has resulted in bringing
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disgrace on our Province.”571 The Conservative platform vowed to undermine the
machine’s sources of patronage by instituting entrance exams for the civil service, a
complete prohibition on the sale and consumption of alcohol to limit the “liquor
interests,” and the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall so that the people had
power over corrupt governments.572 It was a campaign designed to characterize the
Liberals as inherently untrustworthy. Unfortunately for Willoughby, however,
Saskatchewan farmers were unconvinced. Martin had chosen wisely in selecting
Dunning for his cabinet. Not only had Dunning established a reputation above reproach
in the SCEC, but he was, as far as Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers were concerned,
the very embodiment of the self-made man.573 The conservative farmers’ relationship
with Liberals was as strong as ever.
At the same time, the province’s radical farmers were organizing their own party to
combat the Liberals. The Non-Partisan League (NPL)—a socialistic farmers’
organization dedicated to building class consciousness and undermining the party
system—had spread to Saskatchewan following a sweeping victory in North Dakota in
1915. The NPL called for a system of direct democracy wherein farmers would take the
power of government into their own hands. The League hoped to capture the radical
farmers by calling for the government’s complete ownership of the agricultural industry,
the purchase of farm machinery for farmers at cost, and the creation of a system of rural
credit banks. It was also critical of the SGGA’s refusal to enter politics and the close
relationship between conservative farmers and the governing Liberals.574 Yet, to call the
League a political movement, as David Smith notes, “grants this fragmented and
disorganized rural unrest a measure of unity and coherence that it most assuredly lacked.”
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The Liberals marshalled the full weight of their machine against the NPL, but “aside
from scattered instances of enthusiasm for an independent or NPL candidate, the
government faced no real threat.”575 After organizing for over a year, the League only
managed to appoint eight candidates, winning a single seat by acclamation.576 Even with
its relative weakness, the NPL proved more successful than the Conservatives at gaining
farmers’ votes. By appealing to conservative farmers’ individualism, the Conservatives
were battling the Liberals head-on; it was a fight that they could not win. The NPL, in
contrast, catered to the farmers who felt alienated by the main parties. The Conservatives
only managed to outpace the NPL in two of the six ridings where they faced off.577
The Conservatives’ only successes in 1917 lay in their continued appeal to
Saskatchewan’s British nativists. Conservative advertisements urged the people to “vote
for the Opposition Candidate and Banish the Monster of Polylingualism from
Saskatchewan forever.”578 Likewise, the party’s platform called for an English-only
school system.579 The Orange Lodge, following through on its pledge to oppose any
party that supported separate schools leant its support to the Conservatives. In the lead
up to the election, the Lodge queried all candidates on their position regarding racial and
religious issues, including their stance on the creation of “one system of public and
nonsectarian school,” their opposition to “all bilingual teaching,” and their support for
requirements that all trustees be “able to read and write the English language.” Only
candidates who accepted the Lodge’s positions were deemed a “suitable person” worthy
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of support.580 The Lodge did not openly endorse the Conservatives, but their
questionnaire was a thinly-veiled-ploy to undermine Liberal support amongst the nativist
population.
Without farmer support, however, the election was not even close. Conservatives
received thirty-six percent of the popular vote and seven seats scattered across the
province. The Liberals, in contrast, elected fifty-one candidates with fifty-seven percent
of the vote. Once again, Conservatives attributed their failure to the Liberal’s corruption
of the foreign vote. “At all the polls where the foreign born voted,” a Conservative
organizer reported, “were Interpreters who were overzealous in their maters’ cause.”581
There was some evidence to back up these claims. Areas with large Catholic and nonAnglo-Saxon residents—primarily in the central portions of the province—went
overwhelmingly Liberal, providing margins of over 1,000 votes in nearly half of the
ridings. The Conservatives deluded themselves into thinking this was the reason for their
failure. It was not the Liberal Party’s connection with Catholics and immigrants that
defeated the Conservatives, but the party’s inability to gain farmers’ support. The south,
where Conservatives hoped their appeals to the farmers’ individualism would win
support, provided only four seats. The Liberals, in contrast, won nearly half of the
southern seats by a margin of at least 300 votes.582
Farmers did not believe that the Conservatives provided the answer to their troubles. No
matter what the Conservatives tried, they could not overcome their earlier lapses in
judgement and the Liberal’s superior organization. In elections where racial and
religious issues dominated, the Liberals and the Conservatives were relatively evenly
matched. The Liberals secured clear majorities in both the 1905 and 1908 election, but
the number of seats in Saskatchewan’s first-past-the-post electoral system did not fully
reflect the popular vote. Gerrymandering, combined with the concentration of
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Conservative support in the south, disproportionately favoured Liberal candidates. In
1908, for example, the Conservatives secured nearly half of the popular vote but only a
third of the seats. In 1912 and 1917, the Conservative’s fatal mistake in opposing
reciprocity was clear. Conservative strength in the legislature dropped by more than half,
and their share of the popular vote decreased precipitously. Although they retained
nativist’s support, even the increased racial tensions of the First World War could not
make up for Conservatives’ reverses among farmers.
Table 1 - Results for Liberal and Conservative/Prov. Rights Parties, 1905-1917583

Election
1905
1908
1912
1917

Total
Vote
34,090
58,687
87,786
187,976

# of
Seats
25
41
54
59

% of
Vote
52
50.5
57
57

Liberal
# of
Seats
16
27
45
51

% of
Seats
64
68
85
86

Conservative/
Provincial Rights
% of
# of
% of
Vote
Seats Seats
47
9
36
49.5
14
34
42
8
15
36
7
12

The continued inability to make inroads with Saskatchewan’s farm population fractured
the Conservative Party. Willoughby was forced to take the blame for the stunning defeat
and abandoned the province for a position in the Senate. Leadership of the party passed
to Donald Maclean, a Saskatoon lawyer whose only claim to fame lay in polling the
largest majority of any Conservative MLA in the 1917 disaster. Maclean faced an
impossible task in rebuilding the party. The previous four elections had clearly
demonstrated the extent that the Liberals would go to secure their relationship with the
province’s conservative farmers. At the same time, the rise of the NPL, followed by the
Progressives after 1921, limited the Conservative’s ability to pivot and attract the smaller
and more radical farmers’ vote. To make matters worse, the Conservatives could not rely
on British nativist support in perpetuity. Maclean continued to champion English-only in
the province’s schools and restrictions on rights of minority religious groups, but his
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stance on prohibition alienated the Orange Lodge.584 Since at least 1914, the Lodge had
placed itself on record in support of temperance.585 Maclean, however, used the rampant
disregard for the law to attack the Liberals. Prohibition, he proclaimed, proved to be “a
mockery and a farce” under Liberal management. Rather than continue prohibition after
the war’s end, the Conservatives advocated for a system of government-run distribution
houses.586 Maclean assumed that, given Liberal connections with the province’s
Catholics, nativists had no choice but to support the Conservative Party.
It was another miscalculation. The Orange Lodge had never openly endorsed the
Conservatives. Instead, Orangemen emphasized a policy of supporting any politician or
political party that closely adhered to their ideals. The rise of the Progressive Party
provided another outlet for their grievances. As Leo Courville notes, three dominant
factions made up the Saskatchewan Progressive movement: the “conservative” Provincial
Righters who abandoned the party when it aligned with the federal Conservatives; a
“Liberal partisan group alienated from federal liberalism by regional issues;” and the
more radical English and Anglican “non-partisan” element.587 The “conservative
Provincial Rights” faction, Courville argues, carried with it the same “religio-racial
defensiveness” and “white Anglo-Saxon superiority complex” that animated
Saskatchewan’s nativists.588 They also vigorously argued against the evils of alcohol. If
the Lodge could not count on the Conservatives, they could easily turn to the
Progressives.
The Conservatives could not compete with the Progressive movement. Both parties
could turn to the province’s British nativists for support, but it was only the
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Progressives—with their central message of agricultural reform and “economic class
advancement”—that appealed directly to large segments of the province’s farmers.589
The Conservatives found it increasingly difficult to position themselves in the debates
over debt amelioration and grain marketing that dominated the immediate post-war era.
With the Liberals under Martin and Dunning championing conservative farmers’
individualist ideology, and the loose coalition of farmers in the progressive movement
articulating a non-partisan system of group government, the Conservatives floundered
without a clear direction or message. Saskatchewan held eight by-elections between
1917 and 1921, and the Conservatives did not contest one.590
The Conservative Party reached its nadir in the 1921 election. Martin may have used the
election to disarm the Progressives before they had a chance to fully organize, but the
results were even worse for the Conservatives. Maclean realized the party did not have a
chance and announced his retirement on the eve of election, leaving Conservatives
rudderless. Delegates to the 1921 convention realized the party’s hopeless position and
decided to only field candidates in ridings where “conditions give it hope of success.”591
The Conservatives fielded four candidates, electing three—including one who ran as an
Independent-Conservative.592 In comparison, electors returned six Progressives, seven
Independents, and one Labour MLA. For the first time in their history, Conservatives
failed to form the official opposition.593 The rise of the Progressive movement made the
Conservative Party largely irrelevant to post-war political debates.
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The Conservative Party ceased to function as a result. Federal Conservatives maintained
a bare-bones organization, nominating a full slate of candidates for the 1921 federal
election, but did not bother to appoint a new provincial leader and ignored all
organizational work at the local level. The party could not even rely on friendly
newspapers to carry its message. From a position of relative equality with the Liberals in
1905, the decline of Conservative-orientated newspapers mirrored the decline of the party
itself, as editors either changed their political allegiance or went bankrupt. The last
Conservative daily in the province, Moose Jaw’s News, ceased publication in 1920,
leaving the party with a single weekly in Meflort.594 Supporting a membership in the
legislature of only three, an almost complete decline in party organization, and the loss of
any reliable means of getting their message to the electorate, local Conservatives could be
forgiven for expressing their doubts about the party’s future revival.595
The Saskatchewan Conservative Party struggled for relevance in the two decades
following the province’s entry into Confederation. Since 1905, the party formed a close
connection with Saskatchewan’s nativist element. Conservatives consistently articulated
a message in-line with the Orange Lodge’s opposition to separate schools and the French
language. Orangemen rewarded this support with their votes. While a significant force
within Saskatchewan conservatism, British nativists’ conception of a racially-based
citizenship was not widespread enough to overpower Liberal support amongst the
farming community, recent immigrants, and Roman Catholics. The Conservatives’ only
path to power lay in winning larger segments of Saskatchewan’s farmers to their cause; a
feat they consistently failed to achieve. By the end of the decade, however, the
Conservatives had overcome their early weakness to defeat the Liberals for the first time
in the province’s history. They achieved this feat by relying on the lessons they had
learned in their earlier struggles.
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4

A Conservative Victory: J.T.M. Anderson and the 1929
Election

From a position of irrelevance in 1921, the Saskatchewan Conservative Party defeated
the Liberals in the 1929 election. It was a meteoric transformation. The Liberals’ series
of unbroken electoral successes since 1905 had made them Saskatchewan’s “natural
governing party,” while the Conservatives struggled for relevance. This, however, was
not a result of conservatism’s irrelevance but divides within the movement itself. The
Conservative Party had proved adept at capturing British nativist support, but every
attempt to make inroads amongst Saskatchewan’s farmers failed miserably. The reasons
for this dramatic change in Conservative fortunes have never been adequately explained.
Not surprisingly, the most common explanation focuses on the shocking emergence of
the KKK and its hard line racial and religious positions. Klansmen certainly viewed the
Conservative victory as a vindication for their ideology. As election results poured in on
the night of June 6th, numerous communities reported sightings of fiery crosses and
Klansmen jubilantly parading down Regina’s streets.596
Historians have followed the Klan’s lead, maintaining that the Conservative victory was
the product of the racial antagonisms stoked by the Klan. According to David Smith, the
KKK “unified opposition to the Liberals by successfully holding them responsible for the
non-English problem.”597 Similarly, Pitsula alleges that the Klan “changed the political
climate to pave the way for the Conservative victory in the provincial election, an
outcome that had seemed highly unlikely, if not absolutely impossible, before the Klan
arrived on the scene.”598 Patrick Kyba takes this argument furthest and alleges that the
Conservatives did not offer a concrete program, but waged a campaign “born of
desperation.” For Kyba, the Conservative Party’s 1929 victory was only made possible
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by building “on the emotionalism stirred by the Klan.”599 Despite the consensus, not all
historians are convinced. Peter Russell argues that race played a minor role at best. “A
systematic examination of official Conservative Party statements issued throughout the
election,” he argues, “shows little evidence of an appeal to religious (or ethnic)
prejudices.”600 The fact that the Klan was pleased with the outcome does not mean that
they played a pivotal role in the victory.
These explanations for the 1929 election have failed to appreciate the dynamics of
Saskatchewan conservatism. The argument that the Klan was the primary factor in the
Conservative’s victory is predicated on the idea that the Klan’s message was unique to
the late 1920s. Polarization on religious and racial issues was neither unique to the late
1920s or solely the product of the Klan. The Orange Lodge articulated the same nativist
British nationalism since the turn of the century and Conservatives had appealed to these
tensions since 1905 to no avail. The Klan, simply put, was not solely responsible for the
Conservatives’ success. Racial tensions were certainly heightened in 1929, but they
were not powerful enough to topple the Liberals on their own. At the same time,
Russell’s assertion that the Conservatives did not appeal to “religious prejudices” is a
fallacy. Nativists, after all, had served as the Conservative’s base since 1905. It is
therefore improbable that the party would fail to use rising racial and religious tensions to
their benefit. The secret to the party’s success lay in its articulation of a message that
united conservatives, both economic and racial, into a single anti-Liberal coalition.
The Conservative Party had learned valuable lessons in their earlier defeats. On the one
hand, Conservatives understood their main body of support lay with the province’s
nativist elements. Any future success would be based on continued appeals to this base.
It is not a coincidence that J.T.M. Anderson was the Conservative leader that led the
party to victory in 1929. Anderson had long been associated with the Orange Lodge and
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nativists apprehension over the pace of assimilation. The party’s platform was never as
radical as Orangemen and Klansmen would have liked, but the choice of Anderson as
leader demonstrated the party’s continued dedication to assimilation and a limit to
Catholicism’s influence. British nativists, however, did not constitute a large enough
electoral block to ensure victory on their own, even in the heightened tensions of the late
1920s. The second element of the party’s victory lay in their successful appeal to
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers. Throughout the 1920s, Conservatives depicted the
Liberal machine as a fundamental threat to the people’s individual freedoms. By
appealing to these two elements, the 1929 election was a conservative victory.
It took until late 1923 for the Conservative Party to show signs of life. Over the winter,
leading Conservatives began the process of rebuilding the party. The new executive—
headed by James F. Bryant—faced the daunting task of establishing a platform and
appointing a leader that could provide a reasonable hope of electoral success. Bryant
faced the same problem that plagued the Conservatives since 1905: how to balance a
nativist base with the need to attract widespread farmer support. Bryant’s ultimate
strategy was to divide these issues between the leader and the platform. To signal their
continued support of their base, Bryant and the executive selected J.T.M. Anderson as the
leader apparent. Not only had Anderson established his credentials through his work
with non-Anglo immigrants and the Orange Lodge, but his treatment by the Liberal
government had antagonized British nativists across the province. In 1918, the Martin
government appointed Anderson as the province’s Director of Education Among New
Canadians. Dunning eliminated the role in 1922. For Orangemen, the Premier was
attempting “to please the Ruthenians and others for political reasons” needing “their
support at the next election.”601 The real reason, according to Dunning, was more
nuanced. Most of the complaints against Anderson’s stance on assimilation, he wrote to
a supporter, had come from those “connected with the non-partisan league, whom I can

601

QUA, 2121, Dunning, Box 1, File 10, Chronological Correspondence, October, 1922, Rev. C. Endicott
to Dunning, 25 October, 1922.

163

only describe as ‘REDS’ of the very worst variety.” While the Premier did not wish to
“please such people,” he did hope that his move would ensure the support of “those of
foreign extraction who resist” the League’s radical “doctrines.”602 Regardless of
Dunning’s justifications, conservatives considered Anderson’s treatment as continued
evidence of Liberals favouring the foreign vote. Although Anderson had never held
political office, and some expressed doubts on his loyalty to the Conservative Party,
delegates unanimously endorsed him as the new leader in March 1924.603 The
enthusiasm behind this choice was palpable. As one delegate put it, Anderson was “the
modern Moses we have been looking for in this province to lead us out of the political
wilderness which we have been wandering in for the last 20 years.”604
Having signaled the party’s continued support of the nativist cause with Anderson’s
appointment, the Conservative’s platform abandoned its earlier focus on sectarianism.
Drafted by a committee headed by Bryant, the new platform was the party’s attempt to
rebrand itself as a viable option for the province’s independent farmers. As Dunning
feared, the Conservatives were attempting to win over the “saner and more level-headed
farmers” who opposed the NPL, FU, and Progressive Party’s radicalism.605 Borrowing
from Conservative tactics in the 1917 election, Bryant attacked the Liberals’
trustworthiness in handling the province’s affairs in the post-war recession. “In view of
the orgy of extravagance of the Dunning Government,” he proclaimed, “the first and
foremost point of our platform should be that of economy.” Saskatchewan’s economic
woes did not stem solely from the global state of agriculture. Rather, “the ‘Pork Barrel’
politicians who for 19 years have ruled in Saskatchewan, have put us where we are today.
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To them any expenditure was justifiable and expedient, so long as it succeeded in
keeping them in power.”606
Bryant hoped that attacks on the Liberal’s mishandling of the economy would appeal to
the business sense and entrepreneurialism of the province’s larger farmers. The
Conservatives, he promised, would reorganize the government on “sound business
principles.” The “cost of government” would be “materially and in great measure
reduced,” and capital expenditures would be limited to only those “absolutely necessary
and vital and to the interests of the producers of our province.” As for the important
question of grain marketing, the Conservatives understood the divisions within the
farmers’ movement and sidestepped any pronouncements on a pool. Instead, the party
advocated for “the practical application of the principle of co-operative effort in all sound
co-operative undertakings.”607 The Conservatives had learned their lessons in their
earlier failures to win the farmer’s vote. Rather than taking a stance on farmers’
demands, as they had to no avail with the telephone and elevator questions, they instead
appealed to conservative farmers’ ideology, leaving the details for later discussions.
The first test of the rejuvenated party’s strength came with the 1925 election. Anderson
had initially hoped to nominate between forty and fifty candidates, but a lack of
constituency organization continued to plague the fledgling party and they only fielded
sixteen candidates as opposed to the forty Progressives and sixty-two Liberals.608
Anderson and Bryant had only just begun to rebuild the party and had no choice but to
focus on constituencies where the party had some hope of success. The Conservatives
ran a full slate of candidates in the cities but limited their rural candidates to ridings in the
south where conservative farmers predominated. The Conservatives realized they could
not win the election, but they could test their new platform. Throughout the campaign,
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speakers articulated the same theme: “Time for a Change.”609 Anderson also continued
to advocate for nativist policies and announced plans to require school trustees to be
fluent in English. “I do not think there is a district in this province no matter how
backward the district may be,” he reasoned, “that could not find three men who speak
English. No man should take over the management of a school and not be able to read,
write and speak English.”610 Although Orangemen regretted that “no party or politician”
was willing to make “Separate Schools and the One Language a definite issue before our
electorate,” they supported Anderson as a known quantity in their fight for non-sectarian
and English public schools.611
Despite their efforts to rebuild the party, the Conservatives only managed to win three
seats. While this was undoubtedly a blow (the Progressives won six seats while the
Liberals secured fifty-two) there was some reason to remain optimistic. The revived
Conservative Party increased its share of the popular vote to eighteen percent from a low
of four percent in 1921. 612 The results also do not tell the whole story. Anderson
worried that three-way contests would benefit the Liberals and approached the
Progressives early in the campaign to come to an arrangement to avoid splitting the
opposition vote.613 A formal agreement was not reached but the fact that three-way
contests occurred in only five of the province’s fifty-five rural constituencies gave weight
to Liberal charges of a conspiracy. Dunning, for example, explained to Motherwell that
he was “in for a hard fight” owing to the “arrangement between the Tories and the so-
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called Provincial Progressives whereby Tories are nominated to run as progressives.”614
Similarly, the Morning Leader informed its readers that “over thirty of the forty
candidates nominated as ‘Progressives’ are rank Tories.”615
The appearance of a Conservative-Progressive agreement forced Dunning and the
Liberals to take the Conservatives more seriously than would have otherwise been the
case. With only sixteen candidates, Anderson did not pose as significant of a threat as the
forty Progressives. However, Dunning was convinced that many Progressive and
Independent candidates were secret Conservatives and directed much of his attention
towards discrediting Anderson. For example, Dunning responded to Anderson’s stance
on English school trustees by noting that he “may be guilty of sins as a government
leader,” but he would “never be guilty of the outrage of pitting race against race and
creed against creed.”616 Similarly, Liberal organizers toured the province’s “foreign”
settlements handing out copies of Anderson’s book in an attempt to shore up the
“newcomer” vote.617 Dunning also refuted Conservative attacks on his administration of
the province’s finances. After spending eight years reining in expenses, he noted, it was
hard to be told that he had been on “a drunken bat of expenditure.”618 Dunning stressed
that the people of the province had more to fear from a Conservative than Liberal
administration: “When they ask you to discharge the captain and crew of the good ship
Saskatchewan, you have the right to know who is going to lead the new crew and where
they are going to take the ship.”619
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By singling out the Conservatives for attack, Dunning gave the party legitimacy over the
struggling Progressives. The creation of the Wheat Pool, controversies resulting from the
hostile takeover of the SCEC, the merger of the SGGA and FU into the UFC(SS), and
failures at the federal level to effect change sapped the Progressives of both strength and
organizational unity. Between 1925 and 1929, a quasi-civil war waged within the
progressive movement as its different constituent groups fought for control. The more
radical leadership, on the one hand, sought to move the party in line with the ideas of
group government emanating from Henry Wise Wood in Alberta. The more conservative
rank-and-file opposed these moves. The leadership called a “monster” rally in 1927 to
discuss “the question of placing the organization on an economic group basis.”620 They
expected over 5,000 delegates to attend, but only 250 showed up.621
At the same time, a small number of the more radical farmers—the self-styled “left wing
of the farmers’ movement”—organized the Farmers’ Educational League which
advocated for outright class conflict.622 Although limited in membership, the League’s
focus on gaining control of the Pool and the UFC(SS) channeled the energies of the more
radical elements of the progressive movement away from questions of political
involvement.623 As a result, the “Provincial Rights conservatives” were given a wider
berth within the party. 624 The weakening of the Progressives, as Courville notes, led to
“the ascension of the Conservative party from a junior to senior partner in the anti-Liberal
conglomerate.”625 Given this ascension, Anderson’s claim that “10 of the 11” opposition
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MLAs elected in 1925 were “Tories” was not just the leader’s attempt to justify the
Conservative’s defeat.626 Yet, it was not all rejoicing for the Conservatives. They may
have emerged as the dominant opposition party, but they still were a far cry from the
level of support the Liberals enjoyed. It would be an uphill battle for Anderson to form a
government.
The Conservatives’ path to victory lay in exploiting the racial and religious turmoil
surrounding immigration and Saskatchewan’s schools. As late as 1927, leading
Conservatives had attempted to pivot the party away from its close association with the
British nativist vote. Only by attracting the foreign and Catholic vote, they argued, could
the party defeat the Liberals. Anderson undermined these efforts. Not only did Catholics
view his work among new Canadians as “proselytizing,” but he had made little progress
in “getting as many Catholic leaders as possible to assist him.”627 These, however, were
minority voices. Many Conservatives welcomed the continuation of racial and religious
tensions. The Klan, Bryant explained to Bennett, was “going very strong and will be of
great assistance in defeating the present Government.”628 Rather than viewing the
dramatic expansion of the Orange Lodge and the Klan in the mid-1920s as a danger, it
was widely considered a harbinger of future Conservative success.
The exact relationship between the Conservative Party and the Klan is difficult to
measure. Jimmy Gardiner and the Liberals certainly considered it a Conservative
organization and used every means at their disposal—both legitimate and otherwise—to
convince the public of that “fact,” but the actual connections were never clear cut. Dr.
Cowan, the long-time Conservative and Klan treasurer, insinuated a high level of
unofficial support when discussing the matter with R.B. Bennett: “The one [scribbled
out] is the most complete political organization ever known in the west. Every organizer
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in it is a Tory...I know it for I pay them. And I never pay a Grit. Smile when you hear
anything about this organization. And keep silent.”629 Yet, if the Klan was a
Conservative tool as Cowan insisted, the relationship was not widely known. Bryant, the
Klan’s own lawyer, dismissed any connection. Bryant declared that the relationship was
more akin to the strong support that “the Knights of Columbus or any other similar
organization” gave to the Liberals.630 Regardless of who provided the backing, another
leading Conservative explained, the party “would be foolish not to profit by the Klan
movement as the Conservative Party does not owe any thanks to the Church for by it we
have been kept in the opposition.”631 Most Conservatives were content to have the
organizations work together to defeat the Liberals.
This working relationship was on full display at the 1928 Conservative convention. Not
only was the meeting attended by leading Klansmen and Orangemen, but the major
platform policies adopted “met with the entire approval of the Protestant
organizations.”632 Immigration would be “based on the selective principle” catering to
people of Protestant and British backgrounds. Similarly, delegates promised that the
province’s schools would actively serve as sites of assimilation by forbidding religious
emblems and garb as well as eliminating textbooks with a denominational bias. “We
want the spirit of British liberty and justice and loyalty,” Anderson explained, “to breathe
from the covers of our textbooks.”633 More ominously, delegates also took steps to
actively limit the role of Catholics within the party. A.G. MacKinnon, the Regina
Conservative who had proposed shifting the party’s focus away from religious issues, had
his name withheld from a list of nominees for positions in the party’s executive.
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Likewise, J.J. Leddy, a Saskatoon insurance agent, refused to withdraw his candidacy for
an advisory position and was defeated on the convention floor.634 Conservatives were
clear in their commitment to the British nativist cause.
Finding a program that resonated with the province’s farmers proved more challenging.
The 1928 convention made it clear that the party would continue its tactics of painting the
Liberals as extravagant and corrupt. With cries of “break the machine,” Anderson
demanded the government free civil servants “from the chains of bondage of political
service.” The party pledged itself to a civil service commission, thus ensuring that
“selections shall be made on merit and efficiency, and not by reason of political
affiliations.” Similarly, the convention also discussed ways to remove “political
interference” from government spending on infrastructure.635
Although unsuccessful in the past, the convention had reason to believe that their attacks
on Liberal corruption would carry more weight going forward. In 1926, Charles Dunning
joined Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s federal cabinet in Ottawa as the representative
for Saskatchewan. Jimmy Gardiner took over as Liberal leader in the province.
Dunning’s service to the SCEC and his handling of the Wheat Board and Pool
movements entrenched him as the defender of the conservative farmer. Gardiner, in
contrast, was a Liberal partisan who, in the estimation of many farmers, favoured his
party over the needs of agriculture. When Dunning was setting up his first cabinet, for
example, Musselman warned that Gardiner was “decidedly unpopular with the Grain
Growers generally.”636 This disdain only increased as the new Premier reversed
Dunning’s strategy in dealing with the Progressive threat. As William Brennan notes,
Dunning walked a fine line by discrediting “the move to agrarian political action through
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the S.G.G.A. without seeming to discredit the S.G.G.A. itself.”637 Gardiner, however,
“frowned upon men who compromised party principles” and reversed Dunning’s position
by directly attacking both the Progressives and the SGGA.638 T.A. Crerar, the former
leader of the federal Progressives, noted that “Gardiner’s tactics in his efforts to
annihilate them lost thousands of these people who are nominally Liberals and are sore
and angry.”639
Gardiner, unlike Scott, Martin, and Dunning, also retained control of the Liberal machine
after ascending to the Premiership. Although the province’s earlier Premiers maintained
nominal control over the party’s organization, they delegated the day-to-day elements to
trusted lieutenants.640 Gardiner, however, refused to relinquish control. Since taking
over as Minister of Highways in 1922, Gardiner built the machine into a formidable
political force, making himself in the process “synonymous with the Liberal organization
in Saskatchewan.”641 Under Gardiner’s leadership, Dunning confided to Dafoe, the
machine was “no longer the party’s agent, but its master.”642 Conservatives may not
have been able to discredit Dunning’s government with charges of corruption, but
Gardiner’s close connections to the party’s machine was another matter entirely.643
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Conservatives were equally aware that they continued to struggle in separating
themselves from other opposition parties, especially in rural areas. The Progressive
Party, influenced by its “Provincial Rights wing,” also updated its platform to reflect the
rise in nativist sentiment, vowing selective immigration, non-sectarian public schools,
and a general promise of “equal rights for all, special privileges for none.”644 Faced with
the prospect of losing votes to the Progressives, Anderson and Bryant called on “all
forces in the province opposed to the present government to join together to defeat the
government.”645 In the lead up to the convention, the Conservative and Progressive
Parties held secret negotiations wherein it was decided to saw-off the opposition vote.
Conservatives would contest half of the constituencies while the Progressive candidates
would run where their chances of winning were strongest. The strategy, Bryant informed
Bennett shortly before the Conservative convention, also had the party’s platform
incorporate “all the planks which we could conscientiously take from the Progressive
platform…from the resolutions passed at the farmers [sic] convention, the conventions of
the Rural Municipalities and the Trustees’ Convention during the last eight or ten
years.”646 Conservatives, intended to “defeat the government of the day,” even if it
meant adopting the “group system of government” favoured by the more radical
Progressives to do so.647
The plan was simple. The Conservatives, as sole opposition candidates in many ridings,
required a platform that appealed to the largest number of farmers. By borrowing
policies directly from farmers’ organizations—including the return of natural resources,
diversifying agriculture, improving labour conditions, developing a government-owned
power scheme, encouraging co-operative enterprises, promoting temperance,
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reorganizing the farm loan board, reducing taxes, and eradicating bovine tuberculosis—
the party hoped to appeal to the “level headed” farmers who had turned their backs on the
corrupt Liberals.648
In the end, however, the agreement was never formalized. Co-operation had the support
of Dr. C.E. Tran, the Progressive House Leader and leading member of the party’s
conservative wing, but it faced stiff opposition from the party’s leadership. Major
Coldwell—the future leader of the CCF and member of the Progressive Association
Board—later explained that he could not join Anderson because of the support he
enjoyed from “the Klan organization which I regarded as subversive and dangerous and
divisive.”649 The Progressive convention, held in June, resolved to oppose “any
arrangements or negotiations with either the Liberal or Conservative political parties in
the selection of a candidate or the conducting of an election.”650 It was a setback. Yet,
the fact that the Conservatives demonstrated their willingness to co-operate with the
Progressives and adopt the major elements of their platform went a considerable way
towards fulfilling the party’s main goal of winning farmer support.
The first test of the Conservatives’ strategy occurred in the Arm River by-election in the
fall of 1928. Conservatives focused the campaign on three main campaign planks:
maintaining its close relationship with British nativists; discrediting the Gardiner
government as corrupt and undemocratic; and securing as much farmer support as
possible. On the first point, Arm River provided one of the fertile constituencies in the
province to appeal to religious and racial divisions. Not only were two-thirds of the local
communities home to Orange Lodges, but the Klan had been active throughout the region
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in the lead up to the by-election.651 Capitalizing on this sentiment, the Conservatives
selected Stewart Adrain, a former Grand Master of the Orange Lodge, as their candidate.
Adrain, like Anderson, appealed to the nativist vote and campaigned continuously on the
Lodge’s motto of “one flag, one language, one school.”652 Adrain maintained that
“thousand[s] upon thousand[s] of foreign born Roman Catholics” were streaming into the
province with “scarcely a single Protestant” among their numbers.653 Anderson, for his
part, warned of the “hordes of continental peoples” that were responsible for the “ousting
of native born and British settlers from employment.”654 The Conservatives’ message
was also amplified when the Regina Daily Star began publishing in time for the election.
Established with R.B. Bennett’s considerable financial backing, the paper claimed a
circulation of 17,000 by the end of the year. For the first time since 1920, Conservatives
could rely on a friendly editorial stance to get its message to the electorate.655
The province’s schools also featured prominently in Conservative speeches. John
Diefenbaker, then a promising criminal defence attorney, warned that “Sectarian
influences” were “pervading the entire educational system.”656 In attacking sectarianism,
Conservatives appealed directly to the conspiratorial mindset fostered by the Lodge and
the KKK. Bryant maintained that French Catholics were working against the interests of
the people: “There has been no clearer issue on the page of history. The Liberal Party at
Ottawa and the Gardiner Government in Saskatchewan have lined up with the forces of
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the Church of Rome in this struggle for supremacy.”657 Unless something was done to
turn the tide, he foretold, “Roman Catholics will be in the majority in Saskatchewan, and
the French will control the political destinies of Quebec, Saskatchewan and all of
Canada.”658 There was no doubt that the Conservatives stood as the champion of the
province’s British nativists.
The Conservative Party was equally clear on its position regarding the “Gardiner
machine.” Corruption within the civil service, they argued, was destroying
Saskatchewan’s good name. The province’s highway inspectors, for example, stood at
the polls “whispering to people as to how they should mark their ballots.” As a result, the
province’s roads were the “rottenest in the Dominion”659 Even worse, the machine had
allegedly stuffed ballot boxes and bribed voters to steal previous elections. Appealing
directly to the farmer’s individualism, Anderson maintained that the Liberals “had
willfully violated the principles of British fair play and the sacredness of the ballot.”660
Nor could farmers trust the Liberals to maintain British values of law and order.
Conservative speakers repeatedly referred to the Liberals’ unwillingness to prosecute
their political friends. The Bronfman family, for example, established a system of mailorder liquor warehouses in Saskatchewan with the sole purpose of bypassing prohibition
laws on both sides of the international border.661 The inquiry into the 1925 customs
scandal recommended charges, but the provincial Liberals claimed it was a federal matter
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and failed to follow through.662 “One or two things has happened in the Bronfman case,”
M.A. Macpherson, Conservative MLA from Regina, maintained. “Either the Gardiner
Government is not taking steps to prosecute Bronfman…or else the Dominion
government is withholding or delaying prosecution to convenience the Gardiner
Government.”663 The charges against the “Gardiner machine” went much further than
simple questions of justice. Taken together with the Liberal Party’s favoritism towards
Roman Catholics and the “foreign vote,” the Conservatives painted an image of a
government that was fundamentally undermining the people’s personal freedoms and
British traditions.
The Liberals were forced onto the defensive. Gardiner had initially hoped to campaign
on the strong Liberal record. “We appeal to you on our record of administration,” he told
the large crowd assembled to kick off the campaign. “We appeal to you on the financial
standing of our province.”664 Yet, as the campaign progressed, Liberal speakers spent
more time defending the party from Conservative attacks than offering constructive
proposals for the future.665 Their main target was the alleged collusion between
Anderson and the Klan. If the charge that Anderson “associated himself with the Klan”
proved true, the Morning Leader editorialized, “it will brand him as being thoroughly
unfit for his position.” Gardiner fully endorsed the tactic. Not only had the Premier
intended the timing of the by-election to “strike a blow at the movement which has been
on foot in the province stirring up religious prejudice,” but he also privately maintained
that the Liberals were facing the “the whole stock in trade of our opposition composed of
Conservatives and Ku Klux Klan combined.”666 For voters attracted to this
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conspiratorial anti-Catholicism, however, Gardiner’s claims that the Conservatives were
inciting “religious intolerance” for attacking sectarian schools and open immigration was
not a negative. Rather than discredit the opposition, Gardiner’s strategy served to boost
Conservative support.
The election was close. The Liberals managed to retain the seat, but with a margin of
only fifty-nine votes. In 1925, in contrast, the Liberal candidate received over three
hundred more votes. Gardiner maintained that the success, regardless of the margin,
constituted a victory for his record and justified his attacks on the Klan. “I think we have
met the brunt of the attack in the most favourable rural constituency which they had in
the province,” the Premier confided, “and will therefore be in a position to withstand such
an attach[sic] in any general election in the future.”667 Anderson, on the other hand,
viewed the close results as a vindication of the party’s platform. Borrowing from
Provincial Righters’ complaints over Catholic influence in 1905, Anderson publicly
attributed Adrain’s defeat to the single Lakeside poll where “the majority of the electors
are Roman Catholics and are working hand in glove with Premier Gardiner.” Anderson
vowed to continue the fight against the Liberals, but was adamant he would not debase
himself or his party by soliciting “the support of any individual or organization whose
aims and objects do not emphasize the Union Jack and 100 percent Canadian
citizenship.”668 While disappointed in the result, Anderson found comfort in the fact
that, after years of trial and error, the Conservatives had finally settled on a strategy that
promised some success, especially in straight contests with the Liberals. The
Conservative message was also working to galvanize its base. In 1925, only fifty-three
percent of voters cast a ballot in Arm River; in 1928, the Conservative attacks on the
Gardiner machine, and support for religious and racial issues, prompted a turn-out of
eighty-eight percent.669
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Encouraged by the Arm River results, Conservatives continued their three-part strategy in
the lead up to the 1929 election. From the beginning of the campaign, Anderson, Bryant,
and other Conservative speakers were clear that they were the champions of the nativist
vote. “We cannot halt the aggression of any religious sect too soon,” Anderson told a
crowd in Saskatoon.670 The party also insinuated that, whereas Conservative supporters
were being left off the voter lists, “Liberals and Catholics” were not, leaving the
opposition “in the lurch, to the joy of the Government.”671 Hardline anti-Catholics also
used the campaign to denounce the Catholic Church directly. F.W. Turnbull—a
Klansman and future Regina MP—called for a reorganization of the laws surrounding
separate schools so that children “of whatever race or religion that they may profess”
could attend public schools.672 Most Conservative speakers, however, qualified their
racial and religious message. Anderson, for example, maintained that the “separate
school question was not an issue in the campaign,” focusing instead on the anger aroused
by sectarianism within the province’s public schools.673 “What is protested against,” the
Conservatives explained, “is that public schools of the province should be used for
proselytizing and for the propagation of any particular sectarian teaching.”674 Anderson
reminded rallies that he had spent his career urging the people of Saskatchewan to “make
a stand to protect the public school, where children of every race and creed were moulded
into Canadian citizens.”675 The Liberals, in contrast, were allowing sectarianism to
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triumph in an effort to win over “anti-British elements” at the expense of the “rights
of…British residents.”676
Conservative speakers also moderated their stance on immigration. The party was not
“anti-foreigner,” they argued, but simply wanted to ensure that those who arrived were
given every opportunity to “make good.”677 They did not “oppose Europeans coming
into the province,” the Regina Daily Star noted, but “protested only against the over
importation of ‘Central Europeans’ into Canada.”678 Instead of the system of unrestricted
immigration, as practiced under the Liberal regimes in Ottawa and Regina, the
Conservatives encouraged the people to decide “who they are, where they come from,
and what they are going to do here. We do not want people to come here and take the
bread and butter out of the mouths of those who are here.” Whereas the Conservatives
wanted British immigrants, the Liberal government had “no idea of an immigration
policy.”679
In restraining the tone of their attacks, Conservatives hoped to capture the moderate vote.
Many voters were apprehensive about Catholic influence and increased immigration, but
they were alienated by the Klan and Orange Lodge’s extremism. Since 1905, the
Conservatives had positioned themselves as the champion of British nativist voters; there
was little chance that the Lodge and the Klan would abandon them in 1929 by not
attacking separate schools directly. On the other hand, their moderate and “reasonable”
attacks on sectarianism and immigration had the opportunity to win over former Liberals
who had become warry of the party’s close connection with the Catholic Church and
foreigners. It was Gardiner’s lack of support for non-sectarian public schools,
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Conservatives reminded the voters, that caused the rise in racial and religious tensions in
the first place:
no protest has ever been made by Protestants until the limits set to separate
schools has been infringed and exceeded. This has occurred whenever
nuns have taught in our public schools; crucifixes and other religious
paraphernalia affixed to the fabric; sectarian teaching been given to the
children, and the garb of the religious worn by the teachers of the
young.”680
The party selected its candidates to appeal to moderates. In the constituency of Cypress,
for example, divisions between Scandinavians and Roman Catholics prompted the
Conservatives to replace their candidate with a Norwegian, John E. Gryde. The Catholics
voted firmly in favour of the Liberal candidate, but Gryde received enough of the
Protestant vote to win a narrow victory.681
This moderation also allowed the Conservatives to campaign directly towards the
conservative farmers’ individualism. Party speakers maintained that they stood for the
perpetuation of the British rights of “religious tolerance…a claim to personal
freedom…and a claim to impartial justice.”682 The Gardiner government, by giving
special privilege to Roman Catholics and foreign languages in the public schools, had
allowed British “liberty” to “degenerate into license,” and resulted in British subjects
“not getting our rights.”683 The Regina Daily Star was especially forceful on this point,
informing its readers that the Gardner machine was solely responsible for exploiting
“race hatred in the present election” by refusing to stand up for a non-sectarian school
and giving special privileges to its Roman Catholic and foreign supporters.684 At the
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height of the campaign, the paper published a widely-circulated cartoon depicting
Gardiner and Dr. J.M. Uhrich—the “papal knight of the Gardiner cabinet”685—using
sectarianism to divide the province’s public schools. The symbolism was unmistakable.
The Conservatives were the only party willing “to keep sectarian interference out of the
public school” and stand up for Saskatchewan’s liberal-individualist heritage.686
Figure 6 - “Hands Off Our Public Schools!” 687

This same message was apparent in Conservative attacks on the Gardiner machine. As
Peter Russell notes, the Conservatives spent more time and effort on detailing “the
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Liberal’s corrupt use of power and the need for civil service reform” than any other
single issue, including education and immigration.688 Every Conservative rally,
publication, and newspaper editorial carried the same message: “It’s time for a change,
smash the Gardiner machine!”689 Yet, the claim that the prevalence of these issues
proved that the Conservatives did not cater to anti-Catholic sentiment misses the mark.
The Conservatives had previously positioned themselves as the party of Saskatchewan’s
British nativists. The reason they focused heavily on Liberal corruption, therefore, was
part of their efforts to win over the conservative farmers by demonstrating how the
Liberals had undermined their individual freedoms and British traditions. The Regina
Daily Star, for example, kept a running tally of the number of days that lapsed since T.C.
Davis, the Attorney General, had promised that Bronfman’s prosecution would be
“carried through to the end.” The lack of action, the Star editorialized, constituted “A
Mockery of Justice.” The central issue was not that Bronfman was a Liberal supporter
and a prominent bootlegger, but that the Liberals, in refusing to prosecute their erstwhile
supporter, had brought the whole Canadian legal system “into contempt.” 690
Conservative rallies also featured speeches from those who had worked inside the
Gardiner machine. Anderson shared the platform at his first public meeting of the
campaign with T.G. McManus, a former clerk in the provincial Motor License
Department. Speaking at length, McManus outlined his work on behalf of the “Liberal
machine,” including undermining opposition candidates, campaigning for Liberals in the
Manitoba election, and soliciting funds from political friends. “This machine under
Gardiner’s control,” he concluded,
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is like an immense octopus which has spread its tentacles and left its
slimy trail over every town, village and municipality, even in the remotest
parts of our province and beyond. It has drained the public till, spent
large sums of public money for political purposes, interfered and
influenced the administration of justice, until it has become a powerful
instrument for perpetuating the Gardiner administration.691
The controversy surrounding the McManus charges was further enflamed when R.M.
Johnson, Progressive candidate in the 1926 federal election, publicly acknowledged that
McManus was among a group of Liberal agents who had attempted to bribe him into
resigning. Johnson refused and went to the press with the story, but the Liberal friendly
Regina Leader and Moose Jaw Times refused to publish his account. This was yet
another instance of the Gardiner machine violating British freedoms. A free press was
essential to the maintenance of a British society, the Regina Daily Star editorialized, but
both daily papers had “prostituted themselves to the purpose of the Gardiner machine in
return for...job printing patronage.” 692 This corruption undermined the people’s freedom
to choose their own government. “Machine-made and Machine-controlled government,”
the party argued, “is contrary to all British principles in the administration of the affairs
of the people.”693
In appealing to these ideas of British freedom and individualism, Conservatives
attempted to steal the support of erstwhile Liberals. The litany of “malpractices which
have been perpetrated,” they argued, had earned for the government “the execration of all
honest men and women in Saskatchewan.”694 The solution was simple. “All true
Liberals” must join “with other forces…to free the province from the grip of a machine
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that is dragging liberty…into the mire.”695 To reinforce this sentiment, speakers
continually referred to the “hundreds of Liberals” that were abandoning the “Gardiner
machine” for the Conservatives.696 Reporting on a meeting in Lumsden, the Regina
Daily Star noted that “Liberals who never before departed from party ranks are doing so
this election and furthermore they are not backward in expressing the reasons for their
actions.”697 Likewise, McManus, after detailing Liberal machinations, informed the
audience that, because he considered himself “still a Liberal, a believer in Liberal
principles,” he could fairly say “the party led by the Honorable J.G. Gardiner…is not the
party in operation that Liberals should be proud to support.”698 The number of defectors
is unknown, but Gardiner received numerous warnings throughout the campaign. “I have
spoken to people who live among Catholics, Norwegians and Swedes,” one letter noted,
“who have always voted Liberal but…seeing and hearing how the Priests were lining up
their people to all vote a solid Liberal, they the Vikings of the old Protestant faith, would
as little think of voting with them as they would vote for Mussolini.”699 Even the
machine was worried that the Conservatives’ tactics were undermining Liberal support.
Conservatives were equally successful in their efforts to capture the farmer vote. The
Conservative platform promised the farmers redress for most of their longstanding
grievances. However, such promises had not proven successful in gaining farmer support
in the past. Learning from their previous mistakes, the Conservatives borrowed from
Dunning’s approach to the Pool and spoke to the conservative farmers’ ideology.
Conservatives depicted the Farm Loan Board as an inefficient waste of taxpayers’
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money. Far from providing the low interest loans farmers had initially demanded, the
board had “broken faith with the farmers of this province” by providing land to Liberal
supporters well below market rates. If elected, the Conservatives vowed a “thorough
reorganizing of this department with the object of putting it on a more sound business
basis.”700 Similarly, the Conservatives appealed to farmers’ optimism for the future in
their discussion of natural resources. In the lead up to the election, Gardiner announced
that the federal government had agreed to turn over control to the province, but he had
declined the offered compensation. Under the terms of the Autonomy Act, Saskatchewan
received a set annual grant based on the province’s population. Gardiner argued that
Saskatchewan, owing to the large acreage of alienated land, should continue to receive
grants in perpetuity. Although Prime Minister King agreed with Gardiner’s position,
both agreed that the deal could not be concluded until agreement had been reached in
Alberta and Manitoba.701 Conservatives portrayed the Premier’s refusal as a sign that
Liberals did not have faith that direct control would ultimately make up the difference in
subsidies. While the Conservatives were “seized with the vision of what would be the
result were the resources in the hands” of the people, the Liberals were busy with “the
necessity of providing sectarian schools.”702
Despite these appeals to the province’s farmers, the danger still existed that the
opposition parties would end up dividing the province’s farmers in three-way contests.
Anderson maintained his willingness to work with the Progressives to avoid this
outcome, but their leadership stood firmly against co-operation. As the campaign
progressed, however, the prospects of defeating the Liberals proved too tempting for the
party’s “conservative” wing to pass up. Conservatives and like-minded Progressives
divided ridings based on which party had the most probable chance of winning. In
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Rosetown, Progressives did not field a candidate, but Conservative rallies were addressed
by William Loucks, “a prominent farmer…and outstanding in the Progressive party.”703
Similarly, Progressives spoke in favour of the Conservative candidate in Moosomin,
telling the voters that the “Conservative platform aimed at giving legislation in keeping
with Progressive ideals.”704 In situations where an agreement could not be made,
opposition parties jointly selected an independent candidate. Anderson’s first rally
during the campaign was in support of J.V. Patterson, the Independent candidate selected
by the Conservatives and Progressives to run in Milestone.705
This strategy limited the potential of a split vote, but it was not ideal. Conservatives ran
their own candidate in ridings where the Progressive nominee refused to co-operate with
a future Conservative government. In other cases, local Progressives steadfastly refused
to have any dealings with the Conservatives. Additionally, the more radical elements
within the Progressive movement nominated third-party candidates under the label of
“Economic Group” in three ridings where opposition groups had reached an
agreement.706 The Conservatives also failed to win over the support of the Progressive
leadership. C.E. Little, Progressive Association President, spent the campaign
disparaging the Conservatives as being no different than the Liberals. “Replacing one
political machine for another, equally as bad,” he maintained, “will not put into effect
those policies so vital to your economic welfare, for then you will have to fight doubly
hard to gain your rightful inheritance.”707 With three-way contests occurring in only
twelve of the province’s fifty-five rural constituencies, Little and the Progressive
leadership could disparage the Conservatives all they wanted. Not only had the
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Conservatives developed a plan that appealed to the province’s farmers, but they also
successfully limited the possibility of the Progressives splitting the opposition farmers’
vote.
The Liberals tried in vain to stem the rising Conservative tide. As was the case in Arm
River in 1928, Gardiner initially intended to wage the campaign on the Liberal
government’s record: “A RECORD of Substantial Achievement—A Sound Financial
Position, Unprecedented Growth and Wise Progressive Administration.”708 Liberal
speakers fanned out across the province stressing the people’s favoured position because
of their leadership. “I believe the Liberal government has given our province splendid
government,” F.N. Drake, a candidate in Regina, argued, “that we have prosperity under
it, that we stand first in per capita progress, lowest per capita debt and largest per capita
wealth.”709 Likewise, Liberal speakers reminded the province’s farmers of their debt to
the Liberal Party. The party, they argued, had always provided “a real service to the
agricultural community” through its promotion of co-operative enterprises, the farm loan
board, the establishment of an agricultural college, the Hudson Bay Railway. 710 Liberals
also vigorously defended their educational and assimilationist policies, reminding voters
that attacks on the public schools were not based in fact. French-language instruction
only occurred in three schools and the proportion of Catholic instructors was decidedly
lower than every other province. “Saskatchewan is a province with many races and
religions,” they maintained. “On the whole the verdict of time will be that they are all
being made into pretty good Canadians. They are living together in peace and
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goodwill.”711 Despite these attempts, the opposition’s well-planned campaign raised the
distinct possibility that the Liberals could lose the election.
Gardiner had no choice but to directly confront the Conservatives. In terms of
agricultural policy, the Liberals shifted from claims they supported farmers to portraying
a Conservative victory as “THE MOST DAMAGING BLOW POSSIBLE” to the
interests of the province’s farmers.712 “The only traditional Conservative policy in
Saskatchewan,” the Morning Leader concluded, “is the policy that flows to the
Conservative party of Saskatchewan through its affiliation with the Conservative party at
Ottawa. The Conservative party at Ottawa has a traditional policy of high tariff, of high
freight rates…of sympathy for the ‘Big Interests.’”713 This “fact” also gave weight to
Liberal criticisms against the “unholy” alliance between the Conservatives and
Progressives. “Never were the ideals and the objectives of two political parties more
diametrically opposed than in the case of the Conservative and Progressive parties,” they
argued. “The Conservative party in Canada stands for high tariffs…Progressives, on the
other hand, are committed to low tariffs, even lower than the Liberals favor.”714 The
message was clear. With the Progressives abandoning their principles, farmers could
only trust the Liberals to look out for their interests.
The Liberals attempted to counter Conservative efforts to sway the more moderate
Protestant vote by contesting the opposition’s understanding of citizenship. Nativists
adhered to a limited conception of citizenship, with race and religion acting as a litmus
test of belonging. The Liberals, in contrast, maintained that a toleration for minority
rights was central to British values. The province’s Jewish population, for example,
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immigrated to “escape from religious and racial hardships and persecution,” but were
now afraid the violence and intolerance in Europe was coming to Canada.715
“Enlightened citizens imbued with British ideals of fair play and sportsmanship,” they
argued, recognized Conservative tactics as “a deliberate attempt…to cover the
deficiencies of its own platform and conceal the weakness of its own case.”
Conservatives, in short, would “find nothing too low or ignoble” to promote for political
gain regardless of the cost it had on respectable “British” citizens.716 Neither party held a
monopoly on what it meant to be British. Although the Liberal calls for tolerance would
not sway ardent Orangemen and Klansmen, they hoped it would appeal to moderate
Protestants.
Despite the Liberals’ best efforts, they failed in persuading either the farmers or the
moderate Protestants to remain loyal. The Liberals maintained that there was no
foundation to the criticisms leveled against them: “Dr. Anderson has always been a false
prophet. He is merely whistling to keep up his own courage and in an endeavour to
hoodwink his followers.”717 Yet, the fact that they spent most of the campaign
attempting to disarm Conservative “slander, mistreatment, and mud-raking” only gave
weight to these attacks.718 The question over natural resources, for example, featured
prominently throughout the campaign. The Liberals, therefore, felt they had achieved a
singular coup when Bran Thompson, a well-respected lawyer associated with the issue,
publicly declared that only Gardiner could satisfactorily handle the issue. The
opposition, Thompson argued, were “Reaping Where They Have Not Sown.”719
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Conservatives turned Thompson’s criticism into yet another manifestation of the Liberal
machine corrupting the people of the province. “Deep immersion in the principles of
abstract law for forty years,” the Regina Daily Star argued, “would unfit the most
scholarly mind for combat with such practical politicians.”720 Similarly, the Liberals
commissioned a pamphlet, published in both English and French, that detailed
Conservative attacks on the Roman Catholic Church, sectarianism, and the public
schools. 721 While the party hoped that the pamphlet would galvanize Catholics to vote
Liberal, organizers quickly found that it was having the opposite effect on Protestants.
“For every vote it held for the Gardiner machine,” the Regina Daily Star argued, “it was
making three votes for the opposition candidates.”722 The Liberals ordered the pamphlet
destroyed, but the damage had already been done.
Liberals experienced a similar outcome in their attempts to discredit former machine
workers. Gardiner responded to McManus’ charges by insinuating he was rightfully
dismissed for impropriety. “While his home and his wife and children were in Moose
Jaw,” Gardiner alleged, “and he was supposed to be out at work on the roads of the
province, he actually was living with another woman in Regina, and was not contributing
to the support of his real wife.”723 The Regina Daily Star, in response, published
McManus’ wife’s denials and a letter suggesting that he “was not dismissed but tendered
his resignation.”724 Gardiner hoped that accusations of adultery would discredit
McManus, but they actually provided more ammunition for the Conservatives to
disparage the machine. “Perhaps never in the political annals of the country,” the party
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argued, “has a more degrading spectacle been witnessed than the Premier of the province
endeavouring to cast disbelief…by making accusations of domestic trouble which have
no foundation.”725
The Liberals’ attempts to win over moderate Protestants also backfired. Bishop George
Lloyd, the outspoken Anglican Bishop for the Diocese of Saskatchewan, entered the fray
on the eve of the election. Noting that he was a life-long Liberal, Lloyd nevertheless
proclaimed that he “shall vote against the Gardiner government” because it was “nonBritish if not anti-British” in its handling of immigration, administration of the school
laws, and its unwillingness to limit “religious emblems in the public schools of the
province.”726 It was a remarkable coup for the Conservatives’ strategy. Liberals may
have been able to paint Conservatives’ racial and religious ideals as anti-British, but they
would have a harder time convincing Saskatchewan’s moderate Protestants that the
leader of Saskatchewan’s “British” church was wrong in his position as well.727
After a quarter century of struggle, the Conservatives had finally found an electoral
strategy that worked. The Liberals entered election day confident of victory, but as the
results began pouring in, the prospects of remaining in government diminished.728 The
cities, the first ridings to report, went entirely to the Conservatives. The Liberals retained
only Prince Albert, a mixed urban-rural riding, with a narrow victory by T.C. Davis,
Gardiner’s Attorney General. Although the Liberals fared better in rural ridings
(Gardiner increased his margin of victory from 1925 in his riding of North Qu’Appelle) it
was clear that the Conservative strategy paid off. Conservatives were particularly
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effective in two-way fights against the Liberals, winning fourteen of the twenty-two
contests. In comparison, Progressives won five of six direct contests with Liberals, while
the Independent candidates fared the worst, securing five of fourteen seats. It is also
clear that the Conservatives were shrewd in avoiding multiple candidate fights. Of the
twelve ridings with three or more candidates, the Liberals won eight, the Conservatives
four. Yet, there was some vindication for Conservative attempts at co-operation as
disgruntled Progressives lost every race where they entered against another opposition
candidate.729
Table 2 - Comparative Election Results for Selected Parties, 1925-1929730

Party
Liberal
Conservative
Progressive

Party
Liberal
Conservative
Independent
Progressive
Economic Group

Candidates
Nominated
63
18
40

1925
Votes
Cast
% of Vote
130,404
52.58
45,515
18.35
57,142
23.04

Candidates
Elected
51
18
6

% of Ridings
81
3
10

Candidates
Nominated
63
40
17
16
3

1929
Votes
Cast
% of Vote
164,487
45.56
131,550
36.44
32,729
9.07
24,988
6.92
1,942
0.54

Candidates
Elected
28
24
6
5
-

% of
Ridings
44
38
10
8
-

It was a remarkable, conservative victory. The Conservative-Progressive-Independent
coalition captured thirty-five of the province’s sixty-three ridings and more than half of
the popular vote. Although the Liberals still received the largest number of votes, they
were also the only party to field candidates in every riding. The opposition’s popularity
was also evident in the fact that their vote was less concentrated than previous elections.
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In 1925, both the Conservatives and the Progressives won a substantially lower
percentage of ridings than their share of the vote would suggest. In 1929, however, the
division of ridings was no different than would have been the case under a system of
proportional representation. Not only had the Liberals witnessed a dramatic decline in
their total support, but the opposition was able to spread its appeal across wider swaths of
the province.
The secret to this success lay in Conservative manipulation of British values. On the one
hand, the increased anxiety among the province’s Anglo-Saxon population, as seen in the
rise of both the Orange Lodge and the KKK, allowed the Conservatives’ message of a
non-sectarian school system and limited immigration to find traction. The geographic
distribution of seats corroborates this fact. Liberal support was highest in areas with high
proportions of recent immigrants and Roman Catholics. In the late 1920s, these peoples
were predominantly located in Saskatchewan’s south-western borderlands, with its large
population of German and French Catholics, the north, and the area south-east of
Saskatoon stretching to the Manitoba border, containing concentrations of Poles and
German-Catholics.731 The Liberals won twenty-two of the roughly twenty-five ridings in
this area.732 Well over three-quarters of Liberal seats were from ridings dominated by
the Catholic vote. The inverse is also true. Opposition candidates fared best in central
and south-eastern portions of the province where Anglo-Saxon Protestants dominated.
Not since 1905 had the geographic distribution of seats so clearly mirrored these racial
and religious divides. 733
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The second element of Conservative success in 1929 lay in their ability to retain the
nativist vote while also branching out among the province’s conservative farmers.
Although it is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number of individualist farmers
that switched their allegiance from the Liberals, it is possible to make some
generalizations. Opposition candidates, for example, were successful in the flatlands
surrounding Regina where large-scale operations dominated. Not only was the region
home to a large concentration of British settlers, but its topography and settlement
patterns also promoted intensive wheat production and provided the bulk of the
Organization Opposing Compulsory Pool’s support. Gardiner admitted in the election’s
aftermath that the Conservative attacks on the Liberal machine resonated with these
voters. Liberal organization, he confided to Motherwell, was “a little overdone and
people began to think that their views were being made for them...[and] seemed to feel
that the time had come when the lessening of the strength of the Liberals in the Province
would do no harm.”734 There is also evidence that the Conservative-Progressive alliance
finally won over the “more level-headed farmers” as Dunning had feared in 1925.
Election results indicate that in constituencies where no Progressive candidate ran in
1929, the Conservatives received the bulk of their support from 1925. Likewise, half of
the three-cornered fights saw votes for the Progressive candidate drop, while the
Conservative candidate’s support increased disproportionately to the Liberal.735 The
Conservatives failed to win over all of Saskatchewan’s Protestant farmers—the Liberals
still polled forty-five percent of the vote—but they won enough to turn the tide in their
favour.
The Conservative Party finally adopted a set of policies and electoral tactics that brought
together enough of Saskatchewan’s conservative forces to defeat the Liberals. It had
been a long struggle. Since 1905, the party had served as the main political outlet of
Saskatchewan’s British nativists. The Conservatives’ early electoral defeats and poor

734

SAB, F65, Gardiner, IV.9.g, Gardiner to Motherwell, 15 June, 1929.

735

Brennan, “A Political History,” 767; Kyba, “The General Election of 1929,” 105-06.

195

policy decisions, in contrast, alienated the province’s conservative farmers. It took a
quarter of a century to rebuild the party among the province’s farm community. In the
end, it was not their platform policies that bridged the divide, but a skillful articulation of
the farmers’ fundamental values. Rather than view the two conservative constituencies
as separate entities, the Conservatives united them in their shared sense of Britishness.
Figure 7 - Saskatchewan Election Results, 1929
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After a series of joint conferences between the newly elected opposition MLAs, the
Conservatives announced an agreement forming a coalition, what they termed a “cooperative,” government. Independents, Conservatives, and Progressives pledged
themselves to reform the civil service, were adamant that each group would retain its own
identity, and pledged freedom to every member in the federal realm.736 Having agreed to
work together, they issued a joint statement calling on the Liberals to “resign
immediately.”737 Gardiner refused. With the most elected members, the Premier held
out hope he could come to an arrangement with enough Progressive and Independent
MLAs to maintain power. It was a fruitless endeavour. The united opposition quickly
defeated the Liberals when the Legislature reconvened in September. The triumph was
complete.
The celebrations, however, did not last. The 1929 election proved to be a pyrrhic victory
for the combined opposition. The Progressives were never able to overcome the internal
divisions caused by the decision to co-operate with the Conservatives. The party’s
radical elements held their own convention where they decided that, while the elected
MLAs would vote non-confidence in the Liberals, they would refuse any formal cooperation with the Conservatives or positions in Anderson’s cabinet. The only problem
to the plan was that no one had bothered to ask the elected MLAs what they thought.
When M.J. Coldwell subsequently presented the resolutions to the Independent and
Liberal caucus, only Jacob Benson, the Progressive MLA for Last Mountain and an
ardent Pool supporter, agreed to go along.738 All others threw their lot in with Anderson.
“Look,” declared A.C. Stewart, the Independent MLA from Yorkton, “you people can get
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out, it has been decided.”739 Stewart entered the cabinet as Minister of Highways and
Reginald Stipe served as the Progressive representative as a Minister Without
Portfolio.740 The decision destroyed the Progressive Party as the more radical elements,
including M.J. Coldwell, joined the Farmers’ Educational League in taking control of the
UFC(SS), ultimately culminating in the creation of the CCF in 1932.741 Nor would the
Conservatives fare any better in the long-term. The party relied on appeals to British
nativists and conservative farmers’ shared values to portray the Liberals as a malignant
force intent on destroying Saskatchewan’s British traditions. Within months of taking
office, however, the Great Depression struck Saskatchewan, fundamentally altering the
nature of Saskatchewan politics for a generation. The party quickly discovered that the
tactics that united the province’s conservative forces in the 1920s were no longer relevant
in the changed climate of the 1930s.

739

Quoted in Calderwood, “The Decline of the Progressive Party,” 98.

740

Saskatchewan Archives Board, Saskatchewan Executive and Legislative Directory, 1905-1970 (Regina:
Queen’s Printer, 1971), 12.
741

Calderwood, “The Decline of the Progressive Party, 98-99.

198

5

Conservative Christianity and the Great Depression:
The Briercrest Bible Institute and Notre Dame

The economic and ecological catastrophe of the “dirty” thirties devastated Saskatchewan.
For a decade, the province shifted between localized and all out drought conditions. In
1929, the south-central portion of the province—the very heart of Saskatchewan’s wheat
empire—experienced its first in a series of crop failures. The situation grew worse in
1930 when the dried-out areas reached the parkland north of Saskatoon. By 1931,
drought conditions prevailed over half the province and Premier Anderson was forced to
make an infamous declaration that “no one will starve.”742 In 1935, the rains returned,
but grasshoppers and rust proved to be as effective at killing crops as drought. The worst
year proved to be 1937 when two-thirds of farmers reported crop failures. While the
province’s farms were literally blowing away, residents were also dealing with economic
disintegration. The bottom fell out of wheat prices in 1929 and did not recover until the
Second World War. Even if farmers could grow wheat, they could not sell it for a price
coming close to their input costs. In 1928, farm income in Saskatchewan was a record
$185 million; it was minus $31 million in 1931.743 It was a catastrophe. The once
“banner province” was now the poorest in the nation. Between 1928 and 1933,
Saskatchewan’s per capita income dropped seventy-two percent compared to a fortyeight percent drop for Canada as a whole.744 Statistics, however, only tell half the story.
The Depression’s psychological effects were just as pronounced as the economic
realities. As Greg Marchildon argues, “Caution replaced optimism, saving and risk-
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avoidance replaced past eagerness to invest in new ventures, and a sense of foreboding,
even dread, replaced the sunny optimism of the past.”745
The Great Depression altered the nature of Saskatchewan politics. The combined
environmental and economic catastrophes undermined the province’s early conservative
movements. It is an irony of the 1930s that those farmers who were central in
formulating the myth of the self-made-man were the ones to suffer the most when the
bottom fell out. Studies of farm income from 1932 and 1934 indicate that the vast
majority of farmers lost money on their operations, but those who cultivated larger
acreages were significantly worse off.746 Robert Allen Wright’s path from success to
ultimate failure is but one in thousands of examples where the province’s larger farmers
faced ruin. At the same time, the Depression signalled the end of the ascendency for
Saskatchewan’s British nativist movements. Questions of “survival,” Pitsula notes, “took
precedence over identity politics.”747 The rapid decline of the KKK after 1930 occurred
as fast as its rise. From a membership numbering over 20,000 in 1928, the Klan ceased
to function by the middle of the decade. The Orange Lodge, with its more established
history in the British world, outlived the Klan, but could not stem the same type of
decline. As the British connection ceased to matter after the Second World War, so too
did the Orange Lodge.
The Depression gave rise to new political questions and movements. As dust storms,
foreclosures, and breadlines became the norm, people turned to religion to offer both
solace and solutions to the environmental and economic ravages. Historians commonly
associate the response of all Christians with the liberalized theology and social reform
efforts of the province’s mainstream Protestant denominations. The “social gospel”
movement of these churches first emerged at the end of the nineteenth century as leaders
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sought to keep Christianity relevant in the face of an increasingly urban, industrial, and
modern nation. As Richard Allen explains, the social gospel “rested on the premise that
Christianity was a social religion.” It was a call to “realize the Kingdom of God in the
very fabric of society.”748 Rather than fight against the modernism of an industrializing
society, social gospellers used insights gathered from biblical criticism, the social
sciences, progressivism, and Darwinism to accommodate Christianity with modernity.
This millennial vision was central to the CCF’s founding in 1932. While nominally
socialist, the CCF adhered to the social gospel’s belief in the ability to transform society
into a utopia—a New Jerusalem—which would usher in God’s kingdom on earth.749 The
rise of the CCF, Lewis Thomas notes, was predicated on the party’s association with the
“Christian socialism” of the social gospel.750 Tommy Douglas, a Baptist minister and
early leader in the new party, reflected this outlook. Douglas received his seminary
training at the Baptist affiliated Brandon University where he came under the tutelage of
Harris MacNeill, a leading modernist and rationalist voice within the Baptist Church.751
Douglas’ education provided him with a foundational belief in the transformative power
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of the social gospel. According to Thomas and Ian McLeod, Douglas’ political vision
was predicated on creating a society “where the strong would bear the burdens of the
weak, and the desire for social justice would overshadow the hunger for economic
gain.”752 This vision was central to the CCF’s conception of a “co-operative
commonwealth.” By replacing competition with co-operation, the party argued, society
had the opportunity to “create a new social order.”753
Historians have had comparatively little to say on how a conservative Christianity
informed people’s politics during the Great Depression. Although the connection
between the KKK and fundamentalist Christianity has long been established, the political
influence of this theology is largely ignored beyond the KKK’s prominence in the late
1920s.754 Similarly, historians have depicted the Catholic Church’s opposition to the
CCF’s early socialism, but they have failed to detail how Catholics internalized and used
this condemnation in their response to the Great Depression.755
In order to explore how conservative theology influenced the political discussion of the
Great Depression, it is first necessary to establish what these groups believed and how
they responded to catastrophe. This chapter details the foundation and growth of two
religious schools: the fundamentalist and non-denominational Briercrest Bible Institute
(BBI) and the Roman Catholic Notre Dame College. Both groups were founded amid the
trials of the Depression but did not share in the Social Gospel’s quest to ameliorate the
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inequalities and depravations of the capitalist system. Rather, they viewed the social
gospel and its collectivist and socialist challenges to the status quo as a danger to
traditional values. They responded to this threat by running educational institutes aimed
at training Saskatchewan’s youth to reject the collectivist mentality of the social gospel
and reaffirm society’s individualist nature. Both schools instructed students to be leaders
in their communities and placed a primacy on an anti-modern world view. Both schools
also became immensely popular in their constituencies and shaped the ideologies and
political actions of their followers.
Although these schools trace their founding to the height of the Depression, theological
differences and religious bigotry negated any meaningful collaboration between them.
Briercrest and Notre Dame were products of decidedly different theological backgrounds
with divergent interpretations of scripture, the nature of God, and the proper relationship
between Christians and secular society. Briercrest emphasized biblical orthodoxy, the
doctrine of adult or “believer” baptism, and the belief that personal salvation was
reflected in the lives and actions of the converted. 756 Notre Dame, on the other hand,
used the “unwritten” traditions of the Catholic Church to inform its belief structure.
Similarly, religious prejudice, especially the anti-Catholicism which raged across
Saskatchewan in the 1920s drove a wedge between the schools. In 1929, for example,
the Klan, which espoused a fundamentalist theology, threatened to destroy a statue of
Jesus prominently displayed in the Wilcox Parish.757 The legacy of this lingering antiCatholicism, along with their theological incompatibility, prevented co-operation
between fundamentalists and conservative Catholics until well after the end of the Second
World War. Yet, the message espoused by these schools was remarkably similar. They
viewed the Great Depression as constituting a fundamental threat to society’s traditional
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values and articulated an educational program intended to promote an individual ethic
amongst their students. In so doing, both actively resisted the collectivism of the social
gospel and CCF.
Christian fundamentalism developed as part of an early twentieth-century neo-orthodox
response to the emergent liberalism of mainstream Protestant denominations. It
represented a desire to return to the “fundamentals of the Christian faith, including belief
in salvation through Christ alone, the inerrant Bible, and the premillennial return of
Christ.”758 Across the Prairie West, fundamentalists shared the same orthodox Christian
beliefs and concerns over the “secularization” of Canadian society. They viewed the
adoption of higher criticism in colleges and seminaries, as well as the formation of the
United Church of Canada, as a process whereby people were led away from true
salvation.759 This anti-modernism was fueled by fundamentalists’ proclivity for
premillennial dispensationalism, an eschatological belief that periodized the Bible into
specific “dispensations” and held that Christ would return prior to the advent of the
Millennium.760 The liberalization of mainstream religion and society, they argued,
proved God’s displeasure and signaled the coming Apocalypse.761
Although fundamentalists agreed on the corruption of mainstream religion, their
responses underwent significant shifts throughout the inter-war period. Militant antimodernism defined 1920s fundamentalism. Conservative leaders, including William
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Aberhart in Alberta and T.T. Shields in Ontario, publicly attacked the leading signs of
religious modernity, including evolutionary theory, female ministers, and a decline in
biblical inerrancy.762 Likewise, the KKK’s rapid rise in Saskatchewan was partly a result
of the organization’s anti-modern religious message which resonated with Protestants
who “craved a return to simple fundamentalism.”763 By the 1930s, however,
fundamentalists abandoned militancy in the face of increased ridicule as mainstream
society reacted against their “backward” beliefs.764 The ravages of the Great Depression,
often interpreted as a sign of the End Times, also promoted a retrenchment and a renewed
concentration on evangelism. Fundamentalists organized themselves into networks of
churches and schools and dedicated themselves to spreading their “uncorrupted”
Christianity to regenerate society through a modern-day great awakening.765
Briercrest’s history was intrinsically linked to this fundamentalist anti-modernism. In the
early 1920s, Annie Hillson, a teacher from Ontario and former missionary to Bolivia,
began organizing Sunday school classes and weekly Bible study sessions in the rural
village of Briercrest, located twenty-five miles southeast of Moose Jaw. Hillson believed
that a trend towards liberal theology was corrupting the local Methodist church and
gathered a small group of like-minded Christians around her. Isabel Whittaker, an
emigrant from Nova Scotia, soon began aiding Hillson and took a correspondence course
with the fundamentalist Moody Bible Institute, based in Chicago. Sinclair, Isabel’s
husband, became born-again at the urging of his wife, and used his standing as a
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prominent businessman and Conservative MLA to offer credibility to the group.766 From
the outset, the small “congregation” made it their mission to promote a fundamentalist
interpretation of scripture to members of the surrounding community. Frequent Bible
study conferences and revivals were held at the Whittakers’ home, with notable
fundamentalist preachers from across the Canadian Prairies and the United States in
attendance.
These meetings raised doctrinal issues that were increasingly at odds with the liberalism
of the local church. The local Methodist church’s decision to join the United Church of
Canada in 1925 precipitated a backlash against the small group of fundamentalists,
dividing the local community along fundamentalist and modernist lines.767 By the mid1920s, Hillson found herself “excommunicated” for refusing to back down from her
fundamentalist beliefs, and Sinclair Whittaker’s business suffered as long-time customers
refused to continue purchasing from his stores.768 The final break between these two
sides came in the late 1920s when the local United Church, swayed by the social gospel,
decided on a modernist interpretation of scripture and forbade the teaching of
fundamentalist materials at the Sunday School.769 “I was astonished,” Hillson later
recalled, “as I realized that I had been going step by step, down the road of modernism…I
saw for the first time that all my years of Sunday school teaching and work in the church
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had been wasted.”770 Unwilling to compromise, Hillson, the Whittakers, and other
likeminded Christians left the United Church and formed the Briercrest Gospel
Assembly.
These parishioners succeeded in separating themselves from the liberalism of the United
Church, but the small group quickly found that it lacked the necessary spiritual leadership
to effectively develop their biblical training. The onset of the Great Depression
compounded this problem, as young people could no longer afford to travel for a
“proper” Bible education. Initially, the new church hoped to find the necessary support
through an affiliation with a larger fundamentalist institution, but the Moody Bible
Institute quickly dismissed the possibility.771 The congregation then turned its attention
towards recruiting a minister to lead their new church and help launch a Bible school
where the young people of the community would receive a fundamentalist education. In
early 1934, Sinclair Whittaker wrote Henry Hildebrand, a 23-year-old student at the
Winnipeg Bible Institute and circuit-riding preacher for the Canadian Sunday School
Mission (CSSM), to convince him to join the congregation. “We fully realize,”
Whittaker wrote, “that under the economic conditions prevailing here it will require a
great deal of faith to proceed. We have had six crop failures. Ninety percent of the
people are on relief. We are, however, blessed with some dozens of praying Christians
who are endowed with enough faith to move mountains.”772 Hildebrand initially
believed that he lacked the experience necessary to lead the congregation. Through
further correspondence, however, Whittaker convinced him that Briercrest could serve as
“God’s witness” against “the liberalism that swept the field of the prairies.”773
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Hildebrand took up Whittaker’s offer of employment in the winter of 1934 and began
organizing the new church and school.
Hildebrand brought a decidedly conservative outlook to Briercrest. Hildebrand’s family
immigrated to Manitoba as part of the Russlander Mennonite influx during the Russian
Revolution. Although Hildebrand came of age in a religious household, he was not “born
again” until he attended a summer camp sponsored by the CSSM in 1929. “I knew the
gospel from my childhood,” he recalled, “but I was wrong in the manner in which I tried
to receive it, in which I tried to be saved.”774 For Hildebrand, the only path to salvation
lay with developing a personal and individual relationship with Christ. Following his
conversion, Hildebrand studied at the Winnipeg Bible Institute and eventually began
working for the CSSM. Hildebrand’s training in what historian Bruce Hindmarsh terms
the “Winnipeg fundamentalist network” deeply influenced his theological outlook. This
web of individuals, churches, and schools believed fundamentalism’s main purpose was
the conversion of their neighbours before the Apocalypse, not the defence of “Christian
civilization against the onslaught of theological modernism, evolution, and communism”
which dominated the earlier movement. 775 Although Hildebrand sympathized with the
anti-modern concerns of earlier Aberhart and Shields, his commitment to home missions
and evangelism took precedence.
Hildebrand made it clear that the school’s purpose was to spread fundamentalist doctrine
and evangelize the province. An early prospectus, for instance, lamented the “everincreasing ignorance of the pure word of God prevails throughout our land today.”776
Similarly, Hildebrand was firm in the notion that BBI would indoctrinate students in
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proper beliefs. Students would “weigh and consider” fundamentalist doctrines, not
“criticize and refute” them.777 Students enrolled in a three-year diploma program
designed to provide the religious foundations to effectively evangelize and adhere to a
fundamentalist worldview. Students took courses on child evangelism, public speaking,
church history, missions, systematic biblical theology, dispensational truth, and modern
cults, “a survey of the doctrines of modernism and the leading false religious cults as
contrasted with historic Christianity.”778 Part of their training had students practice these
evangelical skills by holding Bible study sessions with children in the local schools.779
Courses on fundamentalist doctrine taught students what to believe and how to act;
courses on evangelism showed them how to spread these beliefs to others.
At the same time, there was a clear sense that this fundamentalist orthodoxy, while
important, was merely a means to the greater end of spreading the gospel to
Saskatchewan’s unconverted. Hildebrand insisted that BBI would function as a transdenominational institute, open to anyone who professed an acceptance of theology
regardless of church affiliation: “To bring man to Jesus--O be this our aim. Not to bring
them to baptism, not merely to a meeting house, nor to adopt our form of worship, but to
bring them to the dear Savior.”780 This emphasis set BBI apart from other fundamentalist
organizations in Saskatchewan that developed ministers for individual denominations or
sought to forestall the assimilation of immigrant children into mainstream Canada.781 In
contrast, BBI’s explicit goal was to bypass this denominational focus to “meet the need
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of trained workers of the Prairies.”782 Hildebrand was not concerned about his students’
backgrounds and entrance requirements were vague. So long as students were “of
approved Christian character,” “considerate of others,” and, most importantly, “obedient
to those over them in the Lord and willing to submit to the discipline and order of the
school,” they could study at BBI.783
For Hildebrand, biblical orthodoxy and evangelism were not mutually exclusive. “Sound
doctrine and a spiritual life,” he noted, “go hand in hand.”784 On the one hand,
fundamentalist dogma filled Hildebrand’s writings and sermons. Hildebrand’s deity was
a personal, all-powerful God that ordained the course of human history by actively
intervening in the day-to-day lives of professing Christians. The story of BBI,
Hildebrand recalled in his memoirs, details “how God overruled infirmities and
weakness.” Hildebrand equated the entirety of his life as a process wherein God shaped
“a servant to become His instrument in founding a college.” 785 Similarly, Hildebrand
was steadfast in his defence of an inerrant Bible. The Bible was the literal “Word of
God,” containing the immutable “facts of history.”786 As such, Hildebrand had little
patience for liberal Christianity and its propensity for biblical criticism. “Some have
suggested that it [the Bible] should be rewritten,” he noted. “This is folly, what is needed
to-day is that it ought to be re-read, not rewritten.”787 Hildebrand also interpreted the
“decay” of modern society as a warning of the approaching Rapture, often pointing to
juvenile delinquency, rising crime rates, a breakdown in traditional gender roles, and the
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increasing secularization of Canadian society as evidence of a “perverse and crooked
generation” which was prophesized as ushering in the End Times.788 “If the clouds are
already arising upon the horizon,” he questioned, “how near the Second Coming of Christ
be?”789 He therefore viewed his role as spiritual leader not to change society, but to save
as many souls as possible before the Apocalypse.
At the same time, Hildebrand’s ministry lacked the militancy often associated with
fundamentalist Christianity. Whereas earlier ministers challenged the leading signs of
modernism, Hildebrand remained above the fray.790 Hildebrand simply did not feel that
his beliefs needed defending. Fundamentalism was the only true Christianity and, there
was no room for debate. Salvation could only come through Christ alone. “A man must
be born again,” Hildebrand warned, “or he is no child of God.”791 Hildebrand held that
his role as a minister was to help the unsaved understand their wickedness; it was up to
them to receive salvation for themselves “lest their last opportunity of accepting Christ is
gone forever.”792 He believed that militancy alienated more people than it saved. He
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would not allow a misguided militancy to distract from the ultimate purpose of
committing “faithful men to the Word of God.”793
Under Hildebrand’s command, BBI promoted an individualist theology. According to
Clark Banack, an emphasis on personal freedom was central to the fundamentalist
project. Aberhart’s ministry, for example, was “individualistic” in that he “understood
personal conversion to be an act of free individual choice.” Protecting personal freedoms
was therefore essential to ensure salvation.794 Similarly, Hildebrand’s fundamentalism
divided society into groups of saved and unsaved, but this distinction was not immutable.
People had the ability to save themselves if they formed a personal relationship with
Jesus. The impetus for this salvation, however, rested in individual initiative.
Hildebrand commonly ended his sermons with an altar call urging people to accept
Christ, but he was equally clear that the ultimate choice between salvation and damnation
was up to the individual sinner. “Oh awake and be saved,” he urged, “lest the judgement
day…will arise and condemn thee for neglecting so great a salvation.”795 People could
not be forced to accept Jesus; they had to come to the decision of their own free will. It
was because of this belief that Hildebrand championed individual freedoms in all areas of
society. Hildebrand believed that modern society was leading people to damnation but
refused to contemplate any measures which would threaten a person’s ability to decide
their own fate. “If you really think the follies of this world are the best,” he told his
listeners, “and believe that a fine fashionable life, a life of frivolity and gaiety, flitting
from flower to flower but getting honey from none, if such a life is most desirable, carry
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it out to its bitter disappointment and shame.”796 In order for people to find true
salvation, they had to make the choice of their own free will.
This personal freedom, however, was a double-edged sword. Like Aberhart,
Hildebrand’s belief in original sin translated into an understanding of human nature
wherein “the individual was a fallen creature and therefore possessed inherent tendencies
towards evil.”797 As much as Hildebrand emphasized individual action in the conversion
process, he was deeply concerned that this individualism, if left unchecked, would
undermine salvation. “All that glitters is not gold,” he argued, “all that profess to be
followers even in our evangelical bodies are not Christ's own. They may have been
moved under the spell of emotion, and come forward, but by and by the newness wears
off and they drift back into the world.”798 To guard against this “backsliding,”
Hildebrand placed severe restrictions on his student’s behavior.799 Hildebrand expected
Briercrest students to live a “Christian life” which exemplified their personal conversion
and piety. BBI’s lengthy list of rules included bans on the use of tobacco, attending
dances and the theatre, as well as getting married “without consulting the Principal and
obtaining permission from the Board of Directors.”800 While these rules limited
individual action, the severity of BBI’s discipline also recognized student’s free-will.
Hildebrand believed that personal liberty was necessary to have people make their own
connection with God, but he was firm that they needed to exemplify their personal
salvation in their day-to-day actions. Becoming a “born-again” Christian was not a one-
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off event; it took consistent action and resolve on the part of the individual. The
scriptures, he argued, taught that Christians had to be “converted” and continuously
“regenerated” or else one had “sadly backslidden” and needed “to be restored.”801
Although BBI limited the personal action of its students, the very existence of these rules
reflected the primacy that Hildebrand placed on the power of individual action to both
ensure and imperil salvation.
Evangelism was central to BBI’s existence, but early attempts to minister to local schools
were unsuccessful. On a practical level, Briercrest’s rural location in south-central
Saskatchewan restricted its students’ ability to spread the gospel. Saskatchewan had yet
to build an all-weather road system, limiting BBI’s reach in the winter months to a small
radius around the Briercrest.802 More importantly, BBI’s school visits also drew
attention and opposition from the local community who believed BBI was “splitting” the
local United Church.803 The anti-Catholic rhetoric of the KKK and the election of J.T.M.
Anderson’s Conservatives in 1929 compounded this antagonism.804 Once in office,
Anderson’s first major legislative activities included banning the display of religious
emblems and the instruction by religious officials in the province’s public schools.805
Although BBI was not Catholic, its opposition to the status quo offered by mainstream
Protestantism posed a similar threat.806 In 1937, school trustees used the precedent set by
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the Anderson Government and voted to ban BBI from local public schools.807 Not
willing to abandon BBI’s emphasis on rural evangelism, BBI had to find a way to
overcome both its geographic isolation as well as the local opposition its efforts
generated.
Radio offered the solution to both issues. As Hildebrand indicated, radio allowed BBI to
“go over the heads of our objectors.”808 This is not to say, however, that religious
broadcasts failed to generate opposition. In 1928, for example, hostility to the featuring
of the Klan’s brand of fundamentalism on a radio station run by the Jehovah’s Witnesses
in Saskatoon led to the withdrawal of the station’s broadcast license.809 Although the
potential for opposition remained if broadcasts became too controversial, radio was much
less antagonistic than direct school visits. By shifting the location of BBI’s evangelism
from the public sphere to the privacy of people’s homes, radio lessened BBI’s threat to
the religious status quo of the province’s schools.810 More importantly, radio also had
the potential to expand the reach of BBI’s ministry. Whereas school visits were restricted
to a small radius around Briercrest, the only limits to a radio ministry were the number of
people that owned a receiver and were willing to tune in. By 1929, Saskatchewan was
home to eleven commercial stations and had sold over 27,000 receiving licenses, the third
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highest in Canada.811 Even if BBI reached only a fraction of the households that owned
radios, the number of potential converts was significant.
In adopting a radio ministry, BBI experimented with a medium which had already proved
its value for evangelization. In the early 1920s, religious broadcasts on the Canadian
Prairies were limited to mainline Protestant churches that transmitted regular Sunday
services over the air.812 This changed in 1925 when William Aberhart’s Back to the
Bible Hour began engaging directly with its radio audience. By designing programs
specifically for his radio listeners, Aberhart transformed them from outsiders into active
participants in his ministry. His success was not lost on other fundamentalists, and
similar radio ministries began to appear across the West.813 BBI’s radio ministry—The
Young People’s Hour—was based on the Aberhart model. The program featured the BBI
choir singing gospel songs and students conducting mock classroom lessons, with
broadcasts typically ending with a sermon from Hildebrand.814
Despite these similarities, Hildebrand’s sermons diverged from Aberhart’s in their
characteristic lack of militancy. For Aberhart, the adoption of radio was an extension of
his militant position in the fundamentalist-modernist debate. As one observer noted,
Aberhart “made some very bitter remarks” and was “stirring up all the trouble” he
could.815 Hildebrand avoided this controversy, believing that militancy would detract
from BBI’s evangelical mission. The Young People’s Hour’s goal was not to defend
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fundamentalism, but to explain it and lead non-believers to Christ. Key theological
concepts were not up for debate.
Fundamentalist positions were introduced as a set of facts which, when accepted, would
allow people to find their own salvation. The foundation of Hildebrand’s Christianity
remained an inerrant Bible, but he did not use this position to attack modernism in the
same way as Aberhart. “The Gospel,” he told his listeners, “is…not a new law. It is not
a code of morals and ethics. It is not a creed to be accepted. It is not a system of religion
to be adhered to…It is a divinely given message concerning a divine Person, the Son of
God, Jesus Christ our Lord.”816 Similarly, Hildebrand’s fundamentalism led him to
believe that the basis of modern society was corrupted by sin:
Sin has blasted and blighted every noble flower that would have bloomed
in moral happiness. Homes are broken, families are separated, children
are left destitute, characters are degraded, and sorrow or sweat marks
every brow. We cannot fathom the crimes committed in this world nor the
sorrows that have swept across it since the first advent of sin. Hearts are
broken--lives are bleeding. This world has become not only a place of
tears, yea, a field of blood!817
Rather than rail against the leading signs of modernity, Hildebrand presented his listeners
with a simple choice that they had to make of their own free will. “One way or another,”
he cautioned, “you must have God and His Christ, or you must be the servants of Satan.
The power of God must hold you or sin will bind you; Heaven must win you and attract
you to itself, or hell will mark you for its own, and downward you will descent[sic].”818
People could either accept they were living in sin and be saved, or deny the fact and be
damned. It was up to them to choose.
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Despite the different focus on militancy, Hildebrand’s radio ministry was just as popular
as Aberhart’s. From the outset, BBI was inundated with letters and donations from
listeners across Saskatchewan who were moved by the program and its offer of salvation
from their worldly concerns.819 In 1938, BBI joined with the Prairie Bible Institute in
Three Hills, Alberta in sponsoring an evangelistic campaign by the noted American
evangelist Oscar Lowry.820 For six weeks, Lowry held daily revival meetings in Moose
Jaw which BBI broadcast across the province. Prairie Bible Institute’s Prairie Pastor
reported on the “wonderful soul winning campaign” in Saskatchewan, noting that over
2,500 letters were received and “hundreds of conversions were reported.”821 Buoyed by
this success, BBI further expanded the Young People’s Hour in 1945, making it Canada’s
first coast-to-coast gospel program, broadcasting on 22 stations from Vancouver, B.C. to
Sydney, Nova Scotia.822
BBI used this popularity to expand its influence amongst Saskatchewan’s fundamentalist
Christians. Enrollment in the Bible school grew exponentially. From an initial class of
eleven students in 1935, BBI grew to over one hundred in its first decade, prompting the
institute to move to a decommissioned British Commonwealth Air Training Plan base
near the village of Caron in 1946. At this new “Caronport” campus, BBI expanded its
offerings to include a high school, general store, post office, and an elementary school.823
Its expansion, however, came at the expense of other more denominationally-based
schools. Of the over thirty Bible schools that opened in Saskatchewan prior to 1940, only
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eleven were still in operation by the mid-1950s.824 At the same time that other schools
were closing, Briercrest experienced unprecedented prosperity, transforming it into the
central force in Saskatchewan fundamentalism.
While fundamentalists warred against their liberal counterparts, the Catholic Church
underwent a similar struggle as it sought to reassert its primacy in the secular world by
adopting an anti-modernist outlook. Throughout the nineteenth century, movements
within the church began experimenting with theological modernism and biblical criticism
in an effort to reconcile Catholicism with modernity. Rather than accept the new
situation as the status quo, however, the Papacy responded by reasserting its own
authority through anti-modernism and biblical orthodoxy.825 In the 1879 encyclical
Aeterni Patris, Pope Leo XIII outlined his belief that doctrinal relativism and biblical
criticism had divorced philosophy from faith, led to the rise of secularism, and threatened
to undermine the very foundations of Catholic belief. Modernists, Leo argued, presumed
that dogma and belief were historically contingent, and weakened the church through
their calls for ecclesiastical reform. Leo maintained that reason without faith undermined
the supernatural basis of Catholicism and led people away from God. Modernist
writings, therefore, gave rise to “false conclusions” about the nature of man, the state, and
the divine.826 In response, Leo proposed to return to the teachings of the Scholastics—
specifically those of St. Thomas Aquinas. As one observer notes, Leo hoped that
“philosophical renewal…would lead to social and political renewal.”827 Leo believed
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that a return to the teachings of the Church’s fathers would reconcile reason with faith, as
well as offer answers to modernity’s ills, thus preserving Catholicism’s relevance and
active guidance within “Christian society.”828
Unlike fundamentalism, which remained outside of the Protestant mainstream, this neoscholastic movement emerged as the dominant expression of Roman Catholic theology.
Following the release of Aeterni Patris, neo-scholasticism and the study of the writings of
St. Thomas Aquinas—known as Thomism—quickly spread throughout Catholic
universities, both in Europe and North America.829 From this base, neo-scholastics
emphasized a “perennial philosophy” founded on the belief that the world “was
essentially static, not dynamic or developing.” Central to this was the concept of natural
law, the belief that the universe was a divinely “ordered hierarchy of being.”830 Natural
law held that, just as humans use reason to accept the presence of the divine, the same
rational mind also prescribes a set of actions which are moral and just.
Neo-scholasticism attacked modernity over its propensity to cause humans to act in ways
contrary to the natural law that God had ordained. They denounced secular humanism
for divorcing humans from divine inspiration. Instead, neo-scholastics offered a vision of
integral humanism—otherwise known as authentic or natural humanism—which argued
that a “true” person existed as both a material and spiritual being.831 Neo-scholastics
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fostered a philosophy which downplayed doctrinal relativism, defended Catholic
orthodoxy, and privileged an all-knowing and all-powerful God. However, this neoscholasticism was not as stridently anti-modern as fundamentalism, calling instead for a
“prudent adaptation to the modern world.”832 Neo-scholasticism attempted to keep the
Church relevant in the modern world by rejecting the excesses of modernity and
secularism, all while accommodating the Church to modern political, social, and
economic realities.833
Just as BBI emerged as a part of Christian fundamentalism’s anti-modernism, the
Catholic Church’s neo-scholasticism influenced Notre Dame’s development. The college
began modestly. In 1920 the Sisters of St. Louis in the rural village of Wilcox, located
forty kilometers south of Regina and approximately the same distance east of Briercrest,
established a convent school for local children. The college, and its Thomist focus, grew
out of the activities of its long-serving president, Father Athol Murray. Murray was born
in Toronto in 1892 to a life of wealth and privilege. Murray’s father made his fortune as
a carpet manufacturer, was a founding member of the Argonauts Rowing Club, and
served as the honorary secretary-treasurer of the Royal Ontario College of Art. The
family settled in the Rosedale area of Toronto and spent the summers vacationing on the
Saint Lawrence River. Murray looked back on this time fondly, but the untimely death of
his mother in 1896 threw this idyllic life into turmoil. Unable to care for his young
family, Murray’s father sent him to live with an aunt before shuffling him through a
series of boarding schools. Murray’s mother had been a devout Catholic, and his father
ensured that Murray would receive a Catholic education. At eight years old, Murray
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spent a year studying under the Jesuits at Loyola College in Montreal, followed by two
years at St. Michael’s in Toronto before enrolling for the next ten years at the French
language St. Hyacinthe near Quebec City. Following high school, Murray completed an
undergraduate degree at Laval University. Initially interested in a journalism career,
Murray returned to Toronto after graduation and worked for the Toronto Star and as a
law clerk before entering the St. Augustine Seminary in Toronto.834
This classical French-Catholic education had a profound effect on Murray’s
understanding of the world. Both Laval and St. Hyacinthe were deeply involved in the
neo-scholastic revival and provided Murray with the desire to bridge faith with reason.835
True education, Murray argued, requires each student to “grasp, not just with faith, but
with rational reason and full certitude, the existence of God.”836 This education also
convinced Murray of the necessity of Catholic activism. Catholic schools, he argued, had
the “lofty and proud responsibility” of showing “the world the product of true Christian
education.”837 It was not enough to learn about Thomism and the natural law; students
had to use scholastic philosophy to guide their everyday lives and better their society.
Murray’s time in Quebec not only left him fluently bilingual, but also instilled in him an
appreciation for Canada’s racial heritage. “There is nothing better in the world,” Murray
argued, than a “good solid French Canadian Catholic.”838 Yet, Murray also believed that
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French Canadians were naturally unstable and prone to emotionalism. Murray attributed
the rise of the KKK in Saskatchewan, for example, as a response to the “childish
indiscretions and effervescences perpetrated by French Canadians themselves.”839
Although Murray respected Quebec for its maintenance of Catholic faith, he also
believed that the British influence after the Conquest was necessary to create a successful
and prosperous nation. The British tradition, he argued, “is quite literally something far,
far more than a mere abstraction, than an idealism. It represents that splendid discipline
of ‘reality’, of ‘authority’, of ‘Almighty God’ that makes for law and order and has
shaped what we freedom loving people know as our culture and civilization.”840
Murray’s appreciation for this British tradition directly influenced his stance on the racial
and linguistic makeup of Canada’s Catholic Church. Quebec clergy had traditionally
dominated the Canadian church and its expansion onto the Prairies. According to
Raymond Huel, the Quebec-dominated ecclesiastical hierarchy jealously guarded their
position.841 For English-speaking Catholics, especially the sizeable number of Irish,
Quebec’s control was intolerable. This division was on full display at the Twenty-First
International Eucharistic Congress held in Montreal in the fall of 1910. During the
proceedings, the Archbishop of Westminster argued that, although Catholics owed a great
debt to Quebec for safeguarding Canada’s Catholic heritage, the future of the Church in
Canada was English. Henri Bourassa, in contrast, noted that three hundred years of
shared history in North America intrinsically linked the Catholic Church and Quebec
society. 842 The conference did not settle the language question, but it did have a
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significant impact on a young Murray whom the Toronto World commissioned to report
on the conference.843 Upon returning to Toronto, Murray dedicated himself to promoting
British influence within the Catholic church. Murray decided to study at St. Augustine’s
Seminary in Toronto, a newly-formed English-language seminary, and spend his career
championing the Catholic Church as a beacon of British values on the Prairies.
The French-English division within the Catholic Church pushed Murray to move to
Saskatchewan in 1923. Formed in 1911, the Archdiocese of Regina was caught within
the bitter French-English divide affecting Catholic communities across the Prairies.844 A
census conducted at the diocese’s creation found that of 73 clergymen, 54 were from
Quebec.845 This Quebec majority trained in a theological and cultural milieu that held
the French language as inseparable from Canada’s Catholic Church and refused any
concessions to their English counterparts. In contrast, English Catholics believed the
only way to assimilate the French, German, and Polish immigrants into a single religious
community was to privilege the English language.
The Quebec clergy won an initial victory, confirming Oliver Mathieu, a French-Canadian
Catholic and rector of Laval University, as the diocese’s first bishop in 1911. It was,
however, a losing battle. Bishop Mathieu found that his appointment did little to quell
the English-French tensions within his diocese and borrowed Murray from the
Archdiocese of Toronto to act as his chancellor and appease the English factions. Over

843

Gorman, Pere Murray, 13.

844

This division is seen in the creation of the Archdiocese of Winnipeg in 1915 out of a portion of the
Archdiocese of St. Boniface. Traditionally, St. Boniface had been the bastion of French Catholics in
Manitoba and the Prairies as a whole. With increased immigration from Ontario, the United States, and
Great Britain, however, English speakers quickly outnumbered their French counterparts and began
demanding an English bishop. Such a move was anathema to the French-dominated clergy. By way of
compromise, the Vatican created the Archdiocese of Winnipeg to cater to English Catholics, leaving St.
Boniface for the French. In practice, however, the new Winnipeg quickly outpaced St. Boniface in
influence. See: Jim Blanchard, “Historical Background to the Birth of the Archdiocese of Winnipeg, 18951916” (unpublished conference paper, The Archdiocese of Winnipeg at 100: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow
(Winnipeg, Mb.: 22-24 October, 2015).
845

Huel, “French Speaking Bishops,” 57.

224

the next four years, Murray and Mathieu developed a strong relationship. When Mathieu
became increasingly ill in 1927, the French clergy, still a majority in Regina, actively
campaigned for a French bishop to replace him upon his death. For Murray, another
Quebec bishop “would be a disaster,” as it would only serve to increase Catholic
sectarianism and weaken Catholics’ ability to lead in modern society.846 Murray actively
opposed the clergy’s plans. The French-speaking priests responded by attempting to
force Murray back to his home diocese in Toronto. Rather than leave the Prairies,
Murray convinced Mathieu to appoint him to the Wilcox parish.
Murray did not choose this parish by accident. Wilcox’s rural location and convent
school provided him with the necessary freedom to conduct an educational experiment
which combined Murray’s neo-scholastic philosophy with his adoration of Canada’s
British tradition. Murray believed that the future of the Prairies would be Englishspeaking and British. He also feared that modern society was not preparing the
province’s British youth for their future leadership roles. Murray spoke often of the
“fleeting idealism” of youth. “If you catch it at the right moment,” he argued, “you can
sweep it on to great achievement.” Yet, if you did not catch this youthful idealism in
time, “it goes into mediocrity.”847
Murray’s experiences as Chancellor in Regina led him to this conclusion. In 1923,
church authorities caught a group of Protestant boys breaking into the cathedral. Murray
overruled the Quebec priests who wished to make an example of the boys, personally
taking responsibility for their conduct. Murray did not believe these boys were inherently
delinquent. Rather, modern society itself was to blame for this bad behaviour because it
had failed to allow the boys to reach their full potential. Murray decided that the boys
needed structure and turned to sport as the vehicle to provide it. For eight years, Murray
organized the Regina Argos sports club, whose hockey, baseball, and lacrosse teams
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toured around the Prairies and eastern Canada.848 When he moved to Wilcox in 1927,
several of his Argos followed with him, providing the nexus for his educational
experiment.
Whereas Hildebrand shaped BBI to train missionaries, Murray intended Notre Dame to
prepare Saskatchewan’s future public leaders. Murray initially operated Notre Dame as a
preparatory high school for his Argos and local children who would take their postsecondary studies elsewhere. With the onset of the Great Depression, however, it was
clear that students would no longer have the funds to continue their education elsewhere.
Murray considered it a “tragedy” that the province’s youth, “just arriving on the threshold
of life,” would find “every avenue closed to their initiative.”849 In response, Murray set
out to create a university in Wilcox and sought affiliation with the University of
Saskatchewan. From its founding, the provincial university jealously guarded its degreegranting monopoly, but reluctantly affiliated with several junior colleges, including the
Jesuit led Campion College in Regina, allowing them to offer the first two years of
university classes. Murray hoped to gain the same recognition for Notre Dame but, after
investigating the facilities available, the University of Saskatchewan refused Murray’s
application.850 Undeterred, Murray turned to the University of Ottawa, then a Catholic
University under papal charter that had a history of affiliating with smaller Catholic
schools across Canada.851 After a brief period of struggle between Murray and the
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recently appointed Bishop in Regina, James McGuigan, Notre Dame affiliated with the
University of Ottawa in 1933.852
Notre Dame’s affiliation with Ottawa provided legitimacy for the new school but Murray
was clear that it would not alter his vision of a Catholic education. Murray focused his
students’ education towards developing leadership. This could only be accomplished by
building the character and values of his students through indoctrination into Catholic
scholastic philosophy and instilling a firm belief in British individualism. “Under the
guidance of almighty God,” Murray noted, Notre Dame “may serve, in the generations to
come, the highest interest of Saskatchewan…[by] arming youth with strength and
suppleness of limb, with clarity of mind and depth of understanding, and with a spirit of
true religion and high endeavour.”853 Murray was careful to point out that students were
not born great. A person made themselves great by stimulating their “intellect towards
the understanding and acceptance of spiritual values.”854 His goal, therefore, was to
transform the English-speaking youth of the Wilcox district—whom he termed “the finest
element in the province” and the “best blood in Saskatchewan”—into the province’s
“patrician class,” a “classe dirigeante.”855 Notre Dame would ensure that its students
were “sufficiently spiritualised in vision to lift themselves out of group and position to
lend help to the struggling ‘better influences.’”856 Under Murray’s vision, the Anglo
elements in Saskatchewan would be given the education, confidence, and tools needed to
fulfill Pope Leo’s vision of a traditional and hierarchical society, albeit one based on
British values.
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Notre Dame’s curriculum was focused towards building what Murray termed “free men.”
This was not freedom solely in the liberal sense of the word. Notre Dame’s students
would use their classical education, Catholic theology, an understanding of the “natural
law,” and an appreciation for British freedoms to live their lives with a sense of higher
purpose, moral strength, and desire to lead. Although the University of Ottawa set the
curriculum along the lines of a classical liberal arts education, Murray maintained that his
vision of “personal formation” would dictate the college’s operations.857 A university
degree was important, but Murray’s main goal was to provide students with “a vision of
greatness” that they could model their own lives after.858 Murray rooted this vision in the
“thin red line” of the British tradition. “Either the British scheme of things is false,” he
noted, “and completely misrepresents the realities of human rights and values; or if it is
true, its maintenance in this changing world must have supreme consequences.”859
Through this education, students would be taught to “cherish freedom for himself, and for
others, not just from concentration camps, but from ignorance and passion and
prejudice.”860 Notre Dame students “should make a better friend, a better husband, a
better father; free men do. He will in short be better prepared to live; and when his hour
comes, whether through illness or civil disaster, or in war, he will know better how to die;
free men do.”861 This focus on creating “free men,” Murray argued, was unique in an
age when “mass regimentation and formalism” threatened British civilization.862
Murray’s opposition to “regimentation and formalism” was a product of his
understanding of British freedoms. For Murray, Britain left Canada a legacy of greatness
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which rested on the values of “the Christ,” “the primacy of the human person,” and “the
moral law—and truth and freedom.”863 To fulfill their destiny as leaders, the province’s
youth needed to have a foundation in all three. Murray was deeply concerned that the
Depression posed a direct threat to the individualistic outlook which made Britain great.
“The most wonderful creature on earth,” he argued, “is the individual man with a body
and a soul.”864 Saskatchewan’s Anglo farmers, however, were being forced to “carry on
in the condition of serfs.”865 The solution, therefore, rested in building “individuals
instead of robots.”866 At Notre Dame, an observer noted, “a student must be an
individual or he is nothing.”867 Unlike Hildebrand, who believed that depraved human
nature required strict rules of behaviour, Murray believed that his student’s British
heritage, combined with the natural law, provided his students with a moral compass
from which they could guide themselves. Murray limited rules and discipline to an
absolute minimum. Notre Dame’s education focused on “building character,” and the
“only discipline worthwhile comes from the individual.” Murray was “opposed to
regimentation” wherever possible. “We want youngsters to develop without any
compulsion or restriction,” Murray argued, “other than a sense of honor, and loyalty to
God, to his creed, to the Padre, and to the gang.” 868
Murray’s focus on promoting his student’s leadership and individualism was evident in
the extraordinary emphasis he placed on athletics. Beginning with the Argos in Regina,
sports were central components of Murray’s educational system. The school’s motto
“Luctor et Emergo—Struggle and Emerge” and Notre Dame’s first crest, with crossed
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hockey and lacrosse sticks, were designed to openly acknowledge Notre Dame as a
sporting institution.869 For Murray, sport not only provided students with much needed
structure, but it also instilled in youth the values of “honesty”, a “sense of fair play”, and
a “desire for that perfection in performance which is attained only through untiring
effort.”870 Sport was not about material reward. Murry intended athletics to bring
students closer to an understanding of the neo-scholastic goal of “authentic humanism”
by forcing them to dedicate the entirety of their effort “toward a definite goal.” Sport
also ensured winners and losers. For Murray, competition was where you saw “humanity
at its best.”871
The competitiveness that sport offered was at the basis of Murray’s educational
experiment. Murray maintained that he could prove his students’ superiority by pitting
his Argos (later renamed the Hounds) against the best that Saskatchewan and Canada
could offer. As the novelist Rex Beach commented in 1937: “they prefer to play older,
heavier, more famous teams than theirs,” with Murray “urging his load of assassins to lay
off the lady-like capers and get down to the serious business of murder, mayhem, and
sudden death.”872 Despite the obvious editorial flourish in Beach’s account, Murray’s
desire to see his students and his school succeed in every facet, including sport, is clear.
These competitions also provided Murray with the opportunity to spread his sense of
British nationalism. “My pet theory,” he wrote R.B. Bennett, “is that in a country of
Canada’s immensity…it [is] sane policy to have Sport properly organized…in order that
youngsters from Truro and Yamaska and Orilla to know well those of Yorkton and Taber
and Westminster.” Such a plan, Murray promised, “would bear fruit.”873 Murray’s
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attempts to develop the Anglo youth of southern Saskatchewan into a leadership class
was only the first step. Introducing these students to other like-minded youth across
Canada would strengthen British ties across the country and ensure the dominance of
Canada’s British values.
Education served as BBI and Notre Dame’s primary focus throughout the Great
Depression. Yet, despite the differences in outlook and theology between the two
institutions and their founders, they espoused a remarkably similar ideological position.
Both Murray and Hildebrand articulated a political outlook premised on the supremacy of
the individual, a hierarchical vision for society, and a rejection of the collectivism
inherent within socialism. Although the schools did not communicate or co-operate with
one another, the shared elements of their world view created a sizeable constituency that
rejected the CCF’s vision for Saskatchewan and answer to the Great Depression.
Unlike the egalitarianism of the CCF, both Hildebrand and Murray believed God’s plan
for the world included social stratification. Hildebrand’s eschatological belief in the
imminent Apocalypse divided society into two distinct categories. The Bible, he argued,
“declares that there are just two classes—There are those who are lost and there are those
who are saved.”874 This distinction was universal and absolute. “God will not have his
cleansed ones defiled by the presence of the unbelieving.”875 Murray’s Catholicism and
understanding of British values resulted in a hierarchical understanding of society. He
did not believe that God created all people equally or endowed them with the same
natural ability to succeed. Rather, Murray maintained that God favoured British peoples.
It took “twelve generations of progressive culture,” he argued, to perfect the British
“breed.” Yet, the danger existed that these youths would be “submerged in a flood of
young yahoos…the off-spring of the peasantry of Europe.”876 Notre Dame’s main
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purpose, therefore, was to instill in British youth a belief in their inherent superiority visà-vis the European “flotsam of the prairie towns.” Murray believed that the British youth
at Notre Dame were the only ones who could “exercise far reaching influence in the
coming ‘Canadian’ mentality of West.” To this end, Murray lent “what orthodox
nurturing” he was “capable of towards shaping that intellectual and ‘dirigeante’
ascendancy” of his Hounds.877
Murray and Hildebrand viewed personal freedom as the means to an end. Murray
believed that creating his “classe dirigeante” would strengthen society’s British and
spiritual makeup. To this end, Murray encouraged his students to achieve their own
personal greatness. Yet, Murray also expected his Hounds to use their privileged position
to sacrifice for the betterment of society. Individual greatness without a sense of duty to
the community divorced the individual from God. “It took some ruminating,” Murray
noted, “for me to realize that after all Christ means primarily self-sacrifice.”878 Murray
expected his students’ success to glorify God. Additionally, as members of the patrician
class, Murray instructed his students to exemplify the meaning of British citizenship to
their inferiors. Citizenship had its benefits, but it also required sacrifice. The British,
Murray concluded, “are the only folk in the world who would sacrifice their everything
for an altruistic motive.”879 Murray took great pride in the fact that sixty-seven of his
students paid the supreme sacrifice during the Second World War.880
Hildebrand, while less concerned about the betterment of the “corrupt” modern society,
also expected self-sacrifice as a reflection of his followers’ individualism. Just as it was
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necessary to come to one’s own personal relationship with Jesus before the Apocalypse,
born-again Christians had to use their conversion experience to help lead the lost to
salvation. When Christ returns, Hildebrand told his followers, “may he find us ready,
serving Him one way or another, at the counter, in the workshop, on the farm, but above
all taking time to teach your children, win the wayward, and everywhere tell out the
sweet story of Jesus and his love till He comes.”881 Hildebrand did not expect this
service to be easy, but their struggle and sacrifice would serve a greater purpose. “If
there is no conflict in a life,” Hildebrand argued, “we may well become suspicious and
ask ourselves whether we are not living in a dishonourable peace, whether we are not
being gradually overcome.”882 It did not matter how much sacrifice or ridicule
Christians were forced to endure, their reward would come from the presence of the Lord.
“True, it will not screen you from envy, from temptation, from slander and suffering,”
Hildebrand conceded, “but it will give you victory through them all and a double portion
of the Heavenly Father’s inheritance—His presence in blessing here below and your
presence with Him blessing hereafter.”883 For Hildebrand, true Christians chose to suffer
and give all for their faith.
Murray and Hildebrand’s beliefs in the hierarchical nature of society and the primacy of
the individual were foundational to their political outlooks. Although both leaders came
to these beliefs through different Christian theologies, the overlap in their political
principles were clear. Both men were deeply ideological, rejecting all forms of
collectivism as the antithesis of Christian action and Canadian values. Hildebrand
disdained socialism and communism. Much of this hostility can be traced to his youth in
Russia during the revolution. In his memoirs, Hildebrand recounted various instances of
the barbarity of the Red Army. These depravations were allowed because the “atheistic”
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and “anti-Christian” communists turned the nation away from God. The lesson,
therefore, was that a nation without God was a nation based on sin; it was doomed. Such
a situation could happen in Canada, he concluded, should the nation “turn away from
God” as well.884
Hildebrand communicated this anti-socialism in his radio ministry as he subtly reminded
his followers of Christianity’s incompatibility with socialism, the social gospel, and the
provincial CCF. Hildebrand argued that the collectivization promoted by socialism and
communism was in direct opposition to Christ’s teachings. “Anyone acquainted with
Christianity on the one hand,” he noted, “and communism on the other hand does not
speak of Christian Communism… Christianity works on the principle of
consecration…Communism on the principle of coercion…Christianity is the communion
of the saints, Communism is confiscation by the select.”885 Similarly, Hildebrand
challenged the social gospel’s theory that it was possible to legislate a new moral order.
These people, he argued, “hold the moral code with its precepts before the sinner and
expect him to keep it, but such labour is in vain.” Teaching “men to walk who have no
feet is a hopeless task, and just such is an instruction in morals before grace implants in
the heart a desire for holiness.”886 As the ills of modern society were a product of sin, it
was folly to believe that a secular law could fix them.
Murray’s opposition to socialism was equally unequivocal. “Man feels cowed and
crushed,” he argued, “before the roar of manned machines and the machine-like masses
of the ‘socialists’--he shrinks from this mechanism of soul as did Pascal ‘before the
silence of infinite spaces.’”887 The basis for this anti-socialist ideology lay in Murray’s
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Catholicism. Beginning in the late 19th century, the Catholic Church wholeheartedly
denounced socialism as a political philosophy.888 In 1891, for instance, Pope Leo XIII
decried socialists’ collectivization policies as being “emphatically unjust, for they would
rob the lawful possessor, distort the functions of the state, and create utter confusion in
the community.”889 Likewise, Pope Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical, “On Reconstruction of
the Social Order,” condemned socialism’s secularism, concluding that “no one can be at
the same time a good Catholic and a true socialist.”890 Murray took these condemnations
to heart. “Rome had spoken,” he recalled, “for Catholics there was no alternative” but to
openly oppose any mention of socialism in Saskatchewan.891
At the same time, Murray’s anti-socialism was also influenced by his interpretation of
British individualism. All the values inherent in the British tradition—including “free
governments, family rights, individual liberty, property rights, [and] freedom of
education”—stemmed from the initiative and freedom of individual people who dared “to
be great.” Socialism’s egalitarian focus negated these values by promoting a
“mediocracy of thought.” Socialists killed “the creative fire of the individual.”892
Canada may be “the greatest country in the world,” Hildebrand warned, but socialism and
collectivism threatened its “patrician touch; the patrician desire to be great.”893 Because

888

Several histories deal with the relationship between Saskatchewan’s Catholic population and socialism.
While they note the Catholic Church’s initial hostility to the CCF, these studies focus on how this
opposition eventually weakened, ignoring those who did not change their stance. For example, see Robert
Dennis, “Beginning to Restructure the Institutional Church: Canadian Social Catholics and the CCF, 19311944.” CCHA Historical Studies 74 (2008): 51-71; Teresita Kambeitz, “Relations Between the Catholic
Church and CCF in Saskatchewan, 1930-1950,” CCHA Study Sessions 49 (1979): 49-69; and Peter
McGuigan, “The CCF and the Catholic Church,” Catholic Insight (January 2004): 34-40.
889

Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, Vatican website, 15 May, 1891, sec. 4.

890

Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, Vatican website, 15 May, 1931, sec. 120.

891

The Lacoon, 2, no. 3 (1947), 4.

892

Quoted in Gorman, Pere Murray, 123.

893

NDA, #37 F15, “Lectures on the Greeks,” c. 1962.

235

socialism formed the antithesis of what it meant to be British, Murray viewed it as an
alien import into Saskatchewan. Socialism was the product of the province’s “large
foreign-born population” which lent “attractive ears to the ‘isms that have swept
Europe.”894 As a result, Murray was resolutely opposed to socialism. “It matters little
under what forms, with what methods, weapons, words—enticing or menacing—and in
what disguise communism hides itself,” he urged. “No one can be excused for remaining
with folded arms, bowed head and trembling knees.”895
Despite the unequivocal nature of their shared anti-socialism, neither Hildebrand nor
Murray entered politics directly. They both opposed the rise of the CCF, but the
existence of their schools took precedence. Hildebrand feared that political participation
would detract from his evangelistic mission. Legislation did have a role to play. “The
devil gets people into all kinds of scrapes,” he noted. “Therefore God instructed
governments, parents, laws, restriction, and civil ordinances. At least they help to tie the
devil’s hands so that he does not rage up and down the earth.”896 At the same time,
Hildebrand was convinced that legislation could not save society or lead people to Christ.
“There is a tendency for us to get occupied with times and seasons and neglect our main
business. Legislation has its place, but God’s program to-day is not to propagate his
word by legislation, but rather by evangelization.”897 This stance put Hildebrand at odds
with William Aberhart in Alberta who used his fundamentalist ministry to promote his
Social Credit Party. In a letter to Aberhart in 1937, Hildebrand warned that many
Christians thought Aberhart took “a step down” when he entered politics. Because
Hildebrand believed that sin produced Canada’s economic and social problems, he was

894

NDA, #33 F6 1991.01, “Fr. Murray to Prime Minster Lester B. Pearson,” 22 April, 1964.

895

The Lacoon, 3, no. 1 (1947): 6.

896

BCS, 92003 A 008, Radio Messages, Galatians to Philippians, “Wherefore the Law?,” 11 January,
1948.
897

BCS, 92003 A 008, Radio Messages, Acts-II Corinthians, “The Day of Pentecost,” n.d.

236

“confident that no new ism or political party” could have “any effect on the root cause of
the disease.” Aberhart responded to this criticism by noting that he “wouldn’t give much
for a Christianity that has no effect upon the environment of a person.”898 Aberhart
believed that Social Credit reforms were necessary to ensure the individual freedom
required for personal salvation. Hildebrand did not consider politics a valid evangelistic
tool and chose to remain non-partisan in his ministry.
This decision to remain neutral was tested when Social Credit “invaded” Saskatchewan in
1938. Premier Aberhart initially believed that Social Credit would prove its worth to the
rest of Canada by virtue of its successes in Alberta.899 When Prime Minister Mackenzie
King disallowed Social Credit legislation in early 1938, however, Aberhart decided that
Social Credit needed a regional powerbase to force Ottawa to back down. A strong
showing in the upcoming Saskatchewan election would do just that. As he told a rally in
Moose Jaw, “if Saskatchewan says so maybe the Dominion government will take
heed.”900 Hildebrand’s fundamentalist constituency and Sinclair Whittaker’s background
in politics made them perfect allies to help lead the charge. Both men refused to take
part. Whittaker later recalled that, although he believed that Aberhart and his lieutenant,
Ernest Manning, were “good Christians,” he was skeptical that political reforms were the
answer to the Depression.901 Whittaker’s fundamentalist beliefs convinced him that
modern society could not be saved. After running as an independent candidate and losing
in 1934, Whittaker largely abandoned politics for the remainder of his life.902 Hildebrand
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was just as clear in his response. “A truly honourable man,” he reminded his listeners,
“is never an office-seeker.”903
This does not mean that Hildebrand sat back as the CCF gathered strength. Hildebrand’s
anti-socialist attacks grew more overt in the early 1940s as the provincial CCF gained
support. In November 1943, he criticized the CCF’s plans for a guaranteed minimum
income. “You may give everybody ‘a living wage’ however extravagant his notions of a
living wage may be,” he argued, “and the world will groan still, because you have not
dealt with the root of all mischief.”904 The CCF’s policies repulsed Hildebrand because
they provided charity to those who would not help themselves. As he reminded his
listeners, “Christianity does not only dole out alms to needy humanity.” Rather, it heals
humanity from sin so that it “can walk on its feet and earn its own living,” and help
others do the same.905 Hildebrand disdained the CCF leaders, whose false message of
creating a “New Jerusalem” only led people astray at the very moment their personal
salvation was paramount. Every so often “some new luminaries flash across the sky,
professing to have the light,” but “time has eclipsed them all and they amounted to no
more than a meteor flash that burns itself out by its own velocity.”906 For Hildebrand,
the only time-tested and true salvation from the economic ravages of the Depression lay
in a personal and individual relationship with Christ.
Unlike Hildebrand, Murray did not have personal or theological qualms about
partisanship. The CCF’s socialism went against everything that Murray stood for.
“Tommy Douglas is a wonderful guy and a grand fellow,” Murray noted, “but I abhor
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and detest and with all my heart abjure, any suggestion of sympathy for his
philosophy.”907 Nor was Murray alone in this sentiment. In the lead up to the 1934
election, the Archbishop of Regina, James McGuigan issued a pastoral letter declaring
that all forms of socialism were entirely irreconcilable with the faith. The Archbishop
did not mention the CCF by name, but its applicability was clear.908 Murray believed
that his opposition to the CCF was in accordance with both his own conscience and the
Church’s teachings. Shortly after the publication of McGuigan’s letter, it came to
Murray’s attention that several Notre Dame students had joined Wilcox’s Young
People’s CCF Club. Murray gave the boys a choice. Either they would immediately
resign from the club, or face expulsion from Notre Dame and a potential excommunication. “Notre Dame philosophy,” Murray recalled, will “not hear of Catholics
professing socialism.”909
Murray’s ecclesiastical superiors, in contrast, were much less willing to take a direct
stand. The CCF used Murray’s actions to attack the provincial Church’s anti-socialist
position. “We would like to know,” an open letter in the Leader-Post asked, “if this is to
be the official attitude of the Roman Catholic toward the C.C.F. or is it merely an
individual viewpoint.”910 Major James Coldwell, the first leader of the Saskatchewan
CCF, also intervened on behalf of the Notre Dame students, calling on McGuigan to rein
in Murray. Although the Archbishop was equally opposed to socialism, his pastoral letter
had carefully refrained from referring to the CCF by name. Murray, in directly attacking
the party, had crossed the line. McGuigan feared such actions could spark a repeat of the
KKK’s “fire of prejudice and campaign against the church,” and publicly condemned
Murray. “The Church,” he maintained, “has never favoured or disfavoured, approved or
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condemned any political party.”911 McGuigan informed Murray in no uncertain terms
that he was not to act politically. “The welfare of God’s Church is concerned,” he
warned, “and you must do absolutely nothing or say absolutely nothing that would make
things more difficult and perhaps draw the Church into discussions which at this time
might seem political no matter how good your intention.”912 McGuigan believed Murray
was “a good priest,” but, fearing Murray’s “unbalanced judgement” and difficulty falling
“in line with the ecclesiastical order of things,” followed up his reproach with a veiled
threat. 913 In the same letter, McGuigan ridiculed Murray for referring to his “institution
as a university,” but stated that he did not wish to discuss the matter at “this time.” 914
The implication of this was clear. Either Murray stopped making political trouble, or his
educational experiment would come to a swift end. Believing the long-term work of
Notre Dame was more important than short-term politics, Murray acquiesced and did not
publicly challenge the CCF until well after the end of the Second World War.
Historians maintain that the Depression caused a general leftward radicalization in
Saskatchewan as people responded to the crisis in capitalism. The rise of the CCF lends
weight to these assertions. The ultimate success of the CCF, however, has overshadowed
other reactions. BBI and Notre Dame were part of a process wherein conservatives
retrenched their faith in the power of individual action and British values in the face of
the decade’s rising collectivism. Murray and Hildebrand believed that the Depression
was weakening people’s faith in the power of individual action. They responded by
articulating a hierarchical, individualistic, and anti-modern worldview.
Unlike the situation in Alberta, where Aberhart used his popularity as a religious figure to
fuel his political career, Murray and Hildebrand placed their school’s success ahead of
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political success. This does not mean that their ideology failed to impact Saskatchewan
politics. Murray and Hildebrand were unwilling to enter politics, but this does not signify
a weakness for the ideology. Political neutrality is not synonymous with weakness. The
success of these schools demonstrates that conservative values continued to animate
portions of the population. What this neutrality did mean, however, was that political
appeals to these values would come from outside the organizations themselves.
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6

The Politics of Individualism: Political Realignment
During the Great Depression, 1929-1938

During the hot and dry summer of 1933, Sinclair Whittaker, the co- founder of BBI and
then Conservative MLA for Moose Jaw County, organized a series of meetings with his
constituents. The Depression was devastating the area. In 1933, over ninety percent of
Whittaker’s constituents were on some form of relief.915 Whittaker, however, claimed
that he had found a solution to their problems. The panacea did not lie in a radical shift
in economic policy or “social legislation,” as proposed that July in the CCF’s “Regina
Manifesto.” Instead, Whittaker borrowed from his fundamentalist background, informing
his constituents of his spiritual awakening that “changed his outlook on life.” The only
solution to the “setbacks” the people were suffering came through their own personal
initiative. An individual’s salvation, Whittaker maintained, only came through a personal
acceptance of the saving grace “offered by Christ in the Bible.”916 Whittaker did not call
for government intervention or reforms to the capitalist system. It was only an individual
relationship with Jesus Christ that provided true relief.
No record exists as to how Whittaker’s constituents responded to his “solution,” but it
speaks to how the Great Depression altered the province’s political discourse. The “new
politics” of the Depression era replaced earlier discussions of wheat marketing and
separate schools with questions of debt moratorium and the utility of the capitalist
system. The issues in both the 1934 and 1938 elections, Andrew Milnor notes, “were
primarily rooted in the Depression, and were the product of debates on solutions to the
provincial economic crisis.”917 On the one hand, the 1930s witnessed radical challenges
to the status quo. The central component of this new society lay in the dismantling of the
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capitalist system. “No C.C.F. Government will rest content,” the Regina Manifesto
declared, “until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the full programme of
socialized planning.”918 In contrast, conservatives emphasized individualism and
personal responsibility in the face of a growing collectivist and socialist trend. Both
Notre Dame and BBI responded to the Depression by articulating a conservative
worldview that retrenched traditional values. Social Credit joined in this crusade,
offering reforms to the capitalist system, not its eradication. As Clark Banack notes,
“protecting individual freedom” was central to William Aberhart and Ernest Manning’s
“support for social credit economics in general and their passage of social democratic
legislation in particular in the heat of the Depression.”919
Historians, however, have presented Saskatchewan’s Depression-era politics as the story
of the remarkable rise of the CCF and its Social Gospel inspired-message of reform and
co-operation. “What began in the Great Depression as an agrarian movement for
fundamental social, political and economic change,” J.F. Conway argues,
“metamorphosed into the natural governing party of Saskatchewan with a record of
success to rival that of the Liberal Party.”920 Social Credit may have swept to power in
Alberta in 1935, but historians largely confine its role in Saskatchewan politics to a
potential foil for the CCF, a final obstacle to overcome before they successfully
challenged the Liberals in 1944.921 Likewise, the conservative response to the
Depression is only discussed as far as it influenced the CCF’s development. David
Smith, for example, argues that the Conservative victory in 1929 began a “shift in
electoral alignments” that culminated in “the displacement of all opposition parties by the
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CCF.” The “threat to the Liberals,” he concluded, “required only time to be realized.”922
As a result, historians have underestimated the strength of a conservative individualist
worldview, even in the face of unprecedented hardship. The fact that Conservatives
adhered to a traditional individualism and belief in the sanctity of the capitalist system is
portrayed as “reactionary” and evidence of the “failure to cope effectively.”923
Radicalism, not conservatism, is viewed as the natural response to the Great
Depression.924
The CCF’s rise and the growing popularity of its vision of a “co-operative
commonwealth” was a central element of Saskatchewan politics. Yet, it was only part of
the story. This chapter examines conservative influence on the politics of the Great
Depression. The CCF emerged in 1932, championing a radical reinterpretation of
property rights, the role of the state, and the nature of the economy. Conservatives
viewed the CCF’s “co-operative commonwealth” as the antithesis to individual values
and aggressively opposed the new party. This hostility made conservatives receptive to
political appeals that privileged traditional values, but the CCF’s rising popularity
demonstrated the strength of a radical solution to the “crisis in capitalism.” This
polarization ushered in a period of political realignment as the Conservative and Liberal
Parties divided between an individualist and collective focus. Anderson’s 1929 victory
was predicated on appeals to a conservative individualism. Their resounding defeat in
1934, however, prompted the party to abandon this individualist focus. It was a decision
that led to internal divisions and electoral irrelevance. The party failed to elect a single
candidate in both the 1934 and 1938 elections. The Liberals, in contrast, repositioned
themselves as the champion of Saskatchewan’s traditional individualism. The Liberals
returned to office in 1934 and, under William Patterson’s leadership, adopted a platform
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and rhetoric that framed the party as the protector of the province’s personal freedoms.
Patterson’s tactics allowed the Liberals to defeat the CCF, steal electoral support from the
Conservatives, and repel William Aberhart’s Social Credit “invasion.” Far from a
“reactionary” response to the CCF, conservatives’ continued adherence to their
individualist outlook shaped Saskatchewan’s Depression-era politics
Anderson won the 1929 election by framing a message that forged independent farmers
and British nativists into a single coalition. The co-operative government spent its first
year in office rewarding this support. Anderson campaigned on the premise that Liberal
corruption undermined the voters’ personal freedom. Once in office, the Premier moved
quickly to “smash the Gardiner Machine.”

In late 1929 the government tasked M.J.

Coldwell, then a member of the Progressive Association executive, with recommending
changes to the Civil Service Act to prevent its use for political purposes. Under
Coldwell’s guidance, the updated legislation restricted the government’s ability to
interfere with appointments below the deputy minister level. Competitive examinations
overseen by a powerful, but non-partisan, Public Service Commission would fill all other
positions.925 The government also hoped to perpetuate voters’ anger against the Liberal
machine. In early 1930, James Bryant launched a Royal Commission to investigate the
allegations raised during the election. The subsequent investigation, Peter Russell notes,
uncovered “a shocking record of corruption and political favouritism.”926 Unlike the
Bradshaw charges, the Bryant Commission found Liberal cabinet ministers culpable in
Liberal corruption.927 Anderson’s efforts to eliminate the basis of the Liberal machine
while using the powers of government to investigate the Gardiner machine’s past abuses
were designed to reinforce conservative voters’ faith in the new government.
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The same strategy figured prominently in Anderson’s approach to religious and racial
issues that figured prominently in the 1929 campaign. In 1930 the government amended
the School Act to forbid the display of any religious emblem and the wearing of religious
garb in the province’s public schools. Further amendments in 1931 removed French
instruction in the first grade and the half-hour of permitted religious instruction. The
government also required all candidates for trustees to be able to read and write in
English. As Keith McLeod notes, “the rout was virtually complete.”928 Anderson did
not interfere with the operation of Saskatchewan’s separate schools, but he did fulfill his
promise to the province’s nativists that his government would protect Saskatchewan’s
non-sectarian public schools. Klansmen voiced their appreciation by passing a resolution
“in hearty accord” with the measure, congratulating “the Premier on his stand.”929
Anderson’s early actions demonstrated his desire to reinforce his government’s
connection with Saskatchewan conservatives, but it was not the only focus. The cooperative government contained a mix of Conservatives, Progressives, and Independents
and the Premier was aware of the need to placate the progressive elements within his
coalition. The government created the province’s first Cancer Commission and
established a provincially-funded School for the Deaf. In addition to limiting French and
Catholic influence in the province’s schools, Anderson created an early system of
teachers’ pensions and passed measures to place the entire educational system outside the
control of party politics. Labour relations also featured prominently as the government
legislated on workplace safety and increased workers’ compensation and the minimum
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wage. 930 It was a “productive” government, Ward and Smith note, that “in happier
circumstances might well have left an enviable record.”931
Economic and environmental deprivation forced Anderson to abandon his earlier focus
and crippled his coalition. Between 1929 and 1931, drought conditions were confined to
the south of the province. The entire province experienced the dramatic drop in wheat
prices, but Anderson believed that the crisis was manageable. The government’s first
throne speech, for example, downplayed the seriousness of the economic and
environmental conditions the province faced. “Adverse climatic conditions” were
wreaking havoc “in certain sections of our province,” Anderson conceded, adding that he
was confident the “ever-present spirit of optimism among our people…still prevails.”932
The government believed the crisis was temporary and focused its efforts on providing ad
hoc relief through existing government departments. The hardest hit municipalities
received direct aid, cash advances helped farmers continue their operations through crop
failures, and the Wheat Pool was saved from bankruptcy by guaranteeing bonds to cover
its overpayment.933 In 1931, however, the drought conditions spread across the entirety
of the province’s agricultural region. With an almost universal crop failure, Anderson
was forced to assure the people that “no one will starve.”934 It was clear that the
catastrophe would not be temporary.
Anderson’s declaration pledged the government to an interventionist policy. The scope
of relief was such that ad hoc arrangements were no longer able to keep up with demand
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for aid or administer it efficiently. In September 1931, the government centralized relief
under a single agency, the Saskatchewan Relief Commission. Under the chairmanship of
Henry Black, a well-respected businessman and former mayor of Regina, the commission
was responsible for the administration of all aid in the province, including the supply of
food, heating fuel, feed, fodder, seed grain, medical and dental aid, the maintenance of
the province’s schools, and supplementing teacher’s salaries. With a budget in the
millions of dollars, the Relief Commission was a powerful government agency. 935
However, this interventionism did not signify a weakening in society’s individualistic
ethic. The commission considered its aid a loan and required recipients to sign
promissory notes. There existed a “frequently expressed opinion,” the commission
reported, “that to take an obligation from the recipient for repayment of the cost of
assistance received would enable him to maintain his self-respect.”936 Despite
unprecedented hardships and an increasingly interventionist government, conservatives
feared that aid would undermine traditional values of self-reliance and the individualist
work ethic. Treating relief as loans reassured conservatives that the government would
not undermine society’s individualism.
Anderson was less inclined to reassure conservatives that his government would practice
fiscal restraint. The co-operative government initially borrowed heavily to maintain its
pre-Depression expenditure levels and fund the province’s share of relief costs. “Money
should be spent freely on public works,” the party whip explained. “The time for a
government to retrench, is when prosperity returned, for then private interests will once
more be in a position to embark on large expenditures.”937 Not all members of
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Anderson’s coalition were content with the reliance on debt financing. In early 1931,
Sinclair Whittaker proposed a motion calling for a drastic reduction in civil servant and
MLA salaries. “Spending one’s way to prosperity,” he reasoned, “is the cause of our
troubles today.”938 Whittaker’s resolution was soundly defeated, but it speaks to the
growing tensions within the Anderson coalition. Progressive forces were willing to
abandon fiscal conservatism in the hopes of maintaining government services.
Conservatives, in contrast, considered the reliance on debt financing to pose as great a
threat to society’s traditional values of self reliance as the provision of relief.
The conservative view won out. By 1932, the provincial government was facing
bankruptcy. Revenue from sales taxes and licensing fees had plummeted while demands
on relief continued to grow. Saskatchewan was forced to turn increasingly towards
financial support from Ottawa and central Canadian financiers to make up the difference.
At the federal level, Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett responded to the growing
federal deficit by “slashing expenditures” and “relentlessly” raising taxes.939 The Prime
Minister expected Anderson to follow the same financial “orthodoxy” as a prerequisite of
continued financial aid. Beginning in the 1932 legislative session, what Russell terms the
“retrenchment session,” the government instituted a collective reduction in civil service
salaries, cut funding to the farm loan board and highway departments, increased the
gasoline tax, and instituted the province’s first income tax. Even this was not enough. In
1933, Anderson cut school grants in half, eliminated maternity grants, and dramatically
decreased mothers’ allowances and old-age pensions.940 These measures ensured
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Bennett’s continued goodwill, but they did little to stop the bleeding. Between 1929 and
1934, the provincial debt skyrocketed from $65,000,000 to $145,000,000.941
Tensions between progressives and conservatives were also apparent in Anderson’s
handling of the farmers’ debt. Since the settlement period, Saskatchewan was a debtor
province. Farmers relied on credit to provide the capital necessary to expand and
improve their holdings. Widespread crop failures and depressed wheat prices made it
impossible for farmers to meet their payments. Provincial officials estimated that interest
payments alone constituted two-thirds of crops harvested after 1930.942 Tens of
thousands of farmers faced the real prospect of losing their farms to foreclosure and
urged Anderson to bring forward a program of debt moratorium or adjustment.
Anderson’s response was complicated by conservative opposition to any debt solution
that undermined personal responsibility. Questions of debt moratorium and adjustment
were not new during the Depression. Dunning faced a similar, albeit less severe, debt
crisis in the early 1920s. He responded by reaffirming his government’s stance that all
debtors were required to honour agreements they had entered of their own free will.
Anderson initially followed the same strategy. The government urged the use of
voluntary conciliatory boards that negotiated a postponement of payments until
conditions improved. As a stopgap measure, the legislation did nothing to treat the
underlying debt and allowed for a continuation of interest charges against the principal.
Farmers could postpone their payments but doing so only put them further into arrears.
As the Depression deepened, an increasing number of farmers faced bankruptcy.
Anderson responded to the worsening conditions by abandoning his government’s earlier
adhesion to individualistic ideals. Amendments in 1932 gave the province’s conciliatory
boards the power to make the debt “reasonable” by overriding financial terms in the
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contracts and to declare individual moratoriums. The 1933 Debt Adjustment Bill and the
Bill for the Limitation of Civil Rights went even further requiring creditors to submit all
debts to a newly established Debt Adjustment Board prior to legal action. This board had
the power to force the creditor to accept a renegotiated contract and moratorium.943
The government justified the move as necessary to protect farmers’ freedoms and
independence on the land. “The effect of this act should be to restore the confidence of
our people of this province to carry on,” the attorney general reasoned. “They will
acquire that confidence knowing that a fair adjustment of their debts added to, and
compounded by factors they could not control, will be made…that as long as they
continue their own efforts to work out their own livelihood and that of their families their
homes are safe.”944 Anderson hoped that conservatives would accept that this
infringement on individual responsibility was necessary for the greater good.
Conservatives, however, were not convinced. The Regina Daily Star, usually supportive
of the Anderson government, worried about the outcome of undermining the sanctity of
contracts. Using the opportunity to attack the government’s controversial guarantee of
the Wheat Pool’s overpayment, the newspaper questioned what would happen if the Pool
decided not to pay its bills.945 Similarly, the province’s legal and business communities
attacked the legislation for undermining the province’s traditional values “From time
immemorial,” the Saskatchewan Bar Association argued, “it has been a basic principle of
British law that contractual rights, acquired for valuable consideration…will not be taken
away by the Legislature.”946 The Liberal Party fueled this opposition. Although the
Liberals voted unanimously for the legislation, Gardiner noted that “he and many other
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Liberals disagreed with the bill.”947 Similarly, the Leader-Post joined conservatives in
attacking the legislation’s threat to individualist values. “The old idea that there was a
moral obligation to fulfill a contract or a bargain so long as it was humanly possible to do
so has been put aside,” the paper editorialized. “Every citizen who feels that he should
escape from the terms of a contract is provided with machinery to make a battle to obtain
amelioration.”948 Anderson believed that the debt legislation was the only way to deal
with a worsening situation, but conservatives viewed it as a betrayal of the trust they had
placed in the Premier.
Anderson’s election was predicated on appeals to a conservative individualism, but he
increasingly found himself forced to act against this ideology to combat the electorate’s
growing radicalism. Since the settlement period, Saskatchewan’s farmers divided over
their understanding of the nature of the capitalist economy. Conservative farmers,
inspired by a belief in their own individualism, had used their position of power prior to
the 1920s to promote a reform program designed to limit monopoly abuse, not transform
the capitalist grain trade. The province’s smaller farmers, in contrast, viewed the grain
trade as fundamentally exploitative and pushed for the creation of the Wheat Pool and the
amalgamation of the SGGA with the FU into the UFC(SS) in 1926. By the onset of the
Depression, the most radical elements of the former FU succeeded in taking control of
the new organization. Led by George Williams, an avowed socialist and former FU
organizer, these radicals self-identified as the agrarian movement’s “left wing” and
increasingly pushed a socialist program within the UFC(SS) calling for “the abolition of
the present competitive system of manufacture and public ownership and democratic
operation of public utilities and natural resources.”949 In 1931, the left wing succeeded in
bringing the UFC(SS) into politics on a platform calling for the nationalization of farm
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land and the social ownership of production. In 1932, the UFC(SS) aligned with the
province’s fledgling Independent Labor Party to form the Farmer-Labor Group (FLG).
The new party sent a delegation to the CCF’s organizational convention the same year,
affiliating as the provincial wing of the national socialist movement.950
Some historians have questioned the extent of the early party’s radicalism, but all agree
that its land policy was on the extreme end of popular solutions to the province’s debt
problem.951 The party’s “use-lease” scheme called for the abolition of private land
holding. Under the Torrens system, farmers possessed title to their land and could
borrow against its value to fund their operations.952 It provided the farmer with needed
capital, but the resulting debts were the reason that many faced the prospect of losing
their farms to mortgage companies. The FLG proposed to absorb famers’ debt through
long-term, interest free bonds. In return, the farmers would surrender title to their land to
the government. The government would then “lease” the land back to the farmers’ in
perpetuity. The system, a supporter noted, would protect the “land which we are
supposed to own, but which we know is practically owned by the big mortgage
companies…”953 The FLG’s radicalism resonated with farmers who viewed their
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situation as hopeless.954 Anderson’s debt legislation gambled that conservatives were
willing to accept a slight infringement on the sanctity of contracts if the alternative was
the nationalization of their farms.
It was a miscalculation. Even this relative moderation earned the Premier enemies
among the hardliners within his own party. Calling themselves “True Blue
Conservatives,” this faction attacked Anderson for abandoning conservative principles.
Dr. D.S. Johnstone, president of the Saskatchewan Conservative Association between
1930 and 1932, was the most vocal critic. Johnstone believed Anderson’s policies were
fundamentally undermining the people’s individualism. “Someone has to have the
courage to call a halt on paternalism,” he urged the 1932 Conservative convention, “just
as soon as times approach normal once more. The necessity for a self-reliant family unit
was never more in evidence.”955 The “True Blue” opposition was indicative of an
uncompromising adherence to a conservative individualism. This was not a majority
opinion. The convention repudiated Johnstone’s remarks, reaffirming its confidence in
Anderson’s leadership. Yet, the presence of an unapologetic conservativism in the face
of Anderson’s moderation demonstrated the conflicting political alignments of
Depression-era Saskatchewan. Anderson’s policies were in stark contrast with the CCF’s
radicalism. However, Anderson’s alienation of hardline conservatives meant that he
could no longer stand as the primary defender of Saskatchewan’s individualist traditions.
The Liberals also opposed the CCF’s radicalism and were happy to welcome disaffected
conservatives into their ranks.
These divisions were on full display during the 1934 election. The election was fought
between Conservatives, Liberals, and the FLG, but a clear divide emerged between
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Farmer-Labour’s radicalism and the older parties’ moderation.956 The new party offered
the most extreme solution to the farmers’ debt problem through its use-lease plan, but its
challenge to traditional individualism did not end there. Throughout the campaign, the
FLG attacked the capitalist system as the cause of the Depression. “The present
economic crisis,” they argued, “is due to the inherent unsoundness of the Capitalist
system, which is based on private ownership of resources and capitalistic control of
production and distribution.”957 The solution, as the CCF manifesto noted, lay in
replacing
the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by
a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by
another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supersede
unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine
democratic self government, based on economic equality, will be
possible.958
FLG speakers were clear that the party stood for a socialist future. In addition to its
policy of use-lease, the FLG called for the “social ownership of all resources and
machinery of wealth production” and “a planned system of social economy for the
production, distribution and exchange of good [sic] and services.” When questioned
whether a “planned system of national economy” meant “socialism,” the party responded
with a firm “yes.”959
Faced with Farmer-Labor’s unabashed socialism, the Anderson government further
moderated its platform. If returned to office, Conservatives promised to “fully study” the
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idea of hospitalization insurance, pressure the federal government to increase social
welfare, implement a progressive taxation system “so that the burden will fall on those
best able to pay,” and improve “working conditions and minimum wage for those
engaged in commercial and industrial employment.” The platform also abandoned the
Conservatives’ earlier nativism, pledging to follow the BNA Act’s lead in all questions of
language and religion.960 The Conservative Party embraced a progressive platform and
severed its earlier affiliation with British nativists in an attempt to steal support from the
FLG.
These moves, however, were not a wholesale abandonment of conservative
individualism. Delegates reaffirmed their belief “in a social order which preserves liberty
of action to the individual citizen and permits him to enjoy the fruits of his labour, and
the private ownership of property, and in a form of Government designed to safeguard all
the rights of the individual in this respect.” In terms of land policy, the party
differentiated itself from the FLG by qualifying who was entitled to aid. All farmers
were suffering, but protection would only be granted to “those who have established a
right to this protection by their own efforts.” Delegates also pledged a policy of fiscal
conservatism and limited intervention, noting that “the credit of the individual citizen can
best be restored only by lessening the requirements of the government…upon the
resources of the public.”961 The Conservative Party’s updated platform reflected the
divisions Anderson faced during the Depression. The Premier believed that he needed to
undermine the province’s increasing radicalism and retain the support of hardliners
within his own party.
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The Liberals also stressed the party’s progressivism during the contest. As Ward and
Smith note, Gardiner’s politics rested on the belief that “the Liberal party was the most
effective instrument for good.”962 Liberalism’s central goal, Gardiner noted, “is the
greatest good for the greatest number.”963 He was therefore deeply concerned by the
rising popularity of the FLG’s radical reform program. “It is well to remember,” he
wrote to a supporter, “that the Liberal Party is the only socialistic party in Canada.”964
The Liberals provided Saskatchewan with a progressive administration, including support
for co-operative elevators, hail insurance, telephone service, maternity grants, and oldage pensions. “When a party is socialistic,” Gardiner argued, “it tries to bring all
organizations in industry, finance, transportation, trade and commerce, labor and primary
production as well as the public service to work in harmony for the common good.”
Socialism, in contrast, sought state power “as a panacea to all our economic ills.”965
Gardiner combated the FLG by stressing the Liberals’ reformist and progressive
credentials. In 1932, Gardiner called a Liberal convention to reaffirm his leadership and
update the party’s platform. In addition to the customary calls for lower tariffs and
increased co-operation, the platform offered decreased taxes, increased crop insurance, a
survey of the province’s debt problem, a non-partisan educational system, a national bank
responsible for issuing currency, as well as increases to the minimum wage and
unemployment insurance.966 The platform, Ward and Smith note, “reflected the
Liberals’ paper response to the rising C.C.F.”967 It was also remarkably close in
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substance to the Conservative Party. Both parties attempted to steal the FLG’s support
by offering a progressive solution to the Depression.
This does not mean, however, that the Liberal and Conservative Parties ignored the
province’s conservative voters. Anderson’s actions in office weakened his party’s close
association with individualist conservatives, leaving it an open question as to which party
they would support going forward. Both parties actively courted conservative voters by
reaffirming their faith in society’s individualist values. The “Socialistic state,” the
Conservatives argued, undermined the individual effort. Under the use-lease plan, a
farmer “could never rise higher than he was, a tenant all his life, just where he started,
with no initiative. If the Government controlled production they would tell the farmer
how much land he could own, how much he could put in crop, what stock he could have.
Instead of being master he would be a servant obeying orders, whether arbitrary or not,
all his life.”968
The Conservatives, in contrast, stood for “a social order that preserved individual liberty
of action to the individual citizen, permits him to enjoy the fruits of his labor, private
ownership of property and safeguards the rights of the individual.”969 The Liberals were
equally clear on their stand for individual values. Farmer-Labor, they argued, stood for
“serfdom…under the directorate of an omnipotent dictatorship.” Far from protecting
farmers’ liberty, the use-lease plan signaled a reversion to feudalism:
It means that you have not developed one iota…from the state of the
savage; it means that the people of Canada--and that includes you--have
not the brains or the backbone to take such other steps as may be
necessary to protect the masses from being exploited; it means that you
and me and nearly ten millions more are ready to throw in the sponge and
quit the fight to keep what we’ve got; it means that millions of free men
are ready to acknowledge that they are buffalooed and busted, ready to
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throw up their hands and quit; ready to relinquish hold on the ground
gained after centuries of struggle.970
Both Conservatives and Liberals shifted their platforms to the left to undermine the
FLG’s growing support but their rhetoric throughout the campaign signified a
competition for conservative voters.
These competing focuses polarized the campaign between individualism and
collectivism. Anderson, in office since the beginning of the province’s troubles, had no
choice but to run on his government’s record. Adopting the motto “we have stood by
you,” Conservative publications and speakers stressed the government’s positive record
in handling the Depression. As M.A. MacPherson explained: “We do not claim to be
perfect; we do not claim we have made no mistakes; but we do claim we have done our
honest best to deal with extraordinary problems in a most difficult period.”971 Increased
taxes and decreased benefits were regrettable, Bryant added, but were necessary as “the
suit had to be cut according to the cloth.”972 Conservatives believed that they had given
the best possible service in the face of the Depression.973
Central to this discussion was the assertion that the government had successfully
protected the province’s individualist ethic. In terms of debt adjustment, for example, the
government maintained that their 1933 legislation alleviated a hopeless situation without
undermining people’s self-reliance. “The debtor has been relieved of crippling financial
bondage,” the party argued, “and the creditor given assurance of the payment of his
voluntarily reduced claim—and from a position, hopeless for both parties, has evolved a
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mutually fair deal, well within their capacity to carry to success.”974 In contrast, the
FLG’s use-lease sought a “repudiation” of farmers’ debts. It constituted “class legislation
of the worst kind, and most inequitable, unless it has provided also a converse power on
behalf of the creditor.”975 The Conservatives realized that many voters did not
sympathize with the “financial interests” but they maintained that the FLG oversimplified
who constituted the interests. “Mortgages…represent the savings of retired farmers and
of parties who are dead, invested for the widows, orphans and the aged,” they noted.
“The Farmer-Labor party says that they stand for humanity first. If they do, they are
thinking only of the debtor and not at all of the owner of the savings.”976 The FLG’s
collectivism was based upon “visions and dreams,” not practical realities.977 “If such a
group should come into power,” Anderson concluded, “all I can say is God help
Saskatchewan and God help Canada.”978 The Conservatives’ opposition to collectivism
differentiated the party from the FLG.
At the same time, the party did little to separate itself from the Liberals in the competition
for conservative voters. Despite Anderson’s portrayal of the debt legislation as a
protection for individual rights, hardliners increasingly turned to the Liberal Party as the
defender of their values. Johnstone, the leader of the “true blue” faction, spent the
election campaigning for the Liberal Party. “Beating the Grits is a noble pastime when
done in an honorable way,” he argued. “I can subscribe to that myself. But sacrificing
everything that is honourable and decent in public life to do it--that is different.”979
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Anderson was also handicapped in this struggle for conservative voters by previous
appeals to racial and religious tensions in the 1920s. The province’s Catholics were
largely opposed to the FLG’s socialism but would not forgive the Conservatives’ close
association with the Orange Lodge and the KKK. In 1928, Catholics warned Bennett that
the party’s courting of British nativists had made it “practically impossible for a Catholic
to support the Conservative party in this province.”980 Changes in the Conservative
platform were not enough to negate the past. Senator Arthur Marcotte, a FrenchCanadian Conservative from Ponteix appointed by Bennett in 1931 to help rebuild
Catholic support in Saskatchewan, did not step foot in the province during the
campaign.981 The Liberals, in contrast, stood in opposition to the FLG’s collectivism and
had spent decades developing inroads with the Catholic community. Catholics
reciprocated by remaining loyal to the Liberal Party. Athol Murray, for example, wrote
Gardiner shortly after the 1929 election noting his “humiliation” that the people of the
province were “so susceptible to the crude cunning of sectarian agitation.” Murray also
expressed “deep, genuine pride” that Gardiner stood against “Klanism” even though
“doing so was, without a shadow of doubt, the cause of” the Liberals’ defeat.982 The
Liberals, in short, were winning the competition for conservative voters.
Anderson realized this fact and focused on attacking the Gardiner machine, the same
tactics that had proven successful in 1929. Conservative speakers informed voters of the
“hundreds of thousands of dollars” it cost the province “to maintain organizers for the
Liberal party while that party was in power.”983 The government portrayed Liberals as
more interested in partisan politics than seeing the province through the crisis. Bryant
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maintained that the Liberals sabotaged the Anderson government before leaving office.
“James G. Gardiner and his ex-ministers are the poorest political sports in the history of
Canada,” he proclaimed. “Defeated at the polls after twenty-five years of Liberal rule in
Saskatchewan, they do nothing but whine and have no hesitancy in violating the best
precedents of honorable political practice.”984 The message was clear. “The people of
the province cannot afford to experiment with theoretical proposals in these days,” the
Regina Daily Star argued, “nor allow themselves to get into the hands of a party which
has been weighed in the balance and found wanting.” Only returning the Anderson
government to office would allow the province to focus on fighting the Depression and
protect individual values. Despite the government’s best efforts to tarnish the Liberals,
conservative voters were unreceptive. Under normal conditions, renewed evidence of
Liberal corruption—especially the findings of the Bryant Commission—may have
convinced voters to shun Gardiner. Such charges had appealed directly to conservatives’
individualism in 1929. The political atmosphere in 1934, however, had decidedly
changed. Voters wanted a solution to the present crisis; they did not care about past
corruption.
Gardiner’s tactics reinforced this understanding. Instead of responding directly to
Anderson’s charges, the Liberals attacked the government’s inadequate provision of
relief. “The money for such purposes is not Premier Anderson’s money,” they
reminded the voters, “neither is it the money of members of his cabinet, nor of his
supporters in the legislature. It is not charity money provided by members of the
Anderson Government. It is Public Money provided by ALL the people of the
Province.”985 The people had a right to question how their money was being spent. This
was especially the case given Anderson’s “Merciless Record of Mismanagement.”
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Campaign material, for example, singled out the rising provincial debt as evidence of the
Government’s incompetence with titles such as “Anderson Plays Politics With Relief,”
and “Wild Extravagance of the Anderson Government.” Liberal attacks on Anderson’s
record came down to a simple question: “What has the Anderson Government done for
Saskatchewan except to make it more difficult for the people to make a living?”986 As
far as the Liberals were concerned, Anderson’s record of doubling the debt, raising taxes,
and decreasing services spoke for itself.
Gardiner’s criticism of Anderson’s record and support for individualist values positioned
the Liberals as the only party capable of handling the present crisis. “Conservative
policies would place the country in the hand of the barons of Wealth,” one pamphlet
argued. “Socialist policies would place the country in the hands of the barons of Power.
Both are alike in this, that they would leave the masses to be directed and controlled by
the few.”987 Liberals portrayed themselves as the middle ground between Conservative
ineptitude and the FLG’s radicalism: “The C.C.F. Will Take Your Earnings. The
Conservatives Will Spend Your Earnings. The Liberals Will Increase Your Earnings.”988
The Liberals relied on this tactic to explain their position on every issue during the
campaign. They positioned themselves between the opposition’s undesirable debt
policies. The opposition would have the people “give up their purse” to Conservative
taxes and mismanagement or they “give up their title” to their land through the FLG’s
radical use-lease program. The Liberals, in contrast, promised “Brighter Days” through
common sense reforms.989 They vowed to provide interest relief in times of crop failure,
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reverse Anderson’s decision to treat relief as loans, and pressure the federal government
to assume the debts farmers entered into “on behalf of Canada” during the Great War.990
As a leading Liberal explained, it was “a clear-cut, out-and-out policy of land and home
ownership by the people, not by loan and mortgage companies on the one hand or by the
state on the other.”991
Figure 8- “Are You Going to Stand for This?”992

This moderation was in marked contrast to the FLG’s radical rhetoric. Unlike the
Liberals and Conservatives who promised compromise between debtors and creditors,
Coldwell vowed to “take nothing from those who serve, but to remove the toll exacted by
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the parasitical interests that oppress us.”993 Coldwell returned to this theme throughout
the campaign. “Behind the Liberal and Conservative parties,” he argued, “are marshalled
all the vested and financial interests of Canada. They realize that the Farmer-Labor
group is determined to place the needs of our people before the greed of the moneyed
interests.”994 The only solution, therefore, was to transform society. Only by voting
Farmer-Labor could electors “protect” their “homes from confiscation by the financial
interests” and free themselves “from tribute such as Caesar never dared to levy on the
barbarians whom he conquered.”995 The use-lease program itself may have been a
radical solution to farmers’ debt, but this radicalism was the only way to protect the
people from the financial interests backing the Liberals and the Conservatives.
The FLG, understanding that many voters were receptive to attacks on the party’s
socialism, downplayed its platform’s extremism. Under the campaign slogan of
“Humanity First,” party speakers focused on the idea that the present system “of
production for profit” held out little hope for the farmers to retain control of their land.996
“Owing to economic conditions, over which he has no control,” the party argued, “he is
hampered in his efforts at development, and in constant danger of losing his equity.” Far
from being a radical quest to destroy the people’s personal freedoms, the FLG portrayed
itself as the only party that would maintain them. Only the FLG’s planned economy
contained “the basic principle for the preservation of freedom, individual rights and the
dignity of the race in which we pride ourselves.”997 The party would “protect the people
from despotic government by capitalist dictators whom Liberal and Conservative parties
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alike serve.” They promised to free the province “from economic slavery.”998 By
simplifying their policies into a question of protection, as Figure 9 demonstrates, the FLG
hoped to bypass the controversial aspects of their land program. Use-lease, they argued,
would make people’s homes “safe” by protecting land titles from the financial interests’
“greed.”
The FLG was equally clear that it stood for a rejection of conservatives’ adherence to
their own individualism. Coldwell argued that farmers’ “rugged individualism” was the
primary cause of the current crisis. “Like a carrot before a stupid donkey,” he
maintained, the opposition “hold out the possibilities of rich rewards as a result of
liberalistic philosophy.”999 Instead, the FLG posited the creation of a “co-operative
commonwealth” where “the principle means of production, distribution and exchange
shall be socially or co-operatively owned by the people, so as they satisfy the needs of
humanity.”1000 Only though co-operation, they explained, could the people receive
“economic security which is a fundamental of self-development and the exercise of
individual achievement.”1001 Whereas the Liberals and Conservatives portrayed
themselves as protectors of society’s individualistic ethic, FLG speakers adopted the
language of collectivism, calling on the province’s voters to “Join the Army of the
Common Good in a War on Poverty.”1002 Voters were presented with a stark choice.
Either they accepted the collective ethos of the FLG, or they voted for the perpetuation of
the capitalist-individualistic ideals offered by the Conservatives and the Liberals.
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Figure 9 – “Is Your Home Safe?” 1003
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The electorate rejected the FLG’s socialism. The new party only received twenty-five
percent of the popular vote and five seats. The Conservatives and Liberals convinced
three-quarters of the electorate that the FLG’s socialism was a direct threat to society, but
only the Liberals transformed this into electoral gains. Gardiner received just under half
of the popular vote, but an overwhelming majority of the seats in Saskatchewan’s firstpast-the-post electoral system. The Conservatives failed to elect a single candidate
despite outpacing the FLG’s support. The Leader-Post took this as vindication for the
Liberals’ 1929 defeat: “It may be a source of public satisfaction that men who raised a
bogus racial and religious issue in 1929 because of a feeling that it would get them votes
have been shown that such a course is to play with fire and that the final consequences
are inevitable.”1004 The Conservatives viewed the results as a travesty. “The wicked
flourish like green bay trees,” MacPherson lamented. “Sadly…Tory votes get no
representation.”1005 F.W. Turnbull, a Klansman and former Conservative MP, blamed
the defeat on the “silent vote” of the Liberal machine and Catholics.1006 The election was
a victory for conservatives’ individualism, but it was a resounding defeat for the
Conservative Party.
Table 3 - Election Results, 19341007
Party
Liberal
Conservative
Farmer-Labor
Other

# of Candidates
56
52
53
8

Total

Votes Cast
206,212
114,923
102,944
5,555

% of Vote
48
27
24
1

429,634
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50
90
5
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55
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Farmer-Labor also viewed the results with dismay. The new party was now the official
opposition but the outcome did not meet the FLG’s pre-election expectations. Coldwell
and other party leaders spent the days before the election proclaiming that the disgruntled
electorate would sweep the new party to a resounding majority.1008 This was not just
pre-election posturing. The FLG was founded on the belief that the Depression had
fatally undermined the capitalist system. The electorate’s rejection was a bitter blow to
this belief. Coldwell confided that he was “bitterly disappointed,” and felt “both tired
and sick.”1009 Publicly, however, he was resolute that the election was the stepping-stone
to ultimate victory. “A new movement,” he noted on election night, “must take hard
knocks at the beginning.”1010 It was not that their policies were wrong, but that
“doctrines required more time and more explanation than they had received by 1934.”1011
The FLG officially changed its name to the CCF in the aftermath of the election,
reaffirming the party’s belief that the voters would ultimately abandon their “rugged
individualism” in favour of a “co-operative commonwealth.”
This process had begun in 1934. The dominant narrative of the CCF’s rise is predicated
on the notion that the 1934 election initiated the process of undermining the people’s
individualist ethic. Lipset, for example, argues that support for the FLG’s radical
collectivism came from the most “prosperous farm areas.” Radical political action was
the realm of “those who possess economic and social status” and “are most resentful of a
threat to their security.”1012 Liberal and Conservative support, in contrast, was confined
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to the “decimated sectors” where the only political question was one of relief.1013
Subsequent observers followed Lipset’s lead. Peter Sinclair infers that “the poorest areas
did not support the CCF” because they may have “saw their situation as hopeless.”1014
Although David Smith complicates the discussion by focusing on previous political
allegiance, the foundations of his analysis also rest on an assumption that wealthier voters
supported the FLG.1015 The province’s wealthiest and largest farmers stood for the
capitalist system and individual freedoms during the 1920s debates over orderly
marketing. Their alleged support for the FLG in the 1930s, as Lipset and others maintain,
would provide evidence for a fundamental weakening of the people’s conservatism.
Voting patterns, however, were not so straightforward. Lipset relies on land assessments
and tenancy rates to argue that FLG was successful amongst those with the “highest
social and economic status.”1016 These show the economic situation as it stood in 1934
but his analysis fails to account for changes in wealth during the Depression. Prior to the
Depression, the province’s southern portions were the centre of the province’s large-scale
wheat production. It was this region that disproportionately backed nativist movements,
opposed orderly marketing, and strengthened conservative rejections of the Social
Gospel. This was also the area that experienced prolonged drought throughout the 1930s.
The most affluent farmers at the height of the Depression, in contrast, were centered in
the northern parkland that only experienced intermittent crop failure.
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Figure 10 - Conservative and Farmer-Labor Results, 1934 Election1017

Areas traditionally associated with conservative individualism stood firmly against the
FLG’s collectivism despite their destitution. The Liberals secured the largest body of
support but the election was not just a question of government versus the opposition as it
had been in 1929. Three-way contests occurred in all but three of the province’s fiftyfive constituencies. The support of second place parties illuminates the geographical
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divide over the FLG’s collectivism. Ridings that elected Liberals and where the
Conservatives placed second clearly rejected the FLG’s collectivism. The Conservatives
outpaced the FLG vote in the southern and central areas of the province where
conservative individualism was strongest. Support for the FLG’s collectivist message
was centered in constituencies that the new party won outright or placed second ahead of
the Conservatives.
Far from being most successful in areas with “high status,” as Lipset alleges, the largest
body of FLG support emanated from the traditionally marginal areas of the province.
The FLG fared best in the south-west, where widespread land abandonment was the norm
even prior to the Depression, and the areas surrounding Yorkton which had also given
rise to the radical FU. As Andrew Milnor notes, Lipset’s economic focus ignores
elements of religion and race that played as important a role in voters’ behaviour. 1018
The FLG’s single largest body of support in 1934 came from eastern-Europeans who had
a history of hostility to “traditional party lines.”1019 Conversely, Roman Catholics and
English farmers in the south rejected the CCF’s collectivism by largely voting for either
the Liberals or the Conservatives.
The Liberal appeals to individualist values were responsible for their decisive majority,
but Gardiner continued to focus on undermining support for the FLG. In late 1934,
Gardiner created the Bureau of Labour and Public Welfare with the express purpose of
studying issues regarding “the relations between capital and labour.”1020 The Liberals
also announced plans for a system of state-funded medicine. The 1935 throne speech
declared that all expenditures must be “kept within revenues.” Given the costs involved,
Liberals were adamant that they had “no immediate” plans “to inaugurate such a service.”
However, J.M. Uhrich, then Minister of Public Health, assured the Legislature that “in
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days to come, I am satisfied, we will solve the problem.”1021 The policy surprised many
Liberal supporters. The Leader-Post blanched at the costs involved. The newspaper
maintained that the policy stood “to do a good deal for the health of the public,” but
cautioned that “all such services, whatever their form—on an individual or collective
basis—come back on the individual pocketbook.”1022 Gardiner was convinced such
policies would weaken socialism’s pull. According to David Smith, the health-care
announcement indicated the Liberals’ “appreciation of where votes lay.”1023
This progressive focus did not survive Gardiner’s move to Ottawa. In late 1935, Prime
Minister Mackenzie King invited Gardiner to enter his cabinet as Minister of Agriculture.
Gardiner accepted, leaving the party to find his successor.1024 Saskatchewan Liberals
divided over two potential replacements: T.C. Davis, the attorney-general and Gardiner’s
“political confidant,”1025 and William Patterson, Minister of Natural Resources and
Telephones. Both men had been in cabinet since 1926 and were capable administrators,
but their personalities were decidedly different. Whereas Davis was described as a
fighter, fiercely partisan and abrasive like his mentor, Patterson was characterized as
quiet, reserved, and generally well-liked by caucus.1026 The job ultimately fell to
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Patterson. Davis had grown tired of the “small arena” of provincial politics and voted
against himself, leaving Patterson with a single-vote majority.1027
Patterson moved the party in a decidedly conservative direction. With a background in
finance, the new Premier stressed “prudence and judgement in formulating policies.”1028
Like Dunning before him, Patterson understood debts as “binding instruments,” and his
measurement of the government’s ability to deal with the continued Depression was
intrinsically connected to his ability to balance the budget and maintain the province’s
credit rating.1029 Patterson was also deeply concerned over the people’s increasing
reliance on government to solve their issues. He considered the rise of the FLG a direct
threat to democratic values.1030 Patterson was not alone in these beliefs. Prime Minister
Mackenzie King, faced with the real prospect of a bankrupt federal treasury, insisted on
reducing spending after his return to power in 1935. As Robert Wardhaugh argues, King
“increasingly” became “a conservative among radicals.”1031
Patterson’s conservatism was reflected in his government’s hesitant approach to the
Depression. The debt question continued to dominate the government’s attention. By the
summer of 1936, Saskatchewan’s farmers, especially those in the province’s south, had
experienced over five years of crop failure. In 1934, the Bennett Conservatives passed
the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangements Act (FCA), making responsibility for debt
adjustments a federal concern. Although the legislation held that a negotiated settlement
was preferred, Bennett insisted that it empower commissioners to force a settlement if
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neither side could agree to an equitable adjustment.1032 Patterson did not oppose this
move. The FCA, while popular, did not solve the debt problem. It kept farmers facing
insolvency “on the farm,” but left it to the provinces to address the underlying causes of
the debt crisis. 1033 Patterson understood that he had to act if he hoped to retain office.
As Premier and Minister of Finance, Patterson’s future was intrinsically linked with the
province’s financial situation. The easiest solution to the ongoing debt problem was for
the province to declare a debt moratorium—a policy advocated by the FLG and used
extensively in Aberhart’s conflict with the federal government over Social Credit
policy.1034 Patterson, however, was determined that the province’s farmers honour their
debts. Moratorium he argued, was akin to the “repudiation of debt and the avoidance of
payment of any debts.” 1035 Instead, he called for an “amicable solution” between
debtors and creditors that would alleviate the burden without resorting to “force.”1036
In September 1936, Patterson announced a blanket scheme of voluntary debt adjustment.
The agreement divided the province into three sections: the “red” areas in the south-west
where drought had been continual since 1930; and the “white” areas where drought was
intermittent at worst; and the “blue” marginal areas between them.1037 All farmers
benefitted by having their mortgage rates lowered to five percent interest, but only those
in the red areas would see their accrued tax arrears, relief payments, and mortgage
interest, accrued prior to 1936, wiped out. Farmers in the blue areas could continue to
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rely on the Government’s debt adjustment board for arbitration, while white areas were
forced to negotiate with their creditors on an individual basis or seek the help of the FCA
if they too became insolvent.1038 The plan reflected Patterson’s understanding of
personal responsibility. While it alleviated the debt problem for those who had no hope
of paying, it forced those who were not destitute to honour the contracts they entered of
their own free will. As T.C. Davis explained, the plan protected the individualist basis of
society by making “insolvent debtors solvent” while not permitting “solvent debtors to
avoid their obligations” as the opposition would have it under a general moratorium.1039
It did not hurt that the plan was immensely successful. The government happily reported
that, in its first six months of operation, the plan had voluntarily reduced $100,000,000
from farmers’ debts.1040
Patterson’s conservative outlook was also clear in his strategy for the provincial debt. By
1936, Saskatchewan owed $192,635,509. It was an untenable situation as interest
payments alone accounted for thirty percent of government expenditures. Although the
federal government’s emergency loans staved off the very real prospect of Saskatchewan
defaulting on its obligations, Mackenzie King was reluctant to continue to support the
province indefinitely.1041 The only long-term solution to the problem was to refund
bonds at a lower rate of interest. Patterson’s problem lay in how to go about lowering
interest rates without jeopardizing the province’s financial future. The easier option
rested in the province acting unilaterally. Aberhart, for example, used Alberta’s 1936
default to arbitrarily halve the interest owing on its long-term bonds, but destroyed the
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province’s ability to borrow further funds.1042 Patterson, who measured his success in
handling the Depression on the province’s credit rating, refused to contemplate such a
solution.1043 Provincial bonds constituted “a contract,” he argued, and the creditor “has
as much right to expect that the province will fulfill its contractual obligations as has the
holder of any other agreement or contract made with the government.” The Premier
insisted that the question of interest rates was a federal issue, to be solved through a
renegotiation of the terms of Confederation. The government would not “repudiate” its
debt or unilaterally lower interest payable. Patterson believed that the drought
constituted a “national emergency,” and urged the recently formed Royal Commission on
Dominion-Provincial Relations to address the province’s debt and financial position on
these terms.1044
Patterson’s conservative stance on debt was further reflected in his approach to taxation.
The Premier believed that provincial debt had grown to alarming proportions because
politicians had been unwilling to make difficult decisions when it came to raising money.
The province could have all the social services it desired, he declared, so long as “they
will find the money to pay for them.”1045 When it came to education, for example,
Patterson faced the same financial problem as his predecessors. With an increase in
property tax arrears across the province, municipalities were unable to pay their teachers.
Both Anderson and Gardiner used direct aid and loans to cover part of the shortfall. The
CCF proposed to take the necessary funds from “monopolistic corporations” that “extract
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huge profits from the people of the province.”1046 Patterson, in contrast, believed that all
“must pay their share of costs.”1047 Backed by the recommendations of a Bank of
Canada study into the province’s potential revenue sources, the Premier announced a
controversial two percent sales tax to cover increased educational funding.1048 Taxes are
never popular but Patterson believed that fiscal conservatism was the only way to ensure
Saskatchewan’s future prosperity. The Leader-Post reflected Patterson’s outlook: “No
one will like it but we think…it will be better in the long run to have Saskatchewan get
back closer to a pay-as-you-go basis than to continue a policy of borrowing to meet
current needs.”1049 Even at the height of the Depression, people continued to adhere to
traditional beliefs in individual responsibility.
Patterson’s conservativism placed the Liberals in direct conflict with the opposition. In
1935, the provincial CCF selected George Williams as leader to fill the vacancy left by
Coldwell’s election to the House of Commons. Williams’ background was intrinsically
linked with the province’s radical farmers. Williams was leader of the agrarian
movement’s “left wing” and was central to the UFC(SS)’s push for a compulsory pool
and its decision to enter politics in 1932. Described as a “devoted Marxist,” Williams
dedicated his life to developing a class consciousness among Saskatchewan’s
farmers.1050 Only “by being outright Socialists,” he explained, could party members
“qualify ourselves for power when the Fascist experiment has run its course.”1051 For
Williams, the Liberals were “supporters of capitalism,” endeavouring to protect the

1046

Leader-Post, 20 January, 1937.

1047

Quoted in Bilson, “William Patterson,” 144.

1048

Leader-Post, 15 March, 1937.

1049

“The Budget,” Leader-Post, 25 March, 1937.

1050

J.F. Conway provides a detailed overview of Williams’ early political career and rise to prominence
through a policy of “socialist agrarian populism.” See, Conway, The Prairie Populist.
1051

Williams to Coldwell, 30 January, 1935, quoted in Sinclair, “The Saskatchewan CCF,” 426.

278

“profit-making” system and its resulting “hunger, thirst, nakedness, eviction, [and]
broken homes.”1052
Williams was also pragmatic. He realized that the CCF’s socialist policies, especially the
use-lease plan, made the party susceptible to attack. The party already had the support of
the province’s more radical elements, but it alienated the moderate voters needed to
defeat the Liberals. As he explained to a supporter, “there comes a time…when we
acquire a certain amount of worldly wisdom and a time when we find if we want to get a
certain place and are continually shot down in frontal attack, you are wise to attack on the
flank.”1053 Under Williams’ leadership, the Saskatchewan CCF removed all references
to socialism from its platform and officially dropped its land nationalization policies.1054
Williams remained committed to a socialized society, but he was willing to downplay this
socialism for short-term success.
Even with this moderation, the CCF remained significantly more radical than the
Liberals. Williams characterized the Patterson government as the “greatest extremists”
whose “conservatism” was based on the premise of “frightening the farmers.”1055 In
contrast, the CCF still stood for a fundamental re-ordering of the capitalist system.
Rejecting traditional notions of self-sufficiency and individualism, Williams maintained
that it was the “economic system, not [the farmers] themselves, which is at fault” for the
province’s economic conditions.1056 Williams characterized Patterson’s voluntary debt
adjustment scheme as making “Saskatchewan safe for the mortgage companies.” The
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farmers had “been sold down the river.”1057 Instead, the CCF called for a “crop failure
clause” that would not allow principal or interest to be charged in years when income
averaged less than six dollars an acre.1058 Similarly, Williams opposed Patterson’s tax
increases. “When our people are suffering from the cumulative effects of years of
depression,” he argued during the 1937 budget debate, “is most certainly not the proper
time to add to the burden of taxation.” Instead, Williams called for the “socialization” of
“monopolistic industries” and the immediate “refunding of the public debt” to pay for
increased social services.1059 Williams had abandoned the most extreme elements of the
early FLG platform, but a clear divide continued to exist between the CCF and the
Liberals’ programs. Whereas Patterson believed that the province owed a duty to
bondholders, Williams argued they must “become Canadians rather than money
grabbers” and voluntarily refund the debt or be forced to do so.1060
The CCF’s moderation was also influenced by Social Credit’s “invasion” beginning in
1935. The brainchild of Major Douglas, a British engineer with no formal economic
training, Social Credit promised to solve the Depression by artificially increasing
purchasing power through twenty-five-dollar dividends and abolishing interest charges
on debts. Aberhart popularized the idea in Alberta as an alternative to the CCF that did
not threaten society’s individualist traditions. Social Credit, he argued, protected “the
individual’s God-given right to freedom.”1061 It was on this message of protecting
people’s individualism that the new party swept the United Farmers of Alberta from
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power in 1935.1062 Buoyed by this success, Social Credit supporters began organizing
Saskatchewan’s federal constituencies in anticipation of the federal election later that
year. Both Social Credit and the CCF offered radical solutions to the ravages of the
Depression, but Aberhart was clear that only he would solve the Depression and protect
society’s individual values. Campaign literature maintained that Social Credit protected
individual “freedom,” stood “for entire freedom of religious belief,” provided “help and
protection to the individual producer,” and most importantly, allowed farmers to control
their own “money” and “property.”1063
Aberhart’s promise to protect individual freedoms resonated with Saskatchewan voters.
Social Credit and the CCF each won two seats in Saskatchewan in the 1935 election, but
Aberhart won the contest for the popular vote, outpolling the CCF candidates in most
rural seats. “For the CCF leaders,” Sinclair explains, “this was the second severe defeat
in little more than a year.”1064 Williams was also deeply concerned that CCF candidates
in eight ridings—including Tommy Douglas in Weyburn, Major Coldwell in RosetownBiggar, and Jacob Benson in Yorkton—went against the party’s leadership and publicly
declared their willingness to support Social Credit legislation if elected. Candidates
feared the new party’s rising popularity more than they feared censure from CCF
officials.1065
Social Credit’s popularity was a threat to the CCF. Williams realized that
Saskatchewan’s farmers found Social Credit’s protection of individual rights appealing.
Although Williams remained a socialist, he hoped the party’s newfound moderation
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would compete with Social Credit’s appeal by convincing voters to “accept the CCF
program by putting a new spring frock on it.”1066 Social Credit’s popularity also
prompted a rethinking of the CCF’s stance on co-operation. As Kenneth Andrews notes,
reform-minded rural voters were more concerned with tangible results on central
questions of debt adjustment and recovery than they were with partisan labels, which they
considered “superfluous ideological attributes and distinctions.”1067 These progressives
viewed the Liberals as hopeless reactionaries, but they did not care which reform party
ultimately formed government. Downplaying the CCF’s socialist roots was not enough.
Williams had to demonstrate a willingness to put aside partisan squabbles for the greater
good. Although Williams was personally opposed to co-operation, he was a pragmatist
and realized that continued opposition to co-operation in the face of widespread
grassroots support would only weaken the CCF.1068 In addition to removing references
to the use-lease plan, delegates to the 1936 convention called for “a united front against
the forces of reaction,” passing a resolution urging co-operation with “all groups opposed
to the present social order.”1069 Williams remained firmly against “fusion candidates,”
insisting that each opposition retain its own platform and identity, but it was clear that he
was willing to avoid splitting the opposition vote in an effort to defeat the “reactionary”
Liberals.
Aberhart was not willing to follow the CCF’s lead. Like Williams, Aberhart was
fanatical in his beliefs, but he did not share the CCF leader’s pragmatism. Aberhart’s
entry into politics was inspired by his fundamentalist beliefs. Like Hildebrand in
Briercrest, Aberhart criticized the CCF’s promise of a “New Jerusalem” and social
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regeneration for leading people towards damnation. Only a personal relationship with
God could provide salvation. CCF leaders, Aberhart proclaimed, “were infidels and were
deceiving the people” at the very moment that their very salvation was of paramount
concern.1070 Whereas Williams could downplay his doctrinaire socialism to save his
party, Aberhart was unable to compromise his religious beliefs.
Internal struggles within Aberhart’s party also made co-operation an impossibility. Once
in office, Aberhart failed to bring forward the promised reforms. A back-bencher revolt
in 1937 forced Aberhart to pass a series of controversial bills that effectively barred the
collection of personal debt, unilaterally refunded provincial bonds, and transformed
banks into little more than provincial clearing houses. These moves saved Aberhart’s
leadership, but legislating on questions of banking, interest, and financial policy was in
clear violation of the divisions of power set out in the British North America Act and put
the province on a collision course with Ottawa. Aberhart’s program was either found
ultra vires, disallowed by Ottawa, or reserved by the Lieutenant Governor.1071 Even if
Aberhart was inclined toward co-operation, the growing conflict with Ottawa required a
sign of strength. Aberhart’s “invasion” was intended as a show-of-force to Ottawa, not to
defeat Patterson.
The Conservatives, in contrast, were more than willing to take the CCF up on their offer.
Co-operation was not new to the Conservative Party. Anderson’s success in 1929 was
only possible with support from Independents and Progressives. Yet, where Anderson
entered negotiations from a position of strength, the Conservatives embraced cooperation after 1934 from a place of decided weakness. For the first time in the party’s
history, Conservatives had failed to earn a single seat in the provincial legislature. It was
clear that a new leader was needed to right the ship. In the aftermath of the election
defeat, rumors circulated across the province of Anderson’s alcoholism. “Unless a man
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can control himself,” a leading Conservative confided, “which the Doctor does not seem
to be able to do, then he should realize that he is certainly not working in the best interest
of those who place him in such a responsible position as the Leader of the Great
Conservative Party.”1072 This lack of faith in the party’s leadership resulted in a
breakdown of organization. “If a caucus of party leaders was called tomorrow,” a
Conservative organizer questioned, “how many former provincial ministers, federal
ministers, members of Parliament or senators would be sufficiently interested to attend?
Not a Corporal’s guard!” The situation was “worse if possible than in 1926 when Dr.
Anderson re-organized the province.”1073
It fell to John Diefenbaker, then party president, to intervene. Beginning in the spring of
1936, Diefenbaker began creating a “completely new organization.”1074 The first task lay
in overcoming, as much as possible, the internal divisions that had plagued the
Conservatives since the 1929 election. R.L. Hanbridge, a former Conservative MLA for
Kerrobert, explained the situation to Diefenbaker: “The position of leadership in this
province is a mighty difficult one, with the ‘true blues’ and the insurgent elements that
we have in the party; and one of our big problems will be to try to choose a man as leader
who can bring all these more or less combative groups into a harmonious organization,
fighting together for one cause.”1075 Diefenbaker initially spurned any suggestion that he
take over leadership, but he was convinced by mid-1936 that only he could bridge party
divides and began actively campaigning for the job.1076 He did not have to fight very
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hard for the dubious “honour.” Party delegates to the 1936 leadership convention
nominated twelve people to the role, including Anderson, M.A. MacPherson, Robert
Weir, and F.W. Turnbull. Each had more electoral success than Diefenbaker; all refused
the job. Only Diefenbaker was willing to lead the moribund party. A “congratulatory”
letter summed up the feeling of most of the party in the prospect of Diefenbaker’s
leadership: “As a compromise candidate between the various factions, you are by far the
greatest leader available.” 1077 Diefenbaker was the least objectionable to all groups.
After accepting his party’s “unanimous” support, Diefenbaker’s second task lay in
repositioning the party to increase electoral support. As Patrick Kyba explains, the
platform had to contain “a selection of policies which both provided an attractive
alternative to those of the government and also showed the Conservatives to be as
progressive as the CCF in light of the circumstances in which the province found
itself.”1078 Diefenbaker understood that Patterson’s approach to the Depression had
captured the conservative and moderate vote for the Liberals and began moving the party
to the left to challenge the CCF and Social Credit for the reformist vote. This process
mirrored a similar situation that had occurred within the federal Conservative Party. R.B.
Bennett, hoping to stave off almost certain defeat in 1935, announced a Canadian “New
Deal” intended to “paint the Liberals into a laissez-faire corner.”1079 Declaring that “the
old order is gone,” Bennett called for a fundamental reordering of the capitalist system
and placed the federal Conservatives in favour of unemployment insurance, progressive
taxation, health and accident insurance, better working conditions, revised old-age
pensions, and increased agricultural aid.1080 Bennett’s “New Deal” did not save his
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administration but it did resonate with many Conservatives in Saskatchewan who relished
the opportunity it provided to make the party relevant.
Even before he became leader, Diefenbaker was inundated with policy proposals
advocating for a similar shift in provincial policy. The Moose Jaw Conservative
Constituency, for example, passed a resolution calling for a change to the party’s name.
Given that Bennett “intimated most forcibly…that the Conservative Party of today is not
the stand-pat, reactionary party that its name might indicate,” the local resolved to “take
the first step towards the absorption of the thousands of misled and disillusioned citizens”
by altering the name to “The Social Reform—Conservative Party of Saskatchewan.”1081
The resolution was never brought to a convention floor but it was clear that many
Conservatives agreed with the sentiment behind it. “We have to forget the old days,” a
long-time Conservative argued, “and meet facts and conditions as they are and plan to
take care of them.”1082 Others were more forceful in their stance, threatening to jump
ship if their demands were not met: “In my own case (and I know of many staunch
conservatives who feel likewise), if the platform does not formulate some proposals to
alleviate the suffering existing in this Province, then I am going to vote for that party
which does offer such platform.”1083 The message was clear. Either the Saskatchewan
Conservatives follow Bennett’s lead and adopt a reformist platform or they would lose
any chance of emerging from the 1934 disaster. The Saskatoon Star-Phoenix
summarized the general thinking. The party had to move “considerably to the left of

and Colin Read, “The Politics of Opportunism: The New Deal Broadcasts,” Canadian Historical Review
60, no. 3 (September 1979): 324-349; and Glassford, Reaction & Reform, 153-57.
1081

UofS, GS01, Diefenbaker, Series II, Vol. 3, Reel M-6816, Conservative Party: SaskatchewanConventions, 1936, “Resolutions from the Executive of the Moose Jaw City Constituency.”
1082

UofS, GS01, Diefenbaker, Series II, Vol. 4, M-6816, Conservative Party: SaskatchewanOrganization-Provincial, 1936-1937, Wm. Duff[?] to Diefenbaker, 30 October, 1936.
1083

UofS, GS01, Diefenbaker, Series II, Vol. 7, Reel M-6818, Conservative Party: Saskatchewan-PolicySuggestions, 1936-1937, Fred Kent to H. Keown, 4 December, 1936.

286

traditional Conservatism,” but it remained an open question as to “how far to the left” the
party would go.1084
The new platform, drafted over the course of 1937, furthered the ongoing process of
political realignment by moving the Conservatives decidedly to the left. In terms of debt
adjustment, for example, Diefenbaker differentiated himself from Patterson by
abandoning ideas of individual responsibility and the sanctity of contracts. The platform
promised to legally prevent all foreclosures in situations where the debtor had maintained
positive equity in the property. Likewise, it vowed to immediately refund the province’s
debt at lower rates of interest even though such a policy had already been declared ultra
vires in Alberta. Mirroring Bennett’s “New Deal,” Conservatives also committed the
party to a dramatic increase in government regulation and intervention. Containing
provisions for crop insurance, increased teachers’ salaries, a reduction in the minimum
age for old-age pensions, elimination of the education tax, increased mothers’ allowances
and maternity grants, a system of state health insurance, unemployment insurance,
increased minimum wage, and an improved highway system, the platform was
Diefenbaker’s attempt to place the Conservatives as a clear alternative to the Liberals and
a “progressive” contender to the CCF and Social Credit.1085
The party was divided over such a move. Supporters viewed it as the only way the party
could compete. As R.M. Balfour, President of the Regina Conservative Association,
explained: “A few years ago you and I may have thought this platform a bit radical, but
Conservatism is not opposed to advancement with the times.”1086 Nor was the party shy
in openly expressing its desire to capture the radical vote. “Every plank in the CCF
platform,” J.T.M. Anderson wrote in the Regina Star, “is ours and there is no reason why
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the members of the [CCF] cannot conscientiously support us.”1087 Conservatives hoped
to remain relevant by arming themselves with a new leader and an updated and relatively
radical platform,.
Opponents, in contrast, viewed the new platform as a continuation of Anderson’s reversal
of individual responsibility. Johnstone publicly declared that the platform was the final
straw in the party’s degeneration. “Left wing Conservatives must be having a dizzy time
of it, trying to think of new stunts to keep them in the limelight,” he wrote in an open
letter to the Craik Weekly News. As was the case in the lead up to the 1934 election,
Johnstone urged “true” Conservatives to vote Liberal: “Ten years of leftist control of the
Conservative party explains the entire political mob that exists outside the Liberal ranks
today. The complete suppression of Conservative views over the past ten years has
brought about the disappearance of that party in so far as anything Conservative is
concerned.”1088 Rather than healing internal divisions as Diefenbaker hoped, the new
platform further alienated conservatives from the party.
The Liberals welcomed these divisions. “They have promised everything that any
individual in Saskatchewan could possibly wish to have,” T.C. Davis announced, “and
surely the intelligence of the people of this province has not yet sunk to the level where
they will seriously believe that it is within the realms of human possibility for any
government to do the things that the Conservative Party promises to do.”1089 The
Liberals did not view the Conservatives as a threat. Rather, it was Social Credit and the
CCF that posed the main risk to continued Liberal rule. They did, however, welcome the
support of erstwhile Conservatives who were opposed to Diefenbaker’s policy shift. The
Leader-Post, for example, mirrored Johnstone’s sentiment in attacking the Conservatives
newfound radicalism: “Outside of Social Credit dividends and of the state ownership of
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everything urged by the Communists, the new Conservative platform appears to offer
nearly everything that any other party may be able to offer. The C.C.F. which specializes
in state help for everybody, will have a hard time keeping up with it. Mr. George
Williams, the C.C.F. leader, may wonder what is there left to offer the people in the form
of government assistance.”1090 By actively courting conservatives, the Liberals furthered
the province’s political realignment begun by Diefenbaker.
The new platform fatally weakened the Conservative Party. Diefenbaker abandoned the
party’s connection with individualist conservatives to compete with Social Credit and the
CCF for the reformist vote. The task was exceedingly difficult. Diefenbaker competed
with both the CCF and the Social Credit who did not have the Conservative Party’s
history in office to contend with. With no way to effectively differentiate itself from
other opposition groups, the Conservatives had to accept Williams’ offer of co-operation.
“As long as those anxious for reform are to remain split up into three or four groups
opposed by financial interests and the Roman Catholic Church,” a Conservative reported
to Diefenbaker, “there is little or no hope of success.” The only option was to “advocate”
for “a considerable measure of socialism.”1091 Diefenbaker was unwilling to go further
to the left, but he was favourable towards co-operation. “If we allow all of our friends to
become CCF or Liberal followers,” he argued, “where will we ever be in the future?”1092
The leader was also under pressure from federal Conservatives who hoped to avoid
competition in their fight with the federal Liberals. E.E. Perley, Conservative MP for
Regina, met extensively with Douglas and Coldwell in early 1938 to negotiate an
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arrangement whereby each party would avoid competition in key ridings but retain their
separate identities.1093
The agreement benefitted both sides, but it was the Conservatives who entered it from a
position of weakness. Co-operation, Kyba notes, “destroyed the party’s claim to be a
credible alternative to the Liberals.”1094 Williams intended co-operation to help diffuse
the Social Credit threat. When it came to negotiations with the Conservatives, however,
he insisted that the CCF were “the dominant party in the province” and that the
Conservatives recognize they “are distinctly inferior” before any deal could be
reached.1095 Diefenbaker had hoped that his shift would differentiate his party from the
Liberals, but it only succeeded in weakening the party. The best Diefenbaker could hope
for was to be a junior partner in a CCF-led coalition.1096
The 1938 election completed the process of political realignment begun at the
Depression’s onset. Two central issues emerged throughout the campaign: debt
adjustment and the restoration of agriculture given the improved crop conditions in 1938.
The Liberals were adamant that, if returned to office, they would not deviate from
Patterson’s conservative stance. Debt adjustment, the party argued, had “been
accomplished with a minimum of disturbance to the economic life of the people.” The
Liberals had reduced hundreds of millions of dollars from farmers’ obligations through
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“voluntary amicable settlement.”1097 The opposition, in contrast, advocated for
moratorium, repudiation, and general “soak-the-rich” policies. All constituted an
abandonment of individual freedoms in favour of “compulsion.”1098 The Liberals argued
that only their financial policies allowed Saskatchewan to pass “through the most difficult
years in the history of the province with credit unimpaired,” and the people’s “reputation
for fair dealing unsullied.” Financial retrenchment and increased taxes were never
popular, but the Liberals chose “duty” over “popularity.”1099
The Liberals maintained that only their policies alleviated suffering and protected
individual freedoms. The worst year for the Depression in Saskatchewan was 1937.
Farmers seeded over 15,000,000 acres and harvested only 35,000,000 bushels, a return of
barely two-for-one on seed grain. With crop failure the norm, over half of the population
was on relief.1100 It appeared in early 1938, however, that the province had finally turned
the corner as the rains returned and forecasts called for a large harvest. The question on
many farmers’ minds during the election was the extent that their creditors would
confiscate their crops to pay for past debts. The Liberals were adamant that, although
they respected the “contractual ‘Promise to Pay’,” their policies placed the farmers’
interests above all others.1101 The first plank in the Liberal election manifesto promised
that proceeds of the expected 1938 crop would go towards farmers securing “himself and
family...until another crop is harvested.”1102 Patterson adopted a fiscally conservative
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policy that upheld the sanctity of debts, but the Liberals maintained this was the only plan
that would allow individual farmers to rehabilitate themselves when conditions improved.
The CCF and Conservatives, in contrast, used the election to paint the Liberals as a
“reactionary” government out of touch with the suffering of everyday people. Although
the CCF moderated its socialist focus in 1936, Williams continued to view capitalism as
the cause of society’s misery. “The abuses of capitalism,” the party argued, “have
brought about a state of planned economy that regiments all of us as well as our
governments. It is a planned economy by the vested interests. We bow to its
regimentation but share very meagrely[sic] in its rewards.”1103 The opposition
maintained that Patterson’s efforts to preserve credit and contractual obligations
supported a status quo detrimental to the people’s interests. Liberal promises meant
“standing still, submission to ‘Laissez-Faire’ ideology, indifference to wrongs and
maintaining the attitude that our present conditions are the best we have reason to hope
for.” The CCF upheld “the stability based on positive and planned action not the stability
of utter passiveness.”1104 Whereas Patterson’s supporters believed in the sanctity of
individual action, the CCF catered its message to more radical elements that believed the
government had the power and the responsibility to create a “new social order” based on
co-operation, not competition.1105 A fundamental divide existed between the two sides
over the understanding of debt, the Depression, and the role of government.
The Conservatives joined the CCF in condemning the Liberals as reactionary
nonetheless. “‘Do Nothing’,” they argued, “has been its guiding plan. It has represented
the essence of inaction, the quintessence of stagnation. Dawdling without leadership has

1103

“Election Forum,” Leader-Post, 27 May, 1938.

1104

“Election Forum,” Leader-Post, 2 June, 1938.

1105

SAB, F65, Gardiner, X.VI.11, “A Handbook to the Sask. C.C.F. Platform & Policy (1938).”

292

characterized every effort. It has always been waiting for something to ‘turn up’.”1106
As Diefenbaker explained, “this government has nailed to its masthead the flag of
inaction.” The Liberals had sacrificed the wellbeing of the people by placing them
through the “wringer” of increased taxation while protecting “financial interests” from
repudiation.1107
In direct response to this “do nothing” attitude, Diefenbaker pledged to rescind
Patterson’s controversial sales taxes and dramatically increase spending through a
program of direct government intervention. Diefenbaker promised the voters the best of
both worlds. Advocating a policy of “sound businesslike government,” Diefenbaker
believed that forcibly refunding the provincial debt and a policy of “rigid economy and
efficiency” would be enough to pay for increased government spending without having to
rely on increased taxation.1108 “Out of savings we will effect in government
administration,” Diefenbaker declared, “the Conservative party will bring in state
hospitalization, child guidance clinics, reductions of age for old age pensions from 70 to
65.”1109 Diefenbaker failed to explain how exactly these economies would be found.
Instead, the Conservatives relied on veiled references to Liberal corruption.
Saskatchewan’s debt increased by one hundred million dollars during the Liberals four
years in office, the party noted, but the province had nothing to show for it other than
“useless and unnecessary inspectors, supervisors and political friends.”1110 These attacks
on the Liberal “machine” had succeeded in 1929 but no longer resonated with voters.
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Conservatives hoped to justify their leftward shift by portraying Liberal inaction and
corruption as being responsible for transforming a manageable situation into four years of
continued suffering and hardship. Individualist voters, however, had long ceased to see
the Conservative Party as their champion.
Aberhart, in contrast, was less interested in fighting the provincial Liberals than he was in
using the campaign to challenge Ottawa. The Alberta Premier spurned grassroots
organization in favour of authoritarian control from Edmonton. Aberhart and Manning,
his chief lieutenant, set the party’s platform, hired organizers, and personally selected the
candidates to contest the Saskatchewan election.1111 This unprecedented level of control
of a provincial political party from outside the province allowed Aberhart and Manning
to design their electoral appeal as a regional defence of Social Credit in Alberta. Unlike
the CCF and Conservatives, who framed the struggle as one based between the people
and the provincial Liberals, Aberhart viewed the central conflict as originating with the
financial “interests” in central Canada. As such, Social Credit’s campaign barely
mentioned Patterson at all. Instead, Aberhart vowed to “fight with all of our hearts”
against the “financial tyranny” that was threatening all the people, not just those in
Saskatchewan.1112 In his extensive tours across the province, Aberhart hardly discussed
the Liberal’s education tax, debt program, or supposed corruption. Rather, Aberhart
focused his remarks on depicting the entire apparatus of Canadian federalism as one
designed solely to benefit the “50 bigshots” in the East. The federal power of
disallowance, the Supreme Court, and the British North America Act had all
demonstrated that the people were not free to chart their own destiny. “We are in a real
struggle,” he declared. “The fight for economic freedom is on.”1113 Given this federal
focus, Social Credit did not even bother to print campaign literature specifically dealing
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with the 1938 election, preferring instead to recycle previous publications that outlined
Aberhart’s outlook.1114
It was a missed opportunity. Social Credit’s reform program and protection for
individual rights placed it in a unique position to challenge the Liberals for power. Both
Aberhart and Patterson championed the province’s individualist traditions, but Social
Credit was willing to fight the “interests” where Patterson stood for the economic status
quo. Aberhart’s unequivocal individualism also differentiated the party from the CCF.
Both offered a radical solution to the Depression, but the CCF’s socialist history alienated
more voters than it gained. Social Credit also posed a direct threat to Diefenbaker’s plans
to transform the Conservative Party. The Conservatives hoped their leftward shift would
allow the party to mimic Social Credit’s appeal, but Diefenbaker’s active courting of
CCF support and internal party divisions undermined their efforts. Social Credit
possessed all the Conservatives’ strengths and none of their weaknesses. Aberhart,
however, cared more about fighting Ottawa than he wanted to win in Saskatchewan.
Although Aberhart failed to capitalize on his party’s potential, his “invasion” did have a
direct influence on Patterson’s tactics. The Liberal leader was confident that the CCF’s
socialist platform made the party anathema to voters. Their central tactic in dealing with
the CCF, therefore, rested on undermining Williams’ moderation. As far as the Liberals
were concerned, the CCF continued to pose a threat to individual freedoms. “This
country,” they argued, “rewards Initiative, Thrift and a Willingness to Work.”1115 The
CCF in contrast, remained “a Socialist Party” that hoped “to socialize the Province of
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Saskatchewan.”1116 The Liberals were confident that the people would “have nothing to
do with a party the policy of which…would mean dictatorship, an end to freedom of the
individual, and a breaking down of the democratic institutions of government.”1117
Diefenbaker’s formalized alliance with the CCF opened the Conservatives to attacks on
the same grounds. “Mr. Diefenbaker,” the Leader-Post argued, “cannot act without first
consulting the C.C.F., the Socialist party.”1118 By portraying Diefenbaker as a CCF
stooge, the Liberals depicted the entire Conservative Party as posing the same threat to
personal freedoms as the CCF.
When dealing with Social Credit, however, the same tactics would not hold. Aberhart
may have stressed a radical solution to the Depression but its basis was in preserving
ideas of individual responsibility, action, and initiative. As far as the Liberals were
concerned, it was Social Credit, not the CCF, that was the party to beat in 1938.1119 The
Liberals spent most of the campaign focusing on discrediting Social Credit among the
province’s individualist conservatives. 1120 Liberal propaganda, for example, challenged
Aberhart’s arguments that Social Credit theories protected individual interests. Whereas
Patterson’s debt program protected individual rights through negotiation, Liberal
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propaganda noted, Aberhart sought “compulsion.”1121 Not only did Aberhart introduce a
controversial seven percent tax on all farm produce in Alberta, but his “Crack-Pot
Theories” meant that Saskatchewan’s farmers “would be bled in the effort to make his
weird and incomprehensible theories work in Alberta.”1122 Aberhart, in short, had three
years to make Social Credit theory operable and failed. The Liberals, on the other hand,
offered a “sane” and proven administration that protected people’s individual rights while
ameliorating the worst effects of the crisis.1123
The Liberals deftly used Aberhart’s struggle with the structures of federalism to
characterize the entire Social Credit movement as undemocratic, totalitarian, and contrary
to individualist values. The election was not a fight between political parties, the Liberals
maintained, but a referendum on the very future of the Canadian dominion: “The Liberal
party remains the last bastion buttress of Canadian unity against the sinister forces from
outside the province which seek to undermine and wreck national solidarity. For
Canadian unity is the issue.” In this vein, the Supreme Court was not a tool of the
“interests,” as Aberhart would have it, but existed as the “last bulwark of the liberty of
our people” in defiance of a would-be dictator.1124 Similarly, Liberal speakers depicted
Social Credit’s “invasion” as just that—an assault by a hostile force intent on destroying
the fabric of Saskatchewan society. “Clearly,” they argued, “Mr. Aberhart assumes that,
given a subservient government in Regina, he can treat this province as a ‘puppet-state’
on the Japanese model. Saskatchewan, if Alberta wins, appears destined to become an
Albertan ‘Manchoukuo[sic]’.”1125 This same message was central in the series of
political cartoons published in the Leader-Post throughout the campaign. One depicted

1121

SAB, F65, Gardiner, X.II.66, “Social Credit in Alberta (1938).”

1122

SAB, F65, Gardiner, X.II.73, “Aberhart Wants Another Year to Make Good (1938);” SAB, F65,
Gardiner, X.II.59, “Aberhart Says (1938).”
1123

SAB, F65, Gardiner, X.II.73, “Aberhart Wants Another Year to Make Good (1938).”

1124

Leader-Post, 19 May, 1938.

1125

“Election Forum,” Leader-Post, 2 June, 1938.

297

Aberhart closing Saskatchewan’s legislature for “removal to Edmonton” as a shocked
“citizen” looks on. Aberhart proclaimed that he was standing up for individual rights, but
the reality of a Social Credit administration meant dictatorship and the loss of all political
rights for the people.
Figure 11 - “Dark Days at Regina.”1126

Patterson’s strategy to focus on Aberhart ensured the party’s victory. Only the Liberals,
with fifty-two candidates, and the Social Credit’s forty nominees had a realistic
possibility of securing a majority. The CCF, in contrast, contested thirty-one seats, while
the Conservatives, relegated as the junior partner in their alliance with the CCF, only ran
twenty-four candidates. Patterson’s focus on Aberhart, therefore, neutralized the
Liberals’ main opponent. The only other realistic threat to Patterson rested in an
opposition coalition. The Liberals spent the last days of the campaign attacking such a
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prospect. A coalition of Conservatives, the CCF, and Social Credit, they argued, would
be an unworkable mess. Liberal propaganda depicted such a situation as a form of
“Mulligan stew,” where a combination of “Social ‘No Credit’ Juice, CCF socialism, and
Tory syrup” meant chaos for the province.1127 “A government composed of groups,”
they informed the electorate, “has been a failure whenever and wherever tried.”1128 The
Liberals had secured the support of individualist conservatives. Patterson was able to
ensure a Liberal victory by appealing to moderate voters who feared the prospect of
another coalition government.
Table 4 - Election Results, 19381129
Party
# of Candidates
Liberal
53
CCF
31
Social Credit
40
Conservative
24
Unity
3
Other
9

Votes Cast
200,334
82,529
70,084
52,315
9,848
25,632

% of Vote
45
19
16
12
2
6

# of Seats % of Seats
38
73
10
20
2
4
2
4
0
0

The Liberal victory was not as large as that of 1934, but it constituted a dramatic win for
Patterson’s conservative approach to the Depression. The Liberals secured forty-five
percent of the vote and thirty-eight seats. The CCF placed second, with nineteen percent
of the vote and ten seats. Patterson’s efforts to disarm Social Credit were vindicated, as
Aberhart only secured two seats with sixteen percent of the vote. It was a disaster for the
Conservatives who received twelve percent of the vote and failed to elect a single
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candidate. The majority of the electorate may have voted for an opposition candidate, but
the Liberals secured a healthy mandate with seventy-three percent of the seats.
Not all observers view the results as a Liberal victory. Had it not been for Social Credit
stealing reform-minded voters from the CCF, John Conway argues, Patterson’s
government was doomed in 1938. Conway bases his assertion on the success of the two
Unity candidates—those who were nominated by joint resolutions of the Conservatives,
CCF, and Social Credit—in Bengough and Yorkton.1130 This approach, however,
assumes that votes for opposition candidates were easily transferable; it ignores
individualism’s continued power to motivate voters. Co-operation between opposition
parties may have been the favoured tactic of reform-minded voters, but the very act of cooperation divided the electorate. The Conservative vote in 1938, for example, was half of
that of 1934. Some of these votes went to the CCF and Social Credit but many
Conservatives followed Johnstone’s lead in abandoning the party. Diefenbaker noted
that Conservatives flocked in the “thousands” to the “Liberal candidates in order to make
sure of the outcome.”1131 Likewise, the CCF downplayed the radicalism of its socialist
program, but a clear majority of voters were not prepared to trust a “socialist”
government with power. The Liberals fought the election on the protection of
Saskatchewan’s freedoms. Far from mere “hysteria” and a “fear campaign,” as J.F.
Conway maintains, it was a calculated plan to appeal directly to the broad segment of
Saskatchewan’s population that remained steadfast in their individualist ideology.1132
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Figure 12 - Election Map, 1938

This message was most effective in areas of the province that had proven receptive to
individualist appeals in the past. The Liberals dominated the south and central regions.
Not only were these areas traditionally home to the larger and more independent-minded
farmers, they were also, since the onset of the Depression, fertile grounds for
Saskatchewan’s conservative religious groups. The CCF, in contrast, did not win a single
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seat south of the Qu’Appelle River.1133 Academics attribute these results to the fact that
CCF and Social Credit support was higher in the portions of the province that had the
best harvests in 1937.1134 As was the case in 1934, the argument is that higher income
afforded farmers the opportunity to take a risk on untried economic policies. The
Liberals’ electoral appeal, they allege, relied on poorer farmers who were more interested
in “perpetuating relief” than solving the Depression.1135 This economic determinism,
however, fails to consider the power of an individualist message. Far from merely
campaigning on continued relief, the Liberals offered hope to thousands of electors who
believed that the Depression was solvable through individual effort and responsibility.
The southern portions of the province were the hardest hit during the Depression, but
they were also the regions where ethnic background, religious beliefs, and political
traditions proved most receptive to the individualist message.
The Depression altered Saskatchewan’s political trajectory. The Anderson government
entered office on the eve of the catastrophe with a platform designed to appeal to
Saskatchewan’s conservative farmers and British nativists. The first year of Anderson’s
single term reflected his government’s focus on solidifying this base. As crop failures,
unemployment, and relief became widespread, however, the priorities of the electorate
shifted from questions of separate schools and government patronage, towards tackling
the problem of rising indebtedness and foreclosures. Anderson attempted to mitigate the
worst effects of the Depression but to little avail. While any government that had the
misfortune of governing during the Depression faced a hard fight to retain office, the
Anderson coalition, attacked from all sides, was especially susceptible. Not only did
Anderson have to deal with the “True Blues,” who considered his government the
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antithesis of conservative values, but the Liberals ran an effective campaign criticizing
his “mismanagement’ of the catastrophe. At the same time, Anderson was a victim of the
“new” politics in Saskatchewan. The emergence of the CCF and its calls for an
abandonment of “unbridled individualism” left little room for two parties that, although
differing on tactics, agreed when it came to the principal role of the individual within
society.
The 1934 election began the realignment of Saskatchewan’s political parties along this
new divide between individualism and collectivism. On the one hand, the CCF
championed a radical reinterpretation of the role of capitalism, the state, and individual
citizens. Faced with the growing popularity of the new party, both the Liberals and the
Conservatives shifted their platforms and rhetoric during the 1934 election to emphasize
their reformist credentials and undermine CCF support. At the same time, both parties
also sought to galvanize conservative individualists by stressing the threat posed to
individual freedoms by the CCF’s “lend-lease” program and socialist philosophy. As
much as the election was a referendum on Anderson’s handling of the Depression, it also
served as a dividing line between individualism and collectivism. The rhetoric employed
by all political parties created, in the minds of the electors at least, a dichotomy between
these two solitudes.
Returned to office, the Liberals governed on traditional ideas of individual responsibility
and limited government intervention into the economy. Patterson championed a society
based on the sanctity of contracts and individual responsibility. The CCF began the
process of moderating its socialist policies, but it continued to stand for collectivism and
direct government action. The Conservatives, for their part, responded to their dramatic
defeat in 1934 by moving their platform in a radical direction in the hopes of
undermining opposition support for the CCF. If it had not been for Social Credit’s
“invasion,” the 1938 election could very well have been fought between the Liberals’
individualist ideals and a united opposition advocating for dramatically increased
government intervention and a reinterpretation of individual responsibilities. As much as
Aberhart called for government action in regulating the economy, his motivations were
closer to those of Patterson than Williams. Aberhart sought economic security as a
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precursor to encourage the individual’s ability to make their own personal relationship
with God.
The 1938 election completed the realignment begun in 1934. The Liberals secured a
comfortable majority in the Legislature while Social Credit, vying for the individualistreformist vote, won only two seats. It was the Liberals, not Social Credit, that emerged
as the direct champions of the individualist voter. “An invasion from an adjoining
province has been repelled,” Patterson jubilantly declared, “and a sane, business-like,
constructive program has been chosen in preference to theoretical and theatrical
proposals, advocated by various opposition groups.”1136 Likewise, the Conservative
strategy of moving to the left to stay relevant proved disastrous as they failed to win a
single seat for the second election in a row. Kyba argues that it was the alliance with the
CCF that doomed the party to obscurity.1137 The fact that the Conservatives were
relegated into the role of junior partner certainly damaged their reputation, but it was not
just the alliance that caused the Conservative defeat. The Conservatives were the victims
of the realignment of Saskatchewan politics. Diefenbaker sought, and failed, to steal the
CCF’s reformist vote. It would take almost forty years until the Conservatives were a
viable electoral option in Saskatchewan. It was the CCF who most benefited from this
realignment. Having doubled their representation in the Legislature, the CCF emerged as
the undisputed opposition to the Liberals’ individualist approach.
The Depression polarized Saskatchewan politics. The CCF’s rise provides dramatic
evidence of a growing radicalism among the electorate but it does not tell the whole
story. For every person who abandoned individualist ideals in favour of the Social
Gospel’s promise of a New Jerusalem, there were others who, despite unprecedented
hardship, remained closely aligned with an individualist society. With the Conservatives
and Social Credit discredited, the stage was set for a direct contest between these two
ideologies.
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7

1944: The Defeat

Saskatchewan’s political polarization was on full display in the 1944 election. In 1938,
Patterson’s appeals to a conservative individualism successfully undermined the CCF’s
newfound moderation and repelled Social Credit’s “invasion.” The Liberals were
confident that a similar approach would work in 1944 as well. Patterson was adamant
that his conservative approach to the Great Depression had ensured the province
remained solvent throughout the crisis. Debt and low commodity prices remained an
issue, but Saskatchewan had emerged from the dark days of the Depression. These
appeals, however, failed to resonate with the electorate. Since 1936, Williams had
moderated the CCF’s socialist policies and rhetoric. Tommy Douglas accelerated this
process after he replaced Williams in 1942. Unlike Williams, who remained a committed
socialist, Douglas’ politics stemmed from his religious background and internalization of
the social gospel’s calls for the creation of a more just society.1138 Williams’ previous
support for an unrestrained socialism allowed Patterson to characterize the entire CCF as
a direct threat to the people’s individualism. Douglas, in contrast, framed his message
around the possibility of creating a more equitable post-war society where government
planning and co-operation would ameliorate the injustices caused by unrestrained
capitalism.
The election was a disaster for Patterson. The Liberals’ share of the popular vote fell
from forty-five percent in 1938 to thirty-five percent in 1944 and Saskatchewan’s
“natural governing party” only managed to elect five candidates to the CCF’s fortyseven. Even these victories were close-fought affairs. Patterson retained his seat, but
only six votes separated him from the CCF challenger. As the Leader-Post lamented, the
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magnitude of the defeat constituted “one of the sharpest upsets in the history of Canadian
politics.”1139 The Liberals would not return to office for twenty years.
The causes of the downfall have been of considerable interest to historians. There is a
general understanding that the 1944 election results were the product of a widespread
desire for “meaningful change” among the voting public.1140 The country emerged from
the Great Depression only to face the Second World War. Patterson’s conservative
approach to the Depression had resisted calls for intervention into the capitalist market.
Wartime experiences, however, demonstrated that the government could successfully
take an active role in managing the capitalist system. “Government had moved boldly to
prosecute the war,” Thomas and Ian McLeod argue, and “voters reasoned that
government could also manage economic and social affairs to produce a better and more
secure life for all.”1141 The CCF capitalized on this reformist sentiment.
The CCF’s 1944 victory was also the product of Patterson’s misreading of the political
situation. “The colorful campaign of 1944,” Lewis Thomas argues, “seems to prove the
adage that governments are never defeated by the opposition, but instead commit
suicide.”1142 All governments were forced to contend with the CCF’s growing popularity
and its calls for post-war planning. The federal CCF reached its apogee in September
1943 when it placed first among federal parties in a Gallup Poll. The King Liberals and
the federal Conservatives responded by implementing plans for increased social welfare
and labour regulations. As J.L. Granatstein argues, “Social Welfare legislation,
fundamentally conservative in intent, could help dampen down this unrest; it could
cushion the shocks of peace; it could help re-elect the Liberal Party and thus maintain the
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free-enterprise economy against the assaults of the left.”1143

Patterson, however,

retained his fiscal conservatism and opposed any dramatic changes to the government’s
role in the economy or increases to social welfare. Whereas the King Liberals co-opted
much of the CCF’s platform, Patterson retained his earlier tactics and spent the 1944
election portraying the CCF as a socialist threat to personal freedoms. According to
Robert Wardhaugh, “the federal party moved to steal the CCF thunder,” but “the
Saskatchewan Liberals stood in opposition, and there they would remain for many
years.”1144 Even Prime Minister Mackenzie King considered Patterson’s leadership
“heavy” and “lethargic.”1145 These explanations, however, do not explain why Patterson
was so seemingly out of touch in 1944 when he had successfully managed the political
situation in 1938.
This chapter examines Liberal and Conservative tactics during Saskatchewan’s 1944
provincial election. The Depression polarized Saskatchewan politics between
collectivism and individualism. Patterson responded to the CCF and Aberhart’s 1938
“invasion” by positioning the Liberals as the defender of personal freedoms and
Saskatchewan’s individualist tradition. He continued this approach in 1944. Patterson
was ideologically ill-disposed to follow the federal Liberals’ lead in co-opting the CCF’s
reform program. The Premier did not oppose moderate reforms but his primary concern
lay in protecting the people’s self-reliance. Rather than move to the left to undermine the
CCF, Patterson retrenched his defence of “individualism” that had succeeded in 1938.
The Conservatives, in contrast, were more pragmatic. Diefenbaker’s co-operation with
the CCF in 1938 was a disaster. The party failed to elect a single candidate and, after
Diefenbaker entered the House of Commons in 1940, the party announced that it would
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not engage in “partisan politics” for the duration of the war.1146 It was not until the eve
of the 1944 election that the Conservatives began to show signs of life. The party
formally adopted a new name, the Progressive Conservative Party of Saskatchewan (PC),
elected a new leader, and formulated a progressive platform that called for increases to
the welfare state.1147 The PCs had learned from Diefenbaker’s ill-fated co-operation with
the CCF and stressed their adherence to individualist values throughout the campaign.
Both the Liberals and the Conservatives spent the campaign attacking the CCF as a
communist threat to Saskatchewan’s individualist traditions. Historians disregard these
attacks as simple “redbaiting.”1148 Bill Waiser, for example, contends that such tactics
were the “defensive posturing” of “poorly organized” parties “bereft of any inspirational
policies.”1149 Such dismissals, however, downplay the support that these attacks
continued to receive from the electorate. It is clear in hindsight that the Liberals and PCs
underestimated the CCF’s strength, but the fact that they retained support of a sizeable
portion of the electorate demonstrates the continued appeal of conservativism even with
the CCFs dramatic landslide.
Patterson maintained his conservative approach throughout his second term in office.
The Premier responded to the Depression by adopting policies that maintained the
sanctity of contracts and the people’s self-reliance. Patterson characterized this as an
“Orthodox” approach, “based on the sound business practices” of “smaller
businesses.”1150 Nor did he change tactics when economic prosperity returned during
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the war. In 1940 and 1942, Saskatchewan farmers produced record wheat crops.
Increased wartime demands for foodstuffs also prompted the province’s producers to
diversify their operations away from their previous reliance on “king wheat.”1151 This
prosperity, however, hid the Depression’s lingering effects on the province’s farmers.
According to John Archer, a decade of depression and drought left Saskatchewan with
“an economy that was nearly bankrupt, an agricultural plant that was almost derelict,
[and] a countryside that was scorched and scarred.”1152 Saskatchewan’s brief to the
Rowell-Sirois Commission, for example, noted that the province’s farmers lacked 200
million dollars’ worth of equipment, supplies, and replacements.1153
The central political question of Patterson’s second term centered on how to approach
this prosperity to best rehabilitate Saskatchewan’s farms. The UFC(SS), the Wheat Pool,
and the CCF, urged Patterson to forgive the debt owed to the province by farmers.
“Revision of the entire farm debt structure,” the CCF argued, “must take place without
further delay if the West is to survive within an agricultural economy.”1154 Patterson
characterized these calls as a “whispering campaign” prompting farmers “not to pay their
debts.”1155 The Premier argued that forgiving this debt would undermine self-reliance.
Saskatchewan, he argued, “has always taken the attitude that the responsibility rests with
the person who took seed grain advances.” The only “100 percent solution “would be for
every individual to pay what he owes.”1156 Not all Liberals agreed. Several
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backbenchers argued that the Premier’s approach made “the government appear a
heartless creditor” and “lent assurance to the CCF’s depiction of the Liberals as tightfisted, rigid, and unimaginative.”1157 Patterson’s stance had his cabinet’s full backing,
but the approaching 1944 election forced a compromise. The government reduced relief
debts by forty percent, but Patterson refused any discussion of forgiving it entirely.1158
Patterson’s conservativism was also evident in his government’s approach to post-war
reconstruction. The Premier was deeply concerned that wartime regimentation and
government intervention would undermine the people’s self-reliance. As the war
progressed, Patterson increasingly spoke of the need to ensure that “the value and
importance of individual effort and ability is not lost.”1159 Saskatchewan’s brief to the
House of Commons’ Special Committee on Economic and Social Problems reflected this
apprehension. Patterson advocated for increased healthcare and expanded social services
but cautioned that government aid should be limited to “those unable by their own efforts
to provide security for themselves or their families.”1160 Patterson understood that the
CCF was gaining support and was willing to combat this with provisions for increased
social welfare, but he was unwilling to adopt positions that undermined people’s selfreliance.
Patterson’s policy of moderate reform and defence of individualist values was central to
the Liberal’s election manifesto. The Liberals promised voters an “efficient and
economical administration.” The party advocated for increased social services, including
health insurance, old age pensions, mothers’ allowances, increased education spending,
rural electrification, and highway construction, but these programs would come through
“orderly progress.” A policy of “prudence and economy” would guide all spending
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decisions. Patterson was also clear that his government would continue to promote selfreliance. Liberals limited debt relief to only those farmers who were “unable to meet
their obligations by reason of…causes beyond their control.” Patterson had little
sympathy for those who refused to honour their debts. Only by adopting “care and
prudence,” he argued, could the government protect the people’s wellbeing. The
government would not forgive farmers’ debts, but it would provide “markets at profitable
prices,” “protections against the hazards of nature,” and, most importantly, “independent
ownership and operations of farms.”1161 The Liberals intended their plan to resonate
with Saskatchewan’s conservatives who retained their affinity for individualist values.
Patterson’s policy of “care and prudence” placed the Liberals in direct contrast with the
CCF. The CCF had abandoned its radical agricultural policies—namely its “use-lease”
plan—but its continued adherence to a “co-operative commonwealth” called for a
dramatic increase in the role of the state and “planned development.”1162 The CCF
promised a wide-ranging system of “farm security” that did not make distinctions based
on an individual farmer’s ability to pay. The CCF vowed to end all “foreclosures on and
evictions from the farm home” and to impose a “debt moratorium to force the loan and
mortgage companies to reduce debts.” The platform also called for “urban security” by
supporting “union organization,” “compulsory” collective bargaining, and raises to the
minimum wage. Unlike the Liberals, the CCF promised to immediately increase social
services regardless of the cost. Funds for this program would come from the benefits of a
planned economy and by keeping the people’s wealth “within the province.” Natural
resources, they argued, would serve the “public benefit,” not that of “promoters,
investors, and absentee capitalists.” The CCF’s manifesto was equally adamant that the
party stood for a reinterpretation of the capitalist system. A “planned economy,” they
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argued, would replace “capitalism and the profit system by community ownership for the
common good.” The manifesto concluded by pledging a CCF government to use the
“powers” of office to “carry the Province as far as possible forward to the realization of
the aim set out in the Regina Manifesto.”1163 The CCF had clearly moved away from the
socialist bent of its use-lease plan, but its collectivist and co-operative program was in
direct contrast with Patterson’s defence of self-reliance and individualism.
The Saskatchewan Liberals did not see these differences as a weakness. Far from lacking
“any inspirational policies” as some historians allege, the Liberals designed their
pragmatic and cautious approach specifically to resonate with conservatives. These
policies, they argued, had successfully guided the people through the Depression by
maintaining “the largest measure of democratic freedom.”1164 The CCF, in contrast, was
promising an untested program that threatened the people’s individualism. “There are
some people who do not think very seriously,” Patterson argued in early 1944, “who are
attracted by promises for the future, forgetting that much of what the promises made for
the future amount to depends upon the measure of services given in the past.”1165 The
Leader-Post reported throughout the campaign that over half of the province’s farmers
were debt free because of Patterson’s debt plan.1166 Patterson went to the polls confident
that his proven record and defence of individual freedoms would be enough to win the
election.
The 1944 election, however, was not fought on the parties’ platforms alone. Patterson
was the victim of farmers’ anger towards federal Liberal agricultural policies. Since
1935, the Canadian Wheat Board had operated as a voluntary selling agency with a fixed
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price in tandem with the private grain trade, which operated on market prices. Farmers
delivered to the board when market prices dropped below the board’s fixed price. When
market prices increased, farmers delivered to the private grain trade. The federal
government was setting a minimum price for wheat. The board’s floor price, not tariff or
marketing reforms, became the primary political concern for farmers’ organizations.
According to J.E. Rea, Ottawa’s assumption of responsibility for minimum prices
transformed farmers into “clients of the government.”1167 In 1940, the board set its initial
price at 70 cents per bushel, well below the one-dollar farmers held as their break-even
cost. Farmers’ organizations responded with “a March on Ottawa” in early 1942,
presenting a petition signed by 185,000 farmers demanding “parity prices for all
agricultural products.”1168 The King government raised the price to ninety cents, but
farmers’ frustration was apparent.
Saskatchewan farmers became increasingly hostile to the King Liberals throughout the
war. The Prairies was producing record wheat crops by 1941 but the Nazi takeover of
Europe closed Canada’s traditional markets. As surpluses mounted, Ottawa restricted the
size and time of deliveries to the board and began issuing “acreage payments” to farmers
who switched crops or left their lands fallow. Prairie farmers, Wardhaugh notes, widely
considered these moves as keeping them “from entering real prosperity.”1169 Even W.R.
Motherwell condemned the King government for “grinding us down to privation.”1170
The polls reflected this sentiment. The Liberals lost both federal by-elections held in
Saskatchewan during the war. Patterson was a passive victim of this anger. King relied
on Jimmy Gardiner, his “prairie lieutenant,” and Thomas Crerar from Manitoba to inform
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his government’s agricultural policies.1171 Patterson was rarely, if ever, asked for his
opinion but his close association with Gardiner allowed the opposition to portray the
Minister of Agriculture as the real power behind the Saskatchewan government.
Patterson, they argued, had “been chosen to hold the fort for Jimmy Gardiner and not to
offer ideas of his own.”1172 The 1944 election proved to be an opportunity for the
farmers to air their frustrations with the federal Liberals.
Patterson’s defeat was also the product of his own political blunders. In what he later
characterized as “the one serious mistake” he made in office, Patterson decided to extend
the life of the Legislature beyond its legally prescribed limit.1173 Saskatchewan’s
election laws required the Premier to call an election sometime in the summer of 1943.
The prospect of holding a wartime election, however, troubled many lawmakers who
believed the election would pose a distraction and use valuable funds that could go
towards funding the war effort. In April 1943, A.C. Stewart, Unity MLA for Yorkton,
proposed to delay the election for a year. “The holding of an election this year would be
a waste of the people’s time,” he explained. “It would entail the expense of printing,
burning up gasoline and rubber, distract from the war effort and stir up bitterness and
strife throughout the province.”1174 Patterson did not sponsor the bill, but he believed
that the measure would “accelerate the winning of the war” and supported it as a “private
member.”1175 The Premier was not alone. The entire Liberal caucus and the legislature’s
two Unity and two Social Credit MLAs voted for an extension. Only the CCF remained
opposed.
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In the bitter debate that followed, both sides portrayed the other as undemocratic. The
CCF refused to accept that a wartime election was inherently distracting. “If ever there
was a time when we should take democracy seriously,” they noted, “it is now. There are
many parents who will not appreciate that their sons offer to make sacrifices and [they]
are being refused the right to elect a government of their choosing.”1176 Instead of a
necessary war measure, the CCF used the extension to portray the Liberals as afraid of
facing the electorate. “The Liberal arguments,” a CCF MLA intoned, “are like a
drowning man grasping at a straw.”1177 Supporters of the measure, in contrast,
maintained that the CCF was “more concerned about party and votes than they are about
winning the war.” Their opposition demonstrated that the CCF constituted “a disease of
the mind” that “spreads quickly among those who are down-in-the-mouth.”1178 The
public, for its part, seemed apathetic on the question. The CCF were forced to cancel a
planned protest after they only received one letter supporting such a move.1179
Patterson’s mistake was not in misreading the public mood for an election in 1943 (which
was clearly low), but for believing that the CCF’s opposition to the motion weakened
them. 1180 Since the beginning of the war, both the Liberals and the PCs had neglected
party organization.1181 The CCF, however, continued to organize. Delaying the election
only provided them more time to build their organization. As John Archer explains, “the
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CCF had a further year to organize—a further year to taunt the Liberals with avoiding the
contest.”1182
The extension also gave the CCF breathing room from earlier controversies. Canada’s
declaration of war divided the party. J.S. Woodsworth, national leader since the party’s
inception, considered capitalist greed the cause of all war and refused to support the
present conflict.1183 Williams, in contrast, abhorred war, but believed that force was
necessary to counter the fascist threat.1184 Canada’s decision to follow Great Britain into
war in 1939 threatened to fragment the CCF. Woodsworth, supported by British
Columbia, Manitoba, and factions within the Ontario party, opposed the war, while
Williams, backed by Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia, argued for full
participation up to and including an expeditionary force. Fearing the effects this division
could have on the party, both sides agreed to a compromise wherein the CCF would only
approve of Canada providing economic aid to the Allies. Williams, however, continued
to push for a policy of total war, ultimately deciding to enlist and serve overseas. 1185
According to Conway, William’s “principled stand on fighting the war against fascism”
meant that he “had to set an example and do his part.”1186 His actions had the added
benefit of undermining Patterson’s attempts to portray the CCF as unpatriotic. If
Patterson hoped to use the extension debate to embarrass the CCF, he had to contend with
Williams’ willingness to serve overseas and the Saskatchewan CCF’s support for total
war.

1182

John H. Archer, Saskatchewan, 258.

1183

Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1959), 298-303.
1184

Conway, The Prairie Populist, 179.

1185

Conway, The Prairie Populist, 169-80; McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, 305-13.

1186

Conway, The Prairie Populist, 194.

316

This extension allowed the CCF time to overcome the internal divisions surrounding
Williams’ departure. Serving overseas, Williams was unable to defend his leadership
from mounting attacks. Disgruntled members, including Tommy Douglas and Major
Coldwell, characterized Williams as “dictatorial and controlling” and refused to forgive
him for his split with Woodsworth. Williams’ popularity among Saskatchewan’s rankand-file membership disarmed these attacks, but his departure allowed his opponents to
attack him with impunity. Douglas replaced Williams as leader in 1942.1187
Patterson was aware of the divisions within the CCF but he did not take advantage. An
election in early 1942 would have pitted the Liberals against a CCF in disarray, beset by
internal divisions and a leader posted overseas. Even a 1943 election favoured the
Liberals as Douglas had yet to consolidate his leadership.1188 By 1944, however,
Douglas was the established leader and the CCF had spent the past two years organizing
for the coming contest and establishing local organizations that rivalled the Liberal
machine. The CCF under Douglas’ command increased the circulation of its newspaper,
The Saskatchewan Commonwealth, expanded party membership, and formed a protocabinet and policy committees in anticipation of winning office.1189 The extension also
provided Douglas with time to formulate an election strategy that articulated a detailed
vision for post-war society. Delaying the election did not benefit the Liberals, but it did
serve CCF interests.
The delayed election also gave the PCs time to reorganize. The Conservative Party was
the victim of Saskatchewan’s political realignment during the Great Depression.
Diefenbaker responded to Anderson’s 1934 defeat by rejecting the party’s earlier
association with the province’s conservative individualist ideology. Diefenbaker
formalized a co-operative agreement with the CCF to avoid splitting the “progressive”

1187

Conway provides a detailed discussion of this internal leadership struggle. Conway, The Prairie
Populist, 184-98.
1188

Archer, Saskatchewan, 258.

1189

McLeod and McLeod, Tommy Douglas, 104.

317

vote. Even with this agreement they did not manage to elect a single candidate in 1938.
Diefenbaker stepped down as leader in 1940 following his election to the House of
Commons. Without effective leadership or representation in the legislature, the
Conservatives were moribund for much of the war. Their federal counterparts did not
fare much better. Robert Manion, Bennett’s replacement as leader in 1938, contested the
1940 federal election as a “national unity” government akin to Borden’s Union
Government during the First World War. The plan failed to resonate with voters as
Manion elected forty candidates to the Liberal’s 179. The Conservative Party replaced
Manion with Arthur Meighan in 1941, but the former Prime Minister failed in his
attempts to win a seat. The party “was in desperate need of remaking itself.”1190 In
1942, the Conservatives adopted a new platform that contained provisions for increased
unemployment insurance, low-cost housing, and collective bargaining. They also
selected John Bracken, Premier of Manitoba’s coalition government, to lead the party.
Bracken’s progressive focus lent itself to the party’s updated platform and delegates
voted to change the party’s name to the Progressive Conservative Party as a sign of the
party’s new focus. 1191
Bracken’s progressive focus inspired the Saskatchewan party. Reconstructed on the eve
of the 1944 election, the Saskatchewan PC Party adopted a centrist position between the
CCF’s collectivism and Patterson’s conservativism. The party tasked Rupert Ramsay, a
professor in the Agricultural Extension Department at the University of Saskatchewan, as
leader. Described as a “sincere” and “decent” man with “few enemies,” the PCs hoped
that Ramsay’s background in agriculture would win for the party the province’s farmers
who rejected the CCF but were upset with King’s wartime policies.1192 The PCs’
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platform also reflected the national Conservative’s progressive emphasis under Bracken.
The party’s election manifesto contained provisions for vocational training and cooperation with the federal government to implement low-cost rehabilitation loans, “free
education” for all children, and state-funded healthcare for all citizens regardless of
income.1193 Ramsay was confident that the program placed the party as a moderate
option between the CCF and the Liberals. It avoided the CCF’s collectivism by retaining
the voter’s “freedom” and “rights as an individual.” 1194 Ramsay was clear that his party
would protect people’s individualism and maintained that the party’s platform gave “the
people of Saskatchewan a chance to work out their own salvation in their own way.”1195
At the same time, Ramsay also sought to differentiate the PCs from the Patterson Liberals
who he characterized as reactionary. Ramsay promised that a PC government would
adopt a reform package “based on sound principles.”1196
The Liberals’ decision to delay the election allowed the PCs to rebuild their party as an
alternative option for Saskatchewan’s conservative voters. Ramsay shared Patterson’s
concern that the war was undermining individual freedoms. It was one thing to have “a
certain amount of regimentation” during the war, he reasoned, but once the war was over
he was confident that the people did not “want to be pushed around by an army of
government officials more than is necessary.”1197 Ramsay’s attacks on the CCF also
mirrored the Premier’s defence of individual freedoms. Ramsay was clear that the PCs
opposed the “regimentation and restriction of socialism.”1198 The people, he argued, had
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not abandoned their individualism. The CCF, therefore, would require “the use of force”
to implement its program. A CCF victory would mean “running Canada army style.”1199
Despite Ramsay’s best efforts the PCs did not have a realistic chance in forming
government. The party had neglected its organizational work for the course of the war,
continued to struggle for funds, and was still reeling from internal divisions left over
from the Depression. As Spencer concedes, “all eyes were on the sizzling Liberal-CCF
two-party contest.”1200 However, the reorganized PCs did have the potential to steal
support from the Liberals. The party learnt a valuable lesson from their disastrous cooperation with the CCF in 1938 and Ramsay contested as many constituencies as
possible. It is a testament to Ramsay’s popularity that, although the party had only
reorganized in February 1944, it had thirty-nine candidates in place by June. Patterson
did not lose the election because of vote splitting with Ramsay, but the PCs did manage
to steal enough votes to increase the magnitude of the Liberal’s defeat.1201
Patterson shared Ramsay’s anti-CCF stance. Throughout the campaign, Liberals
portrayed the CCF’s vision of a “co-operative commonwealth” as a dangerous
experiment in state control. The CCF’s “ideal form of State,” a pamphlet declared, could
“be had only at the expense of personal rights and freedoms.” 1202 By relying on the state
to solve society’s problems, the CCF also undermined personal initiative and drive. “The
incompetent who infests the whole district with weeds,” the Leader-Post editorialized,
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“would be kept there as a pest; the dishonest and chiseler would be maintained to prey
upon his neighbors; the waster and the dissolute would be enabled to squander the
country’s resources.”1203 Patterson was clear that only “the preservation of democratic
and individual freedom” would ensure Saskatchewan’s success going forward.1204
A central element in the Liberal campaign strategy lay in convincing the electorate that
the CCF in 1944 constituted the same socialist threat as the FLG had a decade earlier.
The Liberals republished the FLG’s 1933 handbook “in order that everyone may
understand the C.C.F. Socialist plans.”1205 The fact that the CCF disavowed the
handbook in 1936 made little difference. Liberal propaganda also frequently referenced
M.J. Coldwell’s 1943 Maclean’s interview where the national CCF leader stated that the
Regina Manifesto “was and remains a statement of the basic principles of the CCF.”1206
Use-lease was gone, but the CCF’s vision of a co-operative commonwealth posed a
similar danger. The people, Patterson concluded, “don’t want to be socialized…and
while the C.C.F. has to some extent dropped complete socialization of the land, the men
who 10 years ago believed the state should run the farms are still running the party.”1207
The election, according to the Liberals, was a struggle between freedom and compulsion.
It was up to the people to “decide if they wished to be self-reliant and self established
under free enterprise with proper rights and safeguards or depend upon the state under
state control and regimentation.”1208
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socialists[sic] communal sharing plan out of this province,” the Liberals would maintain
the people as their “own boss.”1209 It was within this same vein that Liberals attempted
to equate the CCF with the totalitarian regimes terrorizing Europe. Socialism, Gardiner
argued during a campaign stop in support of Patterson, would “lead on to dictatorship.
Under dictatorship you are either for them or against them, and if you are against them
you will be taken out and lined up against a brick wall.”1210 The message was clear. The
Liberals stood for the forces of freedom, but the CCF represented strife, dictatorship, and
a fundamental threat to Saskatchewan’s security.
In portraying the CCF as a socialist threat, the Liberals were goading the CCF into
defending its early program. Douglas, however, would not take the bait. The CCF leader
realized that the CCF remained susceptible to attacks on its early socialism and refused to
engage with the Liberals. Instead, Douglas framed the election as a referendum on the
type of society Saskatchewan would have after the war. The CCF’s campaign material
painted the election as a stark choice. “You are either voting to go back to the old ‘dog
eat dog’ system,” Douglas argued, “or to go forward to build a new society based on
human needs.”1211 The CCF had learned from its previous mistakes. Rather than open
the party to attack by debating the nature of the party’s “socialism,” the CCF offered a
positive message that promised voters a better life than the one they had during ten years
of depression and five years of war.
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Figure 13 – “When They Come Back”1212

For the Liberal’s strategy to succeed, they had to convince the voters that Douglas was
disingenuous in this moderation. Liberal propaganda portrayed Douglas as a man torn
between the promises necessary to win over Saskatchewan voters and the party’s
dogmatic socialism. The Liberals tacitly accepted that Douglas was a moderate, but they
hoped to convince the electorate that CCF extremists—including Harold Winch, the
“Fire-Eating” leader of the British Columbia CCF, and Clarence Gillis, an avowed trade
unionist and MP for Cape Breton—were the real power behind the CCF in Saskatchewan
and would push the province towards “revolution.”1213 In an oft-cited speech from early
1944, Winch declared that the CCF, if elected, would force its socialist program on
society: “If Capitalism says ‘No’ then we know the answer—so did Russia.” The fact
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that Winch and other “Robespierres of 1944” stumped for the CCF was more than
enough evidence for Liberals to conclude that the CCF stood for “dictatorship and
suppression of opponents.”1214 The electorate may have trusted Douglas, but the Liberals
urged them to consider if they trusted its radical leaders as well.
Figure 14 – “The Crying Towel” 1215
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The Liberals also recycled tactics from previous elections in their attempt to discredit the
CCF. The Liberals withstood Social Credit’s challenge by portraying it as a foreign
“invasion” intent on destroying the foundations of Canadian society. These
characterizations resonated with Saskatchewan’s conservative voters who otherwise did
not view Aberhart as a threat to individual freedoms. Patterson concluded that a similar
approach would have the same outcome when dealing with Douglas. Liberal propaganda
portrayed the CCF as an alien movement intent on parlaying a Saskatchewan victory into
the very destruction of Canadian society. “The question to be decided,” the Leader-Post
urged, “is whether or not Saskatchewan is to become a socialist state and whether or not
the ideological theory of socialism is to be given a start on the road to power in
Canada.”1216 This invasion theme was central to a series of articles written by Bruce
Hutchison, the noted Canadian author and journalist, that lampooned Coldwell as
“Generalissimo” and “Commander-in-Chief” of the “Saskatchewan invasion
headquarters,” leading socialist forces in an ineffective “Prairie Blitzkrieg.”1217
Liberal cartoons from both elections also carried a similar “invasion” imagery. In 1938,
the Liberals portrayed Aberhart as a swarm of locusts intent on destroying
Saskatchewan’s farmers. The same theme was present in 1944 but with the CCF
replacing Aberhart as the threat. These “extremists” had no connection to Saskatchewan,
and their background in organized labour left them with little understanding of
Saskatchewan. Their policies, if implemented, would “bring disaster to agriculture,” the
Liberals argued, “but, of course, that does not matter to the industrial labor overlords of
the C.C.F. socialist party.”1218 Patterson hoped that this invasion theme would have a
similar effect on the province’s conservative voters as it had in 1938. Just as they
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repulsed Aberhart’s attempts to use Saskatchewan as a pawn in his fights with Ottawa,
Patterson believed they would turn back the socialist invasion.
Figure 15 – “Stay in Your Own Backyard”1219

Figure 16 – “D-Day for the Socialist Storm-Troopers”1220
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It was a fatal mistake. Patterson was successful in 1938 because Aberhart’s authoritarian
control of Saskatchewan’s Social Credit Party convinced voters that he posed a direct
danger to their freedoms. To be successful in 1944, the Liberals had to convince the
voters that Douglas posed a similar threat. This strategy was doomed from the start. By
conceding that Douglas himself was a moderate, the Liberals undermined their own
attempts to characterize the party as a group of radicals. Douglas also refused to engage.
Even as Liberal speakers were portraying the CCF as a group of proto-Nazis, Douglas
stuck to his positive message. Patterson failed to convince enough voters that Douglas
himself was a danger to their freedoms.
Table 5 - Election Results, 19441221
Party
CCF
Liberal
Progressive Conservative

# of
Candidates
52
52
39

Votes
Cast
211,364
140,901
42,511

% of
Vote
53.13
35.42
10.69

# of
Seats
47
5
0

% of
Seats
90
10
-

The election was a complete rout for the Liberals. The CCF, backed by Douglas’
leadership and a vision for a better future, won forty-seven of the province’s fifty-two
seats with fifty-three percent of the vote.1222 This victory was the product of the CCF’s
sweep of Saskatchewan’s cities, which had previously been solidly Liberal, and
continued breakthroughs in rural regions, where fifty-eight percent voted for the CCF.1223
As the Leader-Post noted in the election’s post-mortem, “the result was decisive,”
leaving “no doubt that the electors want a change, no matter how drastic that change may
be.”1224
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Figure 17 - CCF Share of the Popular Vote, 19441225

CCF supporters certainly viewed it as a profound endorsement of their aims. “This,”
Coldwell remarked when returns began pouring in, “is sweet revenge.”1226 Patterson, for
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his part, was mystified by the election results as “there did not appear to be any criticism
of the public administration of the province.” The Liberals had “carefully administered”
the province’s “business” and “many of our former difficulties have been overcome or
greatly reduced.”1227 Even in defeat, Patterson failed to appreciate Douglas’ appeal.
Douglas transformed the election into a referendum on the type of society voters hoped
for after the war. It was clear that, when faced with this decision, most of the voters
trusted Douglas with shaping the province’s future.
The size of the Douglas’ victory, however, overshadowed deep divisions amongst
Saskatchewan voters. The CCF captured fifty-three percent of the vote, but their support
was not evenly divided. Douglas’ largest support came from the central-east
constituencies where the CCF received over sixty percent of the vote. Although the party
made inroads into the central farming districts in the south, especially around Douglas’
home in Weyburn, these contests were decidedly closer. The flatlands of Southern
Saskatchewan had long served as the main support for conservative ideologies. Not only
had the region provided the bulk support for the Organization Opposing Compulsory
Pool, the Orange Lodge, and the KKK, but the farming region also fostered Notre Dame
and BBI at the height of the Depression. Conservatives did not constitute the numbers
necessary to defeat the CCF, but Patterson and Ramsay’s appeals continued to resonate
with a significant minority of the voters.1228
Conservatives remained defiant in their defeat. Despite their best efforts, Henry
Hildebrand and Athol Murray could not stop the CCF’s rise to power. Neither man,
however, believed this outcome reflected a failure of their ministries. For Hildebrand,
corrupt societies naturally elected “socialist” parties. The CCF victory signaled a
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triumph for its modernist “false gospel.” The proper response to this outcome did not lay
in abandoning his non-partisan stance, but revolved around fortifying the morality of his
followers, lest they be lost “for eternity.”1229 Non-partisanship and a muted militancy
were necessary to build BBI’s ministry, but Hildebrand never intended his followers to
separate themselves entirely from the corrupted secular society. He urged his followers
to be on constant guard against the evils of modern society and the new “socialist”
government overstepping its bounds.

“Christians are loyal subjects of the

government,” Hildebrand reminded his listeners, “but when a government or institution
denies true Christian freedom then there’s the compulsion that governs each child of
God. ‘He must obey God rather than man.’”1230 If the actions of the government went
against the gospel, Christians were expected to make a stand for God.
Similarly, Murray considered the CCF victory as a sign that his work in creating a
leadership class was not complete. Although he was forbidden to act directly against the
CCF, Murray never ceased his agitation against socialism. In the lead up to the 1944
election, Murray wrote his friends about his fears that the CCF was becoming
“dangerously strong” and urged them to take a stand where he could not.1231 After the
election, Murray used Notre Dame’s classrooms and the pages of the school’s newspaper,
The Lacoon, to warn students about the dangers and threat that socialism and communism
posed to the province. Although the CCF gained the upper hand in 1944, Murray looked
forward to the day when a new generation of leaders would “liberate” Saskatchewan
from socialism.1232
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Patterson also continued his assault against the CCF’s collectivism until his retirement in
1949. From the opposition benches, Patterson harangued Douglas and the government
for what he viewed as the CCF’s “complete, intensive, [and] unscrupulous” quest for
power.1233 Patterson was adamant that the Douglas government was intent on destroying
people’s individual freedoms. For example, Patterson characterized the government’s
decision to broadcast the 1945 throne speech without the legislature’s approval as a
“further step in the direction of centralization and control of all power and authority in
the Government, a road to serfdom.”1234 Similarly, Patterson was critical of the CCF’s
Bill of Rights.1235 Not only did the leader of the opposition believe that British
constitutional traditions provided minority protections, but he thought that it was a farce
coming from a government which avowed “interference with the liberties and freedoms
of the people” and had displayed “absolute indifference to individual rights.”1236
Saskatchewan’s conservatives were disheartened with the election results but they did not
interpret Patterson’s failure as a defeat for their ideology. In the election’s post-mortem,
the Leader-Post articulated the thoughts of many of the province’s conservative voters:
“the fact that the party suppressed its socialism in the campaign, does not alter its basic
philosophy. That remains socialism.”1237 The 1944 election was certainly a victory for
the CCF’s collectivist ethos. Yet, to equate the election as a confirmation of
Saskatchewan’s “social democratic” political culture requires one to turn a blind eye to
those who remained steadfast in their adherence self-reliance, and traditional values.
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Conclusion
It is commonly accepted that Saskatchewan and Alberta constitute twins separated at
birth. Although the provinces possessed similar demographics, economies, and
experiences in territorial politics, we are told that whereas “Alberta tilts right,
Saskatchewan tilts left.”1238 Election results certainly lend credence to this assumption.
Alberta has continually elected a long series of right-of-centre governments, beginning
with Social Credit in 1935, followed by the PCs in 1971, and most recently the United
Conservative Party in 2019. In contrast, Saskatchewan’s 1944 election ushered in a longperiod of CCF/NDP dominance wherein social democratic governments have ruled for
forty-seven of the last seventy-five years. As this study demonstrates, however,
Saskatchewan has always been more conservative than historians have suggested. To
argue that Saskatchewan conservatism was a non-factor due to its inability to the CCF’s
rise in 1944 assumes that elections serve as the sole barometer of ideological
commitment.
Social democracy was not Saskatchewan’s default setting. The province has always been
home to a dynamic and influential conservatism that was predicated on a defence of
individual rights and freedoms. This does not mean that conservatism was static. As the
central political issues shifted over time, so too did the way that conservatives expressed
their understanding of the economy, society, and role of the state. Challenges to the
capitalist wheat economy and the place of religious and ethnic minorities dominated the
political discourse prior to the Great Depression. These issues, one economic, the other
social, resonated with conservatives as they responded by entrenching in their belief in
the societies fundamentally individualistic values. Conservative farmers, on the one
hand, opposed orderly marketing because it was based on an understanding of the
capitalist system as being inherently exploitative. Envisioning themselves as “masters of
their own fate,” conservative farmers believed that they were able to effectively compete
within the capitalist system. In fact, they attributed their own success in large part to the
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very competition which supporters of orderly marketing sought to eliminate. British
nativists, on the other hand, viewed racial and religious minorities as lacking the
necessary cultural and social prerequisites to act individually. Both the Orange Lodge
and the KKK promoted a vision for society wherein Britishness and Protestantism were
the central elements of belonging. As a result, they viewed minority groups with
suspicion and treated them as deficient individuals who were unable to fully take part in
the body politic.
The economic and environmental strife associated with the Great Depression
dramatically altered Saskatchewan’s political discourse. Issues surrounding debt
amelioration and relief replaced the earlier experiments with orderly marketing and
concerns over the rate of minority assimilation. The decade also gave rise to a new
political movement that was predicated on a rejection of individualism in favour of
collectivism. The CCF’s rise and ultimate victory is certainly a central element of
Saskatchewan’s political history of the Great Depression. It would be a mistake,
however, to assume that the increasing support for a socially democratic solution meant a
wholesale abandonment of conservative values. Throughout the Depression
conservatives retrenched their belief in the society’s individualistic nature. This was
evident in the emergence and support given to conservative religious schools. It was also
reflected in the continued support the Liberals received as William Patterson offered a
decidedly conservative response to both the CCF and Social Credit.
Saskatchewan, in short, was much more conservative than historians have previously
accepted. Yet, the question remains of why academics have insisted that Saskatchewan
developed a distinctly socially democratic political culture? Part of the problem stems
from an overreliance on electoral results as the barometer of ideological affiliation. It
was certainly the case that the Saskatchewan Conservative Party struggled for much of
the province’s early history. It is equally true, however, that electoral failures do not tell
the entire story. The Conservative Party did not falter because conservative ideology
failed to flourish in the province. Rather, the party failed because of superior Liberal
organization that divided conservatives. From Saskatchewan’s creation in 1905, the
Liberals worked tirelessly to build its support amongst the province’s conservative
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farmers. At the same time, the Liberals rejected the anti-Catholicism and conception of a
racially-based citizenship emanating from the nativist movement. The Conservative
Party’s criticism of separate schools and support for assimilation earned it the approval of
the Orange Lodge and KKK, but the party failed to gain electoral traction with the
province’s independent farmers who supported the Liberals. The 1929 election (the
Conservative’s sole success prior to 1982) was not solely the product of rising racial and
religious tensions but the party’s ability to briefly unite disparate conservatives into a
single movement. To write off Saskatchewan conservatism as ineffective is to
misconstrue the nature of electoral politics themselves. The Liberal Party’s impressive
record of election victories prior to 1944 was based, in no small part, on its appeals to
conservative’s individualism.
The second element leading observers to downplay the strength of Saskatchewan’s
conservatism revolves around defining the ideology itself. Modern conservatism is
viewed as an amalgam of a tory-inspired vision of hierarchy and tradition and a
neoconservative focus on individual rights and freedoms. As Nelson Wiseman explains
“tories see individuals as members of communities…neoconservatives, like classical
liberals, see communities as associations of individuals.”1239 Although it is widely
accepted that this neoconservative position has dominated Saskatchewan’s recent politics,
it is viewed as a modern phenomenon confined to the period after the rise of Margaret
Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Brian Mulroney in the 1980s. As a result, attempts to
locate Canadian conservatism prior to the Second World War focus almost exclusively on
its tory strain. The fact that Saskatchewan has never been home to a strong tory element
leads to the assumption that conservatism did not flourish prior to CCF’s victory in 1944.
Saskatchewan was home to a vibrant conservative ideology, just not one that was torytouched. Like modern neoconservatives, this ideology sought to protect individual
freedoms against what they viewed as a rising collectivist sentiment. Saskatchewan
conservatives internalized the individuality central to classical liberalism. Conservatives
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viewed society as a collection of individuals, each responsible for their own choices and
ensuring their own success. Privileging individualism placed them within Canada’s
liberal order, but it was their staunch opposition to any attempt to undermine this
individualism that made them conservative. Conservative farmers internalized the “myth
of the self-made man” and attributed their successes to their ability to compete effectively
in the capitalist market as individuals. Conservative farmers’ desire to protect this
freedom of individual action lay at the heart of their opposition to orderly marketing.
This conception of an individually-based society was also at the heart of Saskatchewan’s
British nativist nationalism. Both the Orange Lodge and the KKK considered
Saskatchewan’s British and Protestant makeup as a prerequisite for a person’s ability to
act as an individual and exercise effective citizenship. Their conspiratorial antiCatholicism and attacks on separate schools reflected this belief. This adherence to
society’s individualist nature also survived through the Great Depression and Canada’s
crisis in capitalism. Historians often view the depravations of the 1930s as fueling
support for the CCF’s vision of a “co-operative commonwealth,” but the same conditions
also motivated many people to retrench their defence of individual freedoms. Both BBI
and Notre Dame emerged at the height of the Depression as champions of a conservative
Christianity that downplayed collectivism in favour of individual action. This
individualist conservatism may not have been powerful enough to prevent the CCF’s
1944 victory, but it remained influential nonetheless.
This study focused on the development of a Saskatchewan conservatism, but its
significance is not limited to a single province alone. If nothing else, it demonstrates the
need to rethink previous assumptions about the nature of Canadian politics. A reliance
on the “tory touched” thesis has distorted our understanding of the nature of Canadian
politics generally, and conservatism more specifically. Further research is required to
understand the nature of conservatism both in other provinces as well as how they
interacted between provinces and with their federal counterparts. Likewise, it
demonstrates the need to rethink our previous assumptions about dominant Canadian
political cultures. Just as Saskatchewan has always been more conservative than
academics have suggested, other provinces’ political histories are more complicated than
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assumed. Ideas of a “conservative” Alberta, for instance, overshadow the province’s
deep history of contributions to Canada’s social democracy.1240
A defence of individualism and opposition to collectivism provides a bridge between
Saskatchewan’s modern conservatism and its political history. The CCF’s successes
undoubtedly changed Saskatchewan’s political debate after 1944. Further research is
necessary on the development of Saskatchewan conservatism after the Second World
War. What is clear from this study, however, is that the understanding that Saskatchewan
somehow contained a uniquely social democratic political culture has outlived its
usefulness. Saskatchewan elected the country’s first “socialist” government in 1944, but
the success of the CCF has overshadowed an influential conservative movement. The
dichotomy between a “social democratic” Saskatchewan and a “conservative” Alberta is
at best, an over simplification. Both provinces have always been much more similar than
election results suggest or historians have assumed.
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